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Issue 4, July/August 2002
Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas
Insurance: A Risk to the Economy?
Most people don't appreciate insurance
until they need it. Or can't get it. Last year was a difficult
one for the insurance industry. An unprecedented surge of
catastrophic claims left the industry reeling.[1] In response
to the unexpected rise in claims and weaker investment opportunities,
the insurance industry cut back coverage and sharply increased
premium rates.
Insurance is a valuable financial tool
that boosts economic activity. By purchasing insurance, individuals
and businesses share the risk of making investments and engaging
in activities that they perceive as too risky to pursue on
their own. Homeowners, automobile drivers, doctors and businesses
can pay regular premiums to reduce the expense of an unpredictable
event.
The insurance industry is an integral
part of the economy. Insurance is required for operating a
business and, in most states, for purchasing a home or automobile.
Increases in insurance costs are taking a bite out of corporate
profits and consumers' paychecks. Recent changes in the industry
have made this financial tool more expensive and more difficult
to obtain, which could reduce investment and slow the economic
recovery.
The Economics of Insurance: Life's
a Gamble
Most economic activities involve
risk. Our society has developed mechanisms for reducing the
amount of risk people bear from day to day. Futures markets,
hedge funds and insurance are examples. By transferring risk
to others, these mechanisms make it easier for people to make
decisions when there is uncertainty.
To purchase insurance, an individual
or business pays a fixed price to an insurer, who promises
to pay a lump sum or periodic payments if a covered event
happens within a specified time period (usually 12 months).
For example, property owners buy insurance that will compensate
them for a future loss, such as fire or theft. The risk of
loss is transferred from the property owner to the insurance
company.
The cost of the insurance—the premium—is
calculated so that, on average, it is sufficient to pay the
present value of expected future claims plus administrative
costs and profit. Actuaries estimate the risk involved and
determine the appropriate premium based on the level of risk.[2]
Some risks are more difficult to estimate than others. Historical
loss data are a good predictor of claims for personal automobile
insurance, but catastrophic risks, such as earthquakes and
hurricanes, are very difficult to predict. Other losses, such
as mold, may not be envisioned as a potential large risk when
insurers originally price the coverage. Still other losses
emerge from court decisions that make insurance companies
liable for claims the companies did not anticipate and did
not price into the premium.
Insurers are able to bear the risk of
unpredictable events by pooling a diversified group of customers.
To insure its own risk portfolio, the company issuing the
policy typically sells a percentage of the risk to other insurance
firms, referred to as reinsurance companies. Diversifying
or spreading the risk to reinsurers helps protect the insurer
from catastrophic losses.
Insurance coverage is available for
many types of activities. Individual coverage can be purchased
for life, disability, property, auto and health, while businesses
can be insured for property, workers' compensation, catastrophic
events and business interruption.[3] In recent years, firms
have found innovative ways to use insurance to hedge risk.
Insurance is available to share the risk of potential lawsuits
for company officers and directors. It can hedge losses a
business might incur if it were unable to function.
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An important source of income for insurance
companies—particularly property casualty and life insurers—is
the profits earned from invested premiums. Often companies
use anticipated profits from investment earnings to reduce
premiums to gain market share. Because investment earnings
can be substantial, operating losses—that is, covered claims
—often exceed premium income for several years. For property
casualty insurers, covered claims have exceeded premium income
every year for the past 25 years (Chart 1).
The link between industry income and
premiums contributes to an insurance cycle. This cycle is
affected by many factors, including price competition, the
availability and affordability of reinsurance, regulatory
pressures, unplanned classes of losses and economic conditions.
Insurance companies must maintain an adequate level of income
or capital to cover potential claims. When insurance premium
prices come down due to a limited number of claims or lucrative
investment opportunities or both, the level of capital grows
and the insurance market is referred to as "soft."
High levels of capital and weak demand can lead to loosened
underwriting standards. Competition drives down premium prices,
and coverage is easily available.
When premiums are driven upward, such
as when there is a large number of claims or a poor return
on investment, capital may be depleted and the insurance market
becomes "hard." When the market hardens, premiums
rise and coverage levels decline substantially until capital
is replenished, at which time the market softens and the cycle
resumes.
The cycle most directly affects property
casualty insurers, but it can influence other parts of the
insurance market to the extent that a firm chooses to use
income from one industry segment to finance expansion in others.
