

# Evaluating the Productive Efficiency and Performance of U.S. Commercial Banks<sup>\*</sup>

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**Abstract:** In this study, we use a constrained multiplier, input-oriented, data envelopment analysis (DEA) model to evaluate the productive efficiency and performance of U.S. commercial banks from 1984 to 1998. We find strong and consistent relationships between efficiency and our inputs and outputs, as well as independent measures of bank performance. Further, our results suggest that the impact of varying economic conditions is mediated to some extent by the relative efficiencies of the banks that operate in these conditions. Finally, we find a close relationship exists between efficiency and soundness as determined by bank examiner ratings.

JEL Classification: C60, D24, G21, L2

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## **1. Introduction**

Over the past two decades, substantial research by financial economists in government and academia from all over the world has gone into evaluating the efficiencies of financial institutions. Berger and Humphrey (1997) survey 130 studies that apply frontier efficiency analysis to financial institutions in 21 countries. The vast majority of these studies were published in the 1990s, highlighting the importance and greater frequency of this research in recent years.

Not coincidentally, this research and literature has expanded and evolved at a time of great change in world financial markets. A number of forces have fundamentally changed the world in which financial services providers compete, including technology, regulations, and economic changes. For U.S. commercial banks, recent years have witnessed sweeping changes in the regulatory environment, huge growth in off-balance sheet risk management financial instruments, the introduction of e-commerce and on-line banking, and significant financial industry consolidation. All of these forces have made the U.S. banking industry highly competitive.

In competitive industries, production units can be separated by some standard into those that perform relatively well and those that perform relatively poorly. Financial economists have done this “separation” by applying nonparametric and parametric frontier efficiency analyses. Berger and Humphrey explain that information obtained from such studies can be used for a variety of reasons. They can inform government policy by assessing the effects of various regulatory changes on efficiency. Research issues can be addressed by describing the efficiency of an industry. Additionally,

managerial performance can be improved by identifying “best practices” and “worst practices” associated with high and low efficiency, respectively.

Success in competitive markets demands achieving the highest levels of performance through continuous improvement and learning. Comparative analyses and benchmarking information can alert institutions to new paradigms and new practices, leading to significant increases in firm efficiency and effectiveness. Frontier analysis methodologies are essentially sophisticated ways to benchmark institutions to determine the relative performance or efficiency among competing firms. Such analyses can identify best practice institutions and provide a numerical efficiency score and ranking for each institution that can be useful to policymakers, industry analysts, and management of competing firms.

In this paper, we use a constrained-multiplier, input-oriented data envelopment analysis (DEA) model to quantifiably benchmark the productive efficiency of U.S. commercial banks. Using the parsimonious DEA model developed by Siems and Barr (1998), we measure relative productive efficiency of these institutions over the 15-year period from 1984 to 1998. We find strong and consistent relationships between efficiency and our inputs and outputs, as well as independent measures of bank performance. Further, our results suggest that the impact of varying economic conditions is mediated to some extent by the relative efficiencies of the banks that operate in these conditions. Finally, we find a close relationship exists between efficiency and soundness as determined by bank examiner ratings.

## 2. The efficiency of financial institutions

The financial institution efficiency literature is now both large and recent. Berger and Humphrey (1997) report that of the 130 studies that apply frontier analysis to determine financial institution efficiency, 116 were published from 1992 to 1997. Berger and Humphrey also report that there are now enough frontier analysis studies to draw some tentative comparisons of average efficiency levels both across measurement techniques and across countries, as well as outline the primary results of the many applications of efficiency analysis to policy and research issues. They find that overall, depository financial institutions banks, savings and loans, and credit unions experience annual average technical efficiency ratios of around 77 percent (median 82 percent).<sup>1</sup> Frontier inefficiency, sometimes called X-inefficiency, at financial institutions has generally been found to consume a considerable portion of costs, to be a much greater source of performance problems than either scale or product mix inefficiencies, and to have a strong empirical association with higher probabilities of failures (see Bauer et al., 1998).

