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Issue 1, 1999
Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas
El Paso Branch
Mexico's Economy in 1998 and 1999
Mexico's economy in the second half
of the 1990s has experienced some dramatic moments, which
essentially started with an unexpected peso devaluation in
December 1994. This was followed in 1995 by the most severe
economic crisis Mexico has witnessed since the 1930s. Yet,
later that year a recovery was already under way, which solidified
in 1996 and 1997. Then, in 1998, Mexico was hit by several
external shocks that pushed the economy into lower-than-expected
growth and higher-than-expected inflation. This article examines
Mexico's 1998 economic performance and discusses this year's
outlook.
Key Macroeconomic Indicators in 1998
Three external shocks impacted
Mexico's economy in 1998. First, as a result of the Asian
financial crisis, which started in 1997 and continued into
1998, other emerging economies such as Mexico's saw their
capital inflows reduced through the so-called contagion effect.
Second, the price of oil dropped sharply in international
markets throughout the year (Chart 1), which affected Mexico's
public finances since oil revenues represent about a third
of total government revenues. Finally, Russia's debt default
in August sent shock waves throughout emerging economies as
international investors once again withdrew from these countries.
Mexico was not immune to this new round of contagion effects,
suffering a downturn in its capital inflows. Chart 2 shows
the decreased portfolio investments received by Mexico and
other selected regions in 1998 relative to the previous two
years.
Despite this adverse external environment,
Mexico emerged in 1998 with healthy 4.8-percent gross domestic
product (GDP) growth (Chart 3). Though this rate was lower
than original expectations of over 5 percent, it still placed
Mexico among the fastest growing economies in 1998. Of the
34 countries listed in Table 1, only four—Ireland, China,
India and Taiwan—outperformed Mexico in GDP growth last
year.
On the inflation front, Mexico finished
the year with a higher-than-expected rate of 18.6 percent.
Despite the Mexican authorities' efforts to keep inflation
down by following the appropriate fiscal and monetary policies,
they were unable to fully control the negative effects of
contagion on this indicator. Last year's inflation was not
only higher than the previous year's, it also exceeded the
government's 1998 target of 12 percent (Chart 4 ).
The 1998 performance of other
key macroeconomic indicators was as follows:
Interest Rates. Both
the 28-day Cetes rate and the average interbank interest rate
(TIIP) were higher in 1998 than in 1997. As Chart 5 shows,
both benchmark interest rates hovered around 20 percent for
the first seven months of the year. Mexican interest rates
surged in response to Russia's August debt moratorium and
spiked in September to 41 percent. During the last quarter,
however, interest rates eased from their September peak. The
Cetes and TIIP rates averaged 24.7 percent and 26.7 percent,
respectively, in 1998, up from 19.8 percent and 21.2 percent
in 1997.
Exchange Rate. As
with interest rates, Russia's debt default was a key element
in the performance of the peso-dollar exchange rate in 1998.
Moreover, the two other external factors—the declining
price of oil and the lingering effects of the Asian crisis—contributed
to the volatility exhibited by this indicator for most of
1998. While the exchange rate averaged 8.2 pesos per dollar
in January, it lost ground during the following months and
slipped considerably in August (Chart 6). Though the exchange
rate stabilized thereafter, the year-end rate equaled 9.9
pesos per dollar, a depreciation of 22 percent relative to
year-end 1997.
Budget Deficit. Mexico's
1998 budget deficit target, announced at the beginning of
the year, was 1.25 percent of GDP. Given this tight percent.
Conversely, Mexico's open unemployment rate has come down
since 1995. Last year, the rate fell to 3.2 percent, below
the 1997 rate as well as the rate prevailing before the 1995
crisis (Chart 8 ). Although this is certainly good news for
Mexico, it should be kept in mind that these figures pertain
to a narrow definition of unemployment. Other measures depict
a higher unemployment and underemployment picture, though
even these indicators have improved since 1995 (see box titled "Mexican Unemployment Measures").
Consumption and Investment.
Two important components of growth
in 1998 were private consumer demand and private investment.