Insurance premium rates reflect financial
market conditions as well as underwriting risk because of
the extent to which insurers—particularly property casualty
insurers—rely on investment income. When interest rates are
low, some argue, insurers may not be experiencing a true "underwriting
crisis" based on mispricing the risk but rather a misestimation
of the investment income returns used to offset insufficient
underwriting. There may be some correlation between property
casualty insurance hard markets and trough periods in financial
markets.
The Insurance Industry's Own Catastrophic
Event
The 1990s were good years for those
wanting to purchase insurance and the companies that sold
it. Insurance was readily available and relatively inexpensive.
A raging bull market led to a soft insurance market, in which
insurers used healthy investment returns to hold down premium
costs. Flush with cash, insurance firms sought market share
with less concern for risk.
The insurance market began to harden
in 2000, when growth in investment profits waned with the
economy. By early 2001, faced with growing claims, the industry
was having difficulty offsetting operating losses with investment
income. Lower interest rates weakened earnings from bond holdings,
and stock earnings plateaued. As capital was depleted, insurers
were forced to evaluate risks more carefully, and premium
rates began to rise to more fully reflect potential losses.
Then an unexpected thing happened to
an industry that specializes in helping others deal with the
unexpected. In the midst of a hardening insurance market,
the industry had to absorb an unprecedented catastrophe: September
11. The terrorist attack was the largest single event in any
segment of the industry, including health, workers' compensation,
property, airline liability and the reinsurance market. Catastrophic
losses in 2001 were the highest in the industry's history.[4]
Underwriting losses in the property casualty industry (claims
and administrative fees exceeding premiums) were roughly $50
billion in 2001 (see Chart 1). For the first year
ever, insurers paid more for claims than they collected from
premiums plus investment earnings.
The large volume of 2001 claims and
mounting investment losses drained industry capital and accelerated
the firming of the insurance market. Some of the investments
that had produced hefty gains a couple years earlier were
now reporting substantial losses.[5] Administrative costs
swelled, particularly for property and casualty insurers,
because they need more information from policyholders to properly
classify risk. While insurers must reassess the probability
of terrorism and other catastrophic events, they must also
take more care in classifying other risks. During the 1990s
quest for market share, it was easier for insurance companies
to absorb unexpected losses. Problems with rising noncatastrophic
losses, such as mold and medical liability claims, were also
easier to absorb.
Insurance and reinsurance firms today
can no longer absorb as much risk as they did in the 1990s,
both because the industry has fewer assets to back the risk
and because the risks that previously seemed remote are more
probable now than they were only a few months ago. Terrorism
coverage has become particularly problematic for insurance
firms and businesses. Insurers are generally unwilling to
issue policies for risks they believe are undiversifiable.
While limited coverage is available at high prices, most reinsurance
companies no longer offer terrorism coverage, citing an inability
to project the frequency and magnitude of potential losses.
This leaves primary insurance companies with no way to insure
their risk, while they are locked in to existing policies
until renewal. Further, in some states regulators require
insurers to offer coverage for certain risks, such as workers'
compensation and fire, irrespective of their cause; exclusions
for terrorism are not allowed.
To build capital and rein in exposure,
some firms have stopped issuing policies for certain types
of coverage. Others have drastically reduced coverage or are
issuing policies only to customers perceived as low risk.
Strains on the insurance market are heightening concerns about
rising noncatastrophic claims, particularly in Texas, where
costs for mold and medical malpractice claims have been skyrocketing.
(See the box titled "Big Claims in Texas.")
Big Claims
in Texas
They say that everything
is big in Texas, and the same is true for insurance
claims. And, not surprisingly, insurance premiums.
Texas homeowners pay the highest insurance rates
in the country. Ultimately, insurance rates are
linked to the cost of expected claims, including
the probability of damages and the price of repair.
While the cost of living—and
therefore the price of repair—is relatively low
in Texas, the frequency of insurance claims has
been high compared with other states. Over the
last 50 years, Texas has had more catastrophic
events than any other state.[1] Hurricanes, hailstorms,
floods, tornadoes and high winds—Texas has had
them all, and all cause significant property damage.