Previous studies have examined efficiency and associated effects on financial institution performance from several different perspectives. These include the effects of mergers and acquisitions (see Berger, Demsetz, and Strahan, 1999, and Resti, 1998), institution failure (see Barr, Seiford, and Siems, 1993, and Cebenoyan, Cooperman, and Register, 1993), and deregulation issues (see Humphrey and Pulley, 1997, and DeYoung, 1998), among many others. Frontier efficiency models are employed by these researchers over other performance indicators primarily because these models result in an

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<sup>1</sup> A 77 percent efficiency measure typically means that if the average firm were producing on the frontier instead of at its current location, then only 77 percent of the resources currently being used would be necessary to produce the same output (or meet the same objectives).

objectively determined quantified measure of relative performance that removes the effects of many exogenous factors. This permits the researcher to focus on quantified measures of costs, inputs, outputs, revenues, profits, etc. to impute efficiency relative to the best practice institutions in the population.

There are at least four frontier analysis methodologies used to compute financial institution efficiency, and there is no consensus among researchers on which method is best. The approaches differ mainly in how they handle random error and their assumptions regarding the shape of the efficient frontier. The three main parametric methodologies include the stochastic frontier approach (SFA), the thick frontier approach (TFA), and the distribution-free approach (DFA). In general, parametric approaches specify a functional form for the cost, profit, or production relationship among inputs, outputs, and environmental factors, and allow for random error. The main nonparametric approach is data envelopment analysis. Originally developed by Charnes, Cooper, and Rhodes (1978), DEA computes the relative technical (or productive) efficiency of individual decision-making units by using multiple inputs and multiple outputs.

DEA has proven to be a valuable tool for strategic, policy, and operational problems, particularly in the service and nonprofit sectors. Its usefulness to benchmarking is adapted here to provide an analytical, quantitative benchmarking tool for measuring relative productive efficiency. That is, DEA generally focuses on technological, or productive, efficiency rather than economic efficiency.

Productive efficiency examines levels of inputs relative to levels of outputs. To be productively efficient, a firm must either maximize its outputs given its input quantities, or minimize its inputs given outputs. Economic efficiency is somewhat

broader in that it involves optimally choosing the levels and mixes of inputs and/or outputs based on reactions to market prices. To be economically efficient, a firm seeks to optimize some economic goal, such as cost minimization or profit maximization. In this sense, economic efficiency requires both productive efficiency and allocative efficiency.

As discussed in Bauer et al. (1998), it is quite plausible that some productively efficient firms are economically inefficient, and vice versa. Such efficiency mismatches depend on the relationship between managers' abilities to utilize the best technologies and their abilities to respond to market signals. Productive efficiency requires only input and output data, whereas economic efficiency also requires market price data. Allocative efficiency is about doing things right, and economic efficiency is about doing the right things right. DEA was developed specifically to measure relative productive efficiency, which is our focus here.

### **3. Mathematical foundations for DEA**

DEA generalizes the Farrell (1957) single-output/single-input technical efficiency measure to the multiple-output/multiple-input case. DEA optimizes on each individual observation with the objective of calculating a discrete piecewise linear frontier determined by the set of Pareto-efficient decision making units (DMUs). Using this frontier, DEA computes a maximal performance measure for each DMU relative to all other DMUs. The only restriction is that each DMU lie on the efficient (extremal) frontier or be enveloped within the frontier. The DMUs that lie on the frontier are the best practice institutions and retain a value of one; those enveloped by the extremal

surface are scaled against a convex combination of the DMUs on the frontier facet closest to it and have values somewhere between 0 and 1.

Several different mathematical programming DEA models have been proposed in the literature (see Charnes et al., 1994). Essentially, these various models each seek to establish which of  $n$  DMUs determine the *envelopment surface*, or best practice efficiency frontier. The geometry of this envelopment surface is prescribed by the specific DEA model employed.