Last year, private consumption grew 6.4 percent, consolidating
growth of over 6 percent reached in 1997. Boosting consumption
in 1998 were employment growth, double-digit salary increases
and lower household debt. Total investment last year managed
healthy growth of 10.7 percent, thanks to 17-percent growth
in private investment. Public investment, as expected, dropped
significantly in 1998 (by -20.4 percent) as a result of the
impact of lower oil prices on public revenues.
Retail Sales. Last
year's retail sales performance reflected the healthy growth
in consumption. Retail sales grew 8 percent in 1998, their
strongest showing since the 1995 crisis, when they shrank
almost 19 percent (Chart 9).
International Trade. Mexico
recorded a $7.7 billion trade deficit last year, the result
of $117.5 billion in exports and $125.2 billion in imports
(Chart 10). While total export growth slowed substantially
in 1998, import growth remained strong. Exports grew only
6.4 percent in 1998, down from 15 percent the previous year.
The downturn in this indicator was strongly affected by the
drop in the value of oil exports due to 4 fiscal policy objective,
Mexico was forced to cut its budget three times during the
year in response to the reduction in public oil revenues brought
about by the plummeting oil prices. Mexico was successful
in controlling its public finances last year: the actual budget
deficit was 1.24 percent of GDP.
Employment and Unemployment. Employment
grew 8 percent in 1998, equaling the 1997 rate and surpassing
the 1996 rate (Chart 7 ). Employment has been rising since Mexico's
1995 economic crisis, when it declined more than 4 depressed
oil prices. Exports of manufactured goods, for example, continued
strong in 1998, with nearly 12 percent growth. Total merchandise
imports, on the other hand, managed double-digit growth of over
14 percent last year. Especially strong were consumption goods
imports, which grew over 19 percent and reflected the economy's
overall strong consumer demand.
Foreign Direct Investment and International
Reserves. Although the external
shocks Mexico suffered last year negatively affected its portfolio
investment, they did not dampen Mexico's ability to attract
long-term foreign direct investment. Foreign direct investment
totaled more than $10 billion in 1998 (Chart 11), contributing
to Mexico's gain in international reserves last year despite
the country's volatile short-term capital inflows. International
reserves at year-end 1998 were $30.1 billion, an increase
of over $2 billion from year-end 1997.
1999 Performance and Outlook
The Exchange Rate, Interest Rates and
the Price of Oil. Two weeks
into 1999, Mexico faced yet another external shock. On January
13, Brazil devalued its currency, the real, by 8 percent;
yet by January 15, given the market's negative reaction to
this development, Brazil was forced to allow the real to float
freely in the exchange rate markets.
The expected contagion on Mexico's financial
markets quickly materialized as the peso weakened considerably
during those days (Chart 12 ). Interestingly, however, though
the contagion this time stemmed from a country within the
same region, the negative effects on Mexico were relatively
short-lived. Just a week after the Brazilian real's devaluation,
the peso regained stability and has strengthened considerably
ever since. Thus, after dipping to a rate of 10.6 pesos per
dollar on January 14, four months later—on May 14—the
exchange rate traded at 9.3 pesos per dollar.
It is apparent that with the Brazilian
crisis, international investors differentiated more among
emerging markets and, recognizing Mexico's overall solid fundamentals,
decided not to exit the country as they had during Russia's
debt default in 1998. Hence, rather than spreading, contagion
this time was quickly contained. Interest rates in Mexico,
for example, followed the same path as the exchange rate—rebounding
in mid-January but subsequently declining (Chart 13 ). The
rates for Cetes and TIIP reached 19.8 and 22.93, respectively,
on May 28.
A stabilizing influence on Mexico's
economic performance this year has been the oil price recovery.
While in January the average export price of Mexican oil averaged
$8.61 per barrel, by early May it had gone up to $14.96 per
barrel. And though the price has come down somewhat since
then, it remains considerably above its level near the start
of the year (Chart 14 ). Thus, unlike in 1998, when Mexico
was having to adapt its public-finance situation to accommodate
a declining oil price, so far this year Mexico has enjoyed
a favorable oil-price scenario.
Even though this year the external environment
has not caused the uncertainty it did last year for the Mexican
economy, it is not inconceivable that some shocks may still
emerge before year-end. One external development that negatively
impacted Mexico's financial markets occurred in the latter
part of May. Argentina was rumored to be moving toward abandoning
its currency board with the U.S. dollar, which caused the
peso to weaken to 9.786 on May 27. But, as was the case last
year, Mexican authorities are expected to act with the proper
fiscal or monetary policies, or both, to contain any negative
effects of this or any other external shock.
Other Key Macroeconomic Indicators
First quarter 1999 figures show
Mexico's real GDP annual growth at 1.9 percent. Compared with
previous quarters, this marks a deceleration in Mexico's growth
(Chart 15 ). Industrial production, for example, recorded
annual growth of 1.8 percent in the first quarter after advancing
6.6 percent last year. However, fixed capital investment showed
a healthy performance in the first three months of 1999, with
annual growth of over 3 percent. Moreover, employment in the
same period grew at an annual rate of 6.4 percent, while the
open unemployment rate averaged 2.9 percent. Maquiladora employment
continued strong in the first quarter, with annual growth
of 10.4 percent. [1]
On the trade front, although annual
growth in both exports and imports was quite slow in January,
it picked up in the following months. Export growth surpassed
import growth slightly during the first quarter of the year
at 6.5 percent and 4.1 percent, respectively.
Retail sales in the first three months
of 1999 registered annual growth of just over 1 percent, due
largely to stagnant growth in January (0.7 percent) and negative
growth in February (-0.1 percent). March, however, showed
an important rebound as annual growth in this indicator equaled
2.7 percent.
Finally, monthly inflation has been
on a downward trend since the beginning of the year (Chart
16 ). The April rate recorded by the consumer price index
was 0.92 percent. The rate in May's first two weeks was 0.24
percent relative to the previous two-week period—the
lowest two-week gain since 1994.
Outlook
Mexico's economic growth in 1999
is expected to be below last year's, while inflation is expected
to improve relative to 1998. The official 1999 targets for
GDP growth and inflation are 3 percent and 13 percent, respectively.
Private-sector forecasts, on the other hand, show lower growth
and higher inflation. However, as Table 2 shows, expectations
by private-sector analysts have been improving since the beginning
of the year as their forecasts in May placed growth higher—and
inflation lower—relative to January. Obviously, the Mexican
economy's favorable performance in the first five months is
increasing analysts' optimism about their year-end outlooks.
In a more regional perspective, of the
three biggest economies in Latin America—Brazil, Mexico
and Argentina—only Mexico will record positive growth
in 1999. According to the International Monetary Fund, both
Brazil and Argentina will be in recession this year, with
their economies expected to contract 3.8 percent and 1.5 percent,
respectively.
Conclusion
Mexico was one of the fastest growing
economies last year. Although Mexico's economy was subject
to a series of external shocks throughout 1998, authorities
responded with the proper fiscal and monetary policies to
contain the adverse effects of these developments. The net
outcome for the country was lower-than-expected growth and
higher-than-expected inflation.
In 1999, Mexico has met with a
more favorable set of external conditions. Moreover, authorities
continue to pursue sound fiscal and monetary policies. This
combination will allow Mexico to continue growing this year
under a less inflationary scenario.
—Lucinda Vargas
Mexican
Unemployment Measures
Mexico's open unemployment
rate has a very narrow definition. It is derived
from considering as employed anybody who worked
at least one hour in the week before the unemployment
survey is applied to Mexican households. Therefore,
the open unemployment rate would not capture a
large portion of the unemployed or underemployed
in Mexico. Other unemployment indicators, however,
incorporate broader definitions of unemployment
and better reflect Mexico's true unemployment
and underemployment conditions. These complementary
unemployment rates, together with the open unemployment
rate, are defined below.[1]
Open unemployment rate
(U1). The percentage
of openly unemployed people in the economically
active population (EAP). The EAP in Mexico includes
people 12 years and older who, at the time of
the reference survey period, did not work at least
one hour during the week, but who were either
seeking employment or were trying to become self-employed.
Alternative open unemployment
rate (U2). The
openly unemployed plus those in the economically
inactive population who have stopped looking for
a job and instead decided to stay home or pursue
studies, but who were available for employment.
Also included in this definition are those people
who will be starting a job in the four weeks after
the reference survey period.
Real economic pressure
rate (U3). The
proportion of people in the EAP who were unemployed
or who were employed but looking for a second
job.
Real preference pressure
rate (U4). The
openly unemployed and those people in the EAP
who were employed but who were seeking to switch
jobs.
General pressure rate
(U5). The openly
unemployed and those people in the EAP who were
seeking either second job or to switch jobs.
Part-time employment less
than 15 hours unemployment rate (U6). The
openly unemployed those people in the EAP who
worked less than 15 hours during the reference
week.
Part-time employment due
to market conditions and unemployment rate (U7).
The openly unemployed
and those people in the EAP who, because of market
conditions, worked less than 35 hours during the
reference week.
Part-time employment less
than 35 hours unemployment rate (U8). The
openly unemployed the proportion of people in
the EAP who worked less 35 hours a week.
Employment at less than
the minimum wage unemployment rate (U9).
The openly unemployed
the proportion of people in the EAP who were employed
during the reference week but who earned less
than minimum wage. Critical conditions of employment
rate (U10). proportion of the employed who worked
less than hours per week due to market conditions,
those worked more than 35 hours per week but earned
than the minimum wage, and/or those who worked
than 48 hours per week but earned less than two
minimum wages.
General rate of employment
needs (U11). The
proportion of people in the economically active
and inactive populations who were openly unemployed
during reference survey period but who were available
to even if they have stopped searching for a job,
who start a job soon, who were employed but were
seeking either a second job or to switch jobs,
or who worked than 15 hours during the reference
week. The chart shows the trend in Mexico's open
unemployment rate and in its 10 complementary
unemployment indicators during 1990-98. All complementary
indicators show higher unemployment rates for
Mexico throughout the period. Also, though all
unemployment indicators rose during the 1995 economic
crisis, all have come down since then so that,
in general, it can said that Mexico's overall
unemployment situation improved since 1995. Still,
it can be somewhat misleading to talk about 3.2-percent
open unemployment rate in 1998 (U1) when, In the
same year, for example, 13.6 percent of the population
was either unemployed or underemployed because
they worked less than 35 hours per week or earned
than the minimum wage (U10).
- The definitions are from Instituto
Nacional de Estadística, Geografía
Informática (INEGI), the official source
for unemployment data in Mexico. Also, for a
comprehensive analysis of unemployment indicators
in Mexico, see Susan Fleck and Constance Sorrentino,
"Employment Unemployment in Mexico's Labor
Force," Monthly Labor Review, Bureau of
Labor Statistics, November 1994.
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| About the Author
Vargas is a senior economist
at the El Paso Branch of the Federal Reserve Bank
of Dallas.
Note
- For a review of the maquiladora industry's
performance through 1998, see Business Frontier,
Issues 3 and 4, 1998. Business Frontier
is published four times a year by the El Paso
Branch of the Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas.
About Business Frontier
Business Frontier
is published by the El Paso Branch of the Federal
Reserve Bank of Dallas. The views expressed are
those of the author and do not necessarily reflect
the positions of the Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas
or the Federal Reserve System.
Subscriptions are available
free of charge. Please direct requests for subscriptions,
back issues and address changes to the Public
Affairs Department, El Paso Branch, Federal Reserve
Bank of Dallas, 301 E. Main St., El Paso, TX 79901-1326;
call 915-521-5235 or 915-521-5233; fax 915-521-5228; or subscribe
via the Internet at www.dallasfed.org.
Articles may be reprinted
on the condition that the source is credited and
a copy of the publication containing the reprinted
material is provided to the Research Department,
El Paso Branch, Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas.
Editor: Lucinda Vargas
Publications Director: Kay Champagne
Copy Editors: Jennifer Afflerbach and Monica Reeves
Design: Gene Autry
Layout & Production: Laura J. Bell |
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