Texas also has some of the
most generous home insurance policy provisions
in the country. (State laws govern the provisions
of policies insurers can issue.) For example,
if a Texas homeowner's roof is damaged, it is
fully replaced even if the roof was old and in
poor condition before being damaged. This requires
the insurance company to pay for routine maintenance
as well as catastrophic damage, which results
in higher premiums. In early 2002, the state authorized
the issuance of less comprehensive policies—similar
to those issued in the rest of the United States—which
are slowly being introduced to policyholders.
Recently, a wave of noncatastrophic
claims—specifically from mold and medical liability—has
stirred concern from insurers and policyholders
alike.
Mold has been around for
hundreds of millions of years and, in some forms,
provides delectables for cheese and yogurt lovers.
Recently, however, mold—particularly Stachybotrys
chartarum—has stirred widespread fears of
respiratory distress and insurable damage. Mold
insurance claims have accelerated exponentially
over the past few years, costing insurers more
than $1 billion in 2000–01. Over three-quarters
of those claims are in Texas (see chart ).

In many states mold damage
is not covered, generally because it is considered
a maintenance issue. A recent court case, however,
confirmed the responsibility of Texas insurers
to cover mold damage. In response, some insurers
have increased homeowners' premiums, and the state's
three largest insurers have stopped writing homeowners
policies for new customers.
Medical malpractice insurance
premiums have been escalating across the country,
thanks to a rising number of lawsuits with hefty
damage awards, settlements and legal expenses.
The problem has become particularly severe in
South Texas, where health conditions are among
the nation's worst and the need for doctors is
intense.
Recent increases in premiums
have prompted doctors to rally for reform and
insurance carriers to leave the market. Eight
carriers have stopped issuing medical liability
policies in Texas, and the remaining carriers
have raised rates by 120 percent since 1999, according
to the Texas Department of Insurance. [2] The
department expects premiums for Texas doctors
to rise by 20 percent this year, one of the largest
increases in the nation.
According to the Texas State
Board of Medical Examiners, as of April 16, 2002,
just over half of all Texas doctors have at least
one active malpractice claim filed against them,
up from about 15 percent in 1992. In some specialties,
such as cardiovascular, neurological, plastic,
thoracic and orthopedic surgery, 75 percent or
more of the doctors have at least one outstanding
liability claim.
As with catastrophic events,
noncatastrophic claims can be unpredictable and
large. Problems such as mold and medical liability
arise when the probability of such losses was
not originally factored into the premium rates
and when premiums fail to adjust quickly enough
to changes in the probability of such claims.
The insurance industry can absorb unexpected claims
more easily in a soft market, when investment
earnings are rich. Recent changes in the industry
have accentuated problems with noncatastrophic
claims because insurers can no longer afford to
subsidize premiums for the sake of market share.
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The reduced supply of insurance capacity
has resulted in escalating premium prices. In 2001, written
premiums rose by about 12 percent, according to a Standard
& Poor's industry survey.[6] Standard and Poor's estimates
that overall premiums will grow 17 percent in 2002, with commercial
lines up 30 percent. Some policyholders report premium increases
of more than 200 percent.
A Damper on the Economy?
Insurance helps facilitate economic
investment by encouraging people to take risky but economically
beneficial actions. During the 1990s, consumers and investors
benefited from the good fortunes of the insurance industry.
Insurance firms garnered sizable investment earnings that
were partly used to reduce premiums, making insurance a widely
available and relatively affordable financial tool.
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The recent sharp rise in premium prices
is being felt across the economy, reducing consumer spending
and business investment. For several months, the Federal Reserve's
Beige Book has been reporting widespread concerns about insurance
costs from businesses in all economic sectors. Recent surveys
by the National Federation of Independent Business report
that the cost and affordability of insurance are among the
most important problems facing small businesses. According
to the Employment Cost Index, employers' share of health insurance
premiums resumed its acceleration in 2001, jumping 10.5 percent
in the first quarter of 2002 (Chart 2). Hefty premium
increases are pressuring the bottom line for many policyholders,
particularly those located in high-risk areas or perceived
as exposed to high-risk activities. However, the insurance
cost increases remain a relatively small part of consumer
spending.