To guide this discussion, first assume that there are  $n$  banks to be evaluated. Each bank utilizes varying amounts of  $m$  different inputs to produce  $s$  different outputs. Specifically, bank  $j$  uses amounts  $X_j = \{x_{ij}\}$  of inputs  $i = 1, \dots, m$  and produces amounts  $Y_j = \{y_{rj}\}$  of outputs  $r = 1, \dots, s$ . We assume that the observed values are positive, so that  $x_{ij} > 0$  and  $y_{rj} > 0$ . The  $s \cdot n$  matrix of output measures is denoted by  $Y$  and the  $m \cdot n$  matrix of input measures is denoted by  $X$ .

We use a constrained-multiplier, CCR input-oriented DEA model to reduce the multiple-input, multiple-output situation for each bank to a scalar measure of efficiency (see Charnes, Cooper, and Rhodes, 1978). Consider the following ratio form of the model:

$$\begin{aligned}
 \max \quad & EFF_k = (\sum u_{rk}y_{rk}) / (\sum v_{ik}x_{ik}) \\
 \text{subject to:} \quad & (\sum u_{rk}y_{rj}) / (\sum v_{ik}x_{ij}) \leq 1; \quad j=1, \dots, n. \\
 & \sum u_{rk} > \epsilon; \quad r=1, \dots, s. \\
 & \sum v_{ik} > \epsilon; \quad i=1, \dots, m. \\
 & \epsilon > 0.
 \end{aligned} \tag{1}$$

This model evaluates the relative efficiency of bank  $k$  based on the performance of  $j=1, \dots, n$  banks in the population, where the  $y_{rj}$  and  $x_{ij}$  variables in the model represent the observed amounts of the  $r^{\text{th}}$  output and the  $i^{\text{th}}$  input, respectively, of the  $j^{\text{th}}$  bank. Thus, the multiple-input/multiple-output ratio being maximized in the objective function provides a measure of relative productive efficiency that is a function of the multipliers. The multipliers are the unit weights for each of the outputs and inputs, designated by  $u_{rk}$  and  $v_{ik}$ , respectively. These are the decision variables in the model, so that the objective function seeks to maximize the ratio of the total weighted output of bank  $k$  divided by its total weighted input. For the constrained multiplier model, these weights must be within an established range specified by the analyst. The  $\epsilon > 0$  in the model represents a non-Archimedean constant that is smaller than any positive-valued real number.

Each bank's maximum efficiency score will be less than or equal to 1 by virtue of the constraints. A value of  $EFF_k = 1$  represents full efficiency and it follows that bank  $k$  is a "best practice" bank. When  $EFF_k < 1$ , then some level of inefficiency is present. These efficiency values provide not only a way to benchmark productive efficiency, but also make it possible to identify the sources and amounts of inefficiency in each input and output for every unit being evaluated (see Bowlin, 1998).

The fractional linear programming problem presented above can be transformed into an equivalent ordinary linear programming problem following Charnes and Cooper (1962). The results of this transformation, which are described in Charnes, Cooper, and Rhodes (1978) results in the following linear programming problem:

$$\begin{aligned} \max \quad & EFF_k = \sum u_{rk} y_{rk} \\ \text{subject to:} \quad & \sum u_{rk} y_{rj} - \sum v_{ik} x_{ij} \leq 0 \end{aligned} \quad (2)$$



$$\sum v_{ik}x_{ik} = 1$$

$$-u_{rk} \leq -\epsilon$$

$$-v_{ik} \leq -\epsilon$$

This formulation, while equivalent to the fractional problem presented earlier, can be interpreted as maximizing the sum of the weighted outputs (virtual output) for bank  $k$  subject to unit virtual input for bank  $k$  while maintaining the condition that virtual output cannot exceed virtual input for any bank. Charnes et al. (1985) note that this implies the conditions for Pareto optimality. That is, further increases in this value can be attained only if some of the  $x_{ij}$  inputs are increased or if some of the  $y_{rj}$  outputs are decreased.

