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November 2001
Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas
Houston Branch
Petrochemical
Outlook Still Bleak for 2002
Economic growth along the Texas Gulf
Coast is now slowing rapidly. Weak demand for oil and natural
gas, both at home and abroad, has put downward pressure on
oil and gas prices and taken the steam out of drilling and
oil exploration activity. The domestic rig count, which rose
to 1,278 in July, has fallen to near 1,000 working rigs in
recent weeks and seems likely to decline further as we enter
the coming year. This loss of momentum in drilling removes
the single factor that has kept Houston and the Gulf Coast
growing, even as the U.S. and global economies moved to the
brink of recession.
This article looks at the other end
of the oil industry—the downstream petrochemical and refining
industries and particularly petrochemicals. The economics
here are the reverse of upstream, where falling energy prices
reduce exploration activity. In contrast, falling energy prices
are good news downstream. They reduce the cost of feedstock
and of energy used to run chemical processes and often result
in higher profits and a wave of capacity expansion. Over long
periods, the combination of upstream drilling and downstream
chemicals and refining provides a nice balance to the Gulf
Coast regional economy.
As oil and gas prices weaken, can downstream
profits and related construction provide a significant boost
to the regional economy? Unfortunately, the answer is no,
at least not through next year. The advantages of lower feedstock
costs are not enough to offset weak demand and serious overcapacity
for many petrochemicals. Despite the decline of natural gas
prices to the $2–$3 range, the outlook is for weak petrochemical
profits and limited expansion in 2002.
Feedstock Prices
Last winter, some of the coldest
weather of the previous 100 years put natural gas prices on
a wild ride. In January, prices received by Gulf Coast gas producers
briefly pushed to near $10 per million Btu (MMBtu) and remained
above $5 for most of the heating season. The deregulation of
natural gas in the late 1980s left a substantial oversupply
of gas production capacity in the United States, and the typical
price remained near $2 per MMBtu for much of the decade.
Demand for natural gas grew rapidly
in the late 1990s, however, led by a strong economy, by the
fuel’s environmentally friendly features and especially by
its use in electric power production. The winter price spike
of 2000–01 was widely read by many as the end of the
natural gas glut in the United States and the beginning of
a new era of higher natural gas prices, needed to bring new
reserves into production.
Natural gas prices, however, have steadily
weakened throughout this year, and inventories have risen
to the highest levels of the past decade. From May to September,
natural gas was injected into storage at rates 53 percent
higher than last year and 39 percent higher than 1999. Working
gas in storage in October was 15.6 percent higher than last
year, according to the Department of Energy. These growing
inventories pushed gas prices below $4 in May, below $3 in
August and briefly below $2 in October. Forecasts of another
very cold winter have now pulled gas prices back near $3.
U.S. and Canadian petrochemical producers
have historically relied on relatively cheap and abundant
natural gas liquids as an important competitive advantage
over the rest of the world. Outside North America, petrochemicals
are typically produced from naphtha, a light distillate found
in oil. Naphtha’s price is set in world oil markets. For much
of the 1990s, the price advantage between natural gas liquids
(with prices highly correlated to natural gas) and naphtha
(correlated to oil) fell squarely in favor of natural gas.
The typical price ratio in the 1990s was 10:1 (for example,
$20 per barrel for oil and $2 per MMBtu for gas), yielding
substantially more raw material per dollar from gas.
The run-up in natural gas prices last
winter seemed to threaten the existing competitive balance
between U.S. producers and the rest of the world. A U.S. location
brings many advantages beyond price: access to the world’s
largest market, political stability, a highly developed pipeline
system, and cheap, plentiful storage capacity in salt caverns.
However, assuming that world oil markets were to remain in
their historical range of $17–$22, a natural gas price
of $3–$4 would provide rough parity between natural
gas and naphtha for the production of ethylene, for example,
and take away any U.S. feedstock cost advantage based on natural
gas.