The economy is also being affected by
reduced use of this financial tool, particularly for property
insurance, although the magnitude of this is unclear. Because
of higher premiums and more rigorous underwriting standards,
some policyholders are settling for reduced coverage; others
are unable to obtain any coverage. In these instances, several
outcomes may occur. Investors may continue to engage in the
activity and bear more risk of loss themselves. Or, unable
to reduce the investment risk, they may choose not to invest
at all. In both cases, the effects of the recent insurance
market changes may take time to reverberate through the economy.
Investors who choose to bear more risk
themselves will, in effect, be self-insuring. These individuals
or firms may take actions to reduce the size or severity of
potential losses. For example, they may purchase a new sprinkler
system or burglar alarm, or they may set aside a fund to cover
losses. These expenses could be considered part of the rising
cost of insurance. If successful, they may not result in any
additional effect on the economy. However, the rise in self-insurance
is likely to lead to an increase in uninsured losses if preventive
measures are not taken or are not sufficient. Expenses from
uninsured losses will show up on corporate balance sheets
and in homeowners' budgets as firms and families absorb unpredictable
losses.
Investments that are being foregone
in the new insurance climate may do even more economic damage.
Lack of insurance is impairing certain business transactions,
particularly those requiring aviation liability insurance
and some types of property insurance. The lack of affordable
insurance is causing even more deals to fall by the wayside.
Again, it is difficult to determine the total effect of these
disrupted transactions. But one thing is clear: They would
likely have been successful in a softer insurance market.
And without them, economic activity in the United States is
less than it otherwise would have been.
Conclusion
2001 was a difficult year for insurers
and policyholders. An unprecedented surge of catastrophic
claims, caused primarily by the September 11 terrorist attacks,
has led insurers to reassess the probability of future devastating
losses. The large volume of claims could not have come at
a tougher time for the industry. Weak growth in investment
earnings in 2001 left insufficient industry capital to offset
tremendous underwriting losses. Insurers have responded with
significant premium increases and coverage reductions as they
pull back on the amount of risk they are willing to take.
As a result, insurance firms are again raising premiums enough
to cover claims and rebuild capital; the insurance cycle looks
like it is beginning to turn.
Uncertainty remains for policyholders.
Premium rates have increased, and uninsured property is vulnerable
to unexpected losses. The insurance industry has shifted some
risk back to property owners and stockholders. Recent changes
in the industry are likely to make risk-averse individuals
and businesses unwilling to engage in activities that are
not covered by insurance or not covered at a price they can
afford.
—Fiona Sigalla
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| About the Author
Sigalla is an economist
in the Research Department of the Federal Reserve
Bank of Dallas.
Notes
The author especially wishes
to thank Cynthia Martin of the Knowledge Center
for Insurance Activities at the Federal Reserve
Bank of Boston for her insights and assistance.
Mark Hanna, spokesperson for the Texas Department
of Insurance, provided useful data and industry
information. Thanks also to Jason Saving, Mark
Guzman, Christopher Kelly, Michael Palumbo, Tim
Raine, Mark Wynne, Steve Brown and Kay Champagne
for comments and insights. All errors are the
responsibility of the author.
- The insurance industry defines a catastrophe
as an event that causes at least $25 million
in insured losses.
- The economics of insurance is greatly affected
by the insurer's ability to obtain information
about risk. Several well-known problems can
occur when the insurer cannot clearly observe
the insured's expected risk at the time the
policy is issued. For example, the insured may
hide risky behavior from the insurer (adverse
selection), or an individual may choose to engage
in atypically risky behavior after becoming
insured (moral hazard).
- Insurance companies also sell annuities, a
combined insurance and investment product.
- Property Claim Services, a unit of Insurance
Services Office, Inc., Jersey City, N.J.
- Insurance companies have reported losses from
investments in Enron Corp., Kmart Corp., WorldCom
Inc. and several dot-com companies.
- Insurance: Property-Casualty, Standard
& Poor's Industry Surveys, Vol. 170, no.
4, sec. 2, Jan. 24, 2002.
About Southwest
Economy
Southwest Economy
is published six times annually by the Federal
Reserve Bank of Dallas. The views expressed are
those of the authors and should not be attributed
to the Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas or the Federal
Reserve System.
Articles may be reprinted
on the condition that the source is credited and
a copy is provided to the Research Department
of the Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas.
Southwest Economy
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Affairs Department, Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas,
P.O. Box 655906, Dallas, TX 75265-5906, or by
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