#### **4. Data and model specification**

We use year-end data for U.S. commercial banks from 1984 to 1998. To evaluate productive efficiency, we incorporate the constrained-multiplier, input-oriented DEA model described in Siems and Barr (1998). This five-input, three-output model captures the essential financial intermediation functions of a bank and uses variables employed in similar studies (see Berger and Mester, 1997). Essentially, the model approximates the bank management decision-making process by incorporating the necessary input allocation and product mix decisions needed to attract deposits and make favorable loans and investments.

The five inputs generally represent resources required to operate a bank: salary expense, premises and fixed assets, other noninterest expense, interest expense, and purchased funds (which are large dollar deposits). The three outputs primarily represent

desired outcomes: earning assets, interest income, and noninterest income. Greater detail on the variable definitions is given in Table 1.

Using this model, banks allocate resources and control internal processes by effectively managing their employees, facilities, expenses, and sources and uses of funds while working to maximize earning assets and total income. Banks that do this best (the best practice banks) are on the efficient frontier. Banks with too much input or too little output relative to some subset of their peers, are productively inefficient to some extent.

As stated earlier, we employ a constrained-multiplier model which requires that the weights (the  $u_{rk}$ 's and  $v_{ik}$ 's) be within some prescribed range. These upper and lower bounds were determined through a survey of experienced bank examiners regarding their knowledge of factors that are important in judging bank management quality.<sup>2</sup> The survey was intended to identify the correct set of the most important inputs and outputs, and then evaluate the importance of each variable in relation to the others. Examiners were asked “Which of the given list of criteria are most important in judging and influencing the quality of bank management?”

The “given list of criteria” referenced the five inputs and three outputs used in our model. Table 2 shows the upper and lower bounds on the values of the multipliers that were established from the survey based on an average of the relative scores given by the bank examiners. As shown, four of the five publicly available input variables used in our model have relatively equal importance; only premises/fixed assets has a much lower average weight range. For the three publicly available output variables, earning assets is clearly the most important, followed by interest income and then noninterest income.

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<sup>2</sup> This survey was administered to twelve senior bank examiners at the Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas.


## **5. Hypotheses**

Our overall hypothesis in this study is that more efficient institutions differ significantly from less efficient institutions (as determined by our DEA model) in measurable ways, and these results can be used for benchmarking. As one would expect, some measurable differences should manifest themselves particularly in the DEA model's inputs and outputs. But we also expect to see differences in a variety of bank performance measures and between strong and weak institutions as determined by bank examiner ratings. Specifically, we anticipate that the differences between more efficient institutions and less efficient institutions would tend to be those summarized in Table 3. That is, for the inputs and outputs utilized in our model, we expect that more efficient institutions should tend to have lower expenses, fixed assets, purchased funds, nonperforming loans, and loans-to-assets. More efficient institutions should also tend to have higher income, earning assets, and return on average assets. Further, more efficient institutions should be stronger institutions as determined by bank examiner ratings.

An added benefit of the sequential nature of our data is to enable a rudimentary longitudinal analysis of efficiency using these inputs, outputs, and related measures. The 15-year range of our data (1984-1998) subsumes periods that were both profitable and difficult for financial institutions in the United States. We are also interested to see if these changing conditions have different impacts on the performance measures of institutions of varying efficiencies. Our overall hypothesis in this regard is that more difficult banking conditions would tend to exacerbate the differences between more and less efficient institutions, while improved conditions would close the gap between efficiency levels.