How much have Gulf Coast chemical producers
benefited from the recent fall in natural gas prices? Table
1 shows the cost of producing ethylene, the key chemical building
block on the Gulf Coast, from either natural gas-based ethane
or light naphtha. As the price of natural gas fell from near
$5 in May to near $2 in September, the cost advantage returned
to ethane by July. However, the combination of an October
rise in gas prices to $3 (following a forecast of cold winter
weather) and a decrease in crude oil prices from $30 per barrel
to $20 (as prospects for economic growth dimmed after the
Sept. 11 attacks) pushed the advantage back to the oil side.
Somewhat surprisingly, despite the long slide in natural gas
prices, ethane is again at a cost disadvantage relative to
naphtha. It is not the price of natural gas but the price
of gas relative to oil that counts.
| Table 1 |
Ethylene Production Costs Based on
Two Feedstocks, 2001
(Cents per pound) |
|
|
Ethane |
Naphtha |
| May |
19.5 |
17.8 |
| June |
16.6 |
16.3 |
| July |
15.2 |
15.7 |
| August |
15.0 |
17.4 |
| September |
14.1 |
17.2 |
| October |
13.4 |
12.2 |
|
| SOURCE: CMAI, Inc. |
Does the inventory buildup over the
summer indicate that the overhang in gas production capacity
has returned? Is the gas bubble back? All the data are not
in, but what are available indicate that most of the gas that
went into storage this summer was the result of a weak economy,
not a surge in supplies from new gas reserves. It seems likely
this current gas glut can be cured with a rebound in U.S.
economic growth, presumably in a matter of months and not
the years that were needed to work off the gas surplus of
the 1990s.
Overcapacity
Current high levels of overcapacity
in the U.S. petrochemical industry are the product of two
factors: the quantity of chemicals shipped is shrinking along
with the U.S. industrial sector, and new capacity is coming
online. Keeping our ethylene example, Figure 1 shows long-term
trends in both ethylene capacity and the quantity of ethylene
sold to customers each year. U.S. ethylene shipments peaked
at 56 billion pounds in 1999, after averaging annual growth
rates of 4.8 percent during 1990–99. Ethylene capacity
in 1999 was in balance at 58 billion pounds.
In 2000, U.S. ethylene markets shrank
by 1.5 percent, to 55 billion pounds, and in 2001 they may
shrink by nearly 10 percent, to 50 billion pounds. Meanwhile,
ethylene capacity is growing in the United States, the product
of a number of projects announced in the late 1990s and only
now coming onstream. By the end of this year, capacity will
reach 62 billion pounds, leaving nearly 20 percent of U.S.
capacity idle.
The immediate effect of this overcapacity
has been to drive profit margins to very low levels. As Table
1 indicates, the cost of producing ethylene fell by nearly
one-third between May and October as the cost of natural gas
came down. However, the glut of capacity meant that producers
were unable to hold on to any of the increased profit margins
because ethylene’s price fell as quickly as the cost of production.
Restoring balance between capacity and
the quantity of ethylene demanded will not come easily or
quickly. Perhaps the most certain element in filling the gap
is the recovery of the U.S. economy, although the timing and
pace of recovery are still unknown. Although the events of
Sept. 11 have clouded our crystal balls, we still have every
reason to expect solid U.S. economic growth to resume next
year.
The last comparable glut of ethylene
overcapacity came in the early 1980s (see Figure 1), and it
was in large part managed by the closure of a number of older,
inefficient facilities. In fact, it was 1989 before capacity
returned to the 1980 preclosure levels. Closures are also
likely to play a significant role in eliminating excess capacity
this time.
Poor profits will make routine maintenance
decisions difficult for older and inefficient plants. In the
Houston–Galveston and Beaumont–Port Arthur areas,
plant closures are likely to be accelerated by the recent
adoption of a state implementation plan to comply with air
quality standards for ozone by 2007. Although the plan still
lacks final Environmental Protection Agency approval, its
goal is to reduce plant emissions of nitrogen oxides (NOX)
by 90 percent except in grandfathered plants built before
1971, where the targeted emission reduction is 50 percent.
Credits for NOX reductions can be earned through the shutdown
of older, less efficient plants and then applied to other
facilities to reduce the cost of their NOX compliance. With
some companies facing bills well in excess of $100 million
to bring their southeast Texas plants into compliance, hard
decisions are likely to be made and plants closed.
Finally, the current pace of expansion
of new facilities is running at a very low level. Figure 2
shows the number of new hydrocarbon processing projects announced
in Texas and Louisiana from 1986 through the present. Since
1997–98, the number of projects has trended steadily
downward to its current low level. For ethylene, only three
recent expansion announcements are in the works, with none
coming online after 2004.
This low level of petrochemical and
other downstream construction leaves a significant void in
the Texas Gulf Coast’s economic outlook. Downstream petrochemical
plants are normally a dominant feature of the region’s heavy
construction. The bleak near-term outlook for petrochemical
construction in 2002 is simply one more reflection of the
industry’s current poor profitability and cash flows, with
few prospects for a near-term turnaround.
—Mark Eramo, Robert W. Gilmer and Arved
Teleki
| About the Authors
Eramo is director of light
olefins and Teleki is chief economist at CMAI,
Inc., Houston. |
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Houston
Beige Book
November 2001
The Houston economy continues to slow.
Over the past six months, job growth has fallen to a 1.5 percent
annual rate. Since July the Baker Hughes rig count has dropped
by nearly 300 working rigs, clearly demonstrating that the
drilling boom is over. The Houston Purchasing Managers Index,
which has lost 10 points in the last three months, indicates
that local mining and manufacturing are shrinking for the
first time in two years.
Retail and Auto Sales
Department stores report that they
are steadily falling behind plan and that sales are running
4 to 5 percent below expectations. Furniture stores also saw
sales soften in October as the effects of Tropical Storm Allison
began to fade. Food stores report a surge in sales because
consumers are eating out less and eating in more. October
auto sales set a record, thanks to zero percent financing
and other consumer incentives. Year-to-date sales are now
equal to last year’s record pace.
Energy Prices
Crude oil prices moved in a narrow
range near $21–$22 throughout October. Price movements
were primarily in response to speculation about OPEC production
cuts. Markets have also become sensitive to economic news
since Sept. 11, with fears that a global recession will bring
a collapse in oil demand. Crude, gasoline and distillate inventories
all rose during October. Jet fuel demand fell 15 percent below
year-earlier levels. It now seems to have stabilized and may
even have been turning around in late October.
As a result of weak demand and high
inventories, the price of natural gas slipped briefly under
$2 per MMBtu in late September. The price bounced sharply
to over $3 after a long-range forecast of a very cold winter,
then fell back as weather turned unseasonably warm across
the country.
Refining and Petrochemicals
Refiners increased output as the
fall turnaround season passed. Profit margins fell slightly
in October from September’s moderate levels. By late October,
crude prices had stabilized and product prices were continuing
to fall, putting more downward pressure on margins. Petrochemical
producers saw little change in their situation. A combination
of weak demand and a large overhang of capacity kept profits
depressed. Lower natural gas prices reduced costs, but overcapacity
meant the cost savings were simply passed on to customers.
Drilling and Oil Services
Conditions continue to weaken in
the oil service industry. The number of rigs working in the
United States slid to near 1,000 by early November, and prices
for oil services have come under pressure. Day rates for rigs
working shallow gulf waters have collapsed. Work in deeper
waters, as well as foreign drilling activity, continues at
a healthy pace, helping maintain oil service company revenues.
These companies are delaying layoffs in hope that a quick
rebound in the U.S. economy will revive natural gas demand
and boost gas prices.
| About Houston
Business
For more information or
copies of this publication, contact Bill Gilmer
at (713) 652-1546 or bill.gilmer@dal.frb.org,
or write to Bill Gilmer, Houston Branch, Federal
Reserve Bank of Dallas, P.O. Box 2578, Houston,
Texas 77252. This publication is available on
the Internet at www.dallasfed.org.
The views expressed are
those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect
the positions of the Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas
or the Federal Reserve System. |
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