To examine the data across time, we designate the first eight years of our study as “bad” years in the financial services industry, and the final seven years as “good.” This delineation is admittedly subjective. There is not a universally accepted indicator of good and bad conditions. Further, the conditions varied extensively by geographic region, with the downturn coming at different times to different areas of the country. In the end, we base our consideration of “good” and “bad” years on several factors. In past analyses, Bean et al., (1998) identified the five-year period between 1988 and 1992 as being the height of the crisis of bank and savings and loan failures as shown in Figure 1. We

Figure 1: Bank and Savings & Loan Failures: 1980 - 1998



source: FDIC, 1998

expand this range to begin in the year when total FDIC- and FSLIC-insured failures first achieved a sustained annual level of more than 100 (i.e., 1984). Additional adjustments are made to the endpoint of this range based on our data. The overall return on average assets (ROAA) of our efficiency-determined quartile data was 0.9. We found that the

average ROAA in each of the years from 1984-1991 was less than 0.9, and that the average in each of the years from 1992-1998 was greater than 0.9. We therefore use 1991-1992 as the arbitrary but functional “bad-to-good” turning point. The use of these ranges has the added benefit of bisecting our data into groups of similar size.

## **6. Model results**

Our DEA model was applied to publicly available year-end data reported by U.S. commercial banks from 1984 through 1998. This 15-year range witnessed a wide variety of economic climates, in which the banking industry experienced both difficult and profitable periods. For the purposes of our analysis, *de novo* institutions (defined as those institutions that were less than three years old) are not included, as such institutions tend to have cost structures that differ significantly from more established institutions (see DeYoung, 1998). Also excluded are banks that reported nonpositive values for any of the input or output measures,<sup>3</sup> as such values are frequently indicative of reporting error or anomalous operation.

To isolate the relative input and output characteristics of banks for further analysis, the banks that met our criteria are separated into quartiles by their derived efficiency score. These four groups serve as the basis for our comparison of more and less efficient banks vis-à-vis the DEA models’ individual inputs (salary expense, fixed assets, other noninterest expense, interest expense, purchased funds) and outputs (earning assets, interest income and noninterest income). To control for banks of varying sizes, we employ a weighted ratio for each of the eight components using the appropriate asset


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<sup>3</sup> The exception to this rule was to include institutions with a zero value for purchased funds, which is not uncommon.

measure: quarter-end assets for balance sheet-related items (fixed assets, purchased funds and earning assets) and average assets for the remaining income and expense-related items. Additionally, we analyze the four groups of institutions using three general measures of bank performance: return on average assets, the ratio of nonperforming loans to gross loans, and the ratio of gross loans to total assets.

An important concern at the outset of this study was to evaluate the reliability of the DEA model over time, i.e., does the efficiency score perform as a consistent measure? A t-test of the scores reveals that in each year of the study the differences between means of the most efficient group and the least efficient group are significant at the 0.01 level, suggesting a level of differentiation that permits us to regard differences between the efficiency-ranked quartiles as meaningful. As shown in Figure 2, this level of statistical

Figure 2: Score by Efficiency Quartile




significance is also observed when comparing the means of each adjacent efficiency

score quartile, suggesting that our convention of quartile-based analysis is also appropriate.<sup>4</sup>

An analysis by average asset size also reveals interesting differences between efficiency groups. In each year of the study, the smallest institutions are most efficient, and the largest are least efficient, as displayed in Figure 3. Further, the relative positions

Figure 3: Score by Size Quartile




of the means of the second and third quartiles remain statistically significant and rank-distinct<sup>5</sup> across the 15 years of the study. This result seems to underscore the potential for greater inefficiencies in the operation of larger, more complex organizations.

<sup>4</sup> When reviewing data based on efficiency scores it is important to bear in mind that the DEA model derives an efficiency score for a particular institution relative to other institutions in a finite reference group. The score therefore cannot be generalized to periods or institutions external to the original reference group, i.e., scores cannot be compared year to year: a score of 0.8 in one year is not necessarily more efficient than a score of 0.4 the following year.

<sup>5</sup> Quartile data are rank-distinct in a given period if the four groups of dependent variables remain distinct and congruent with the independent variable across that time, e.g., the institutions in the lowest efficiency score-based quartile have the highest average salary expense, the adjacent efficiency score quartile has the second highest average salary expense, etc.

Efficiency scores of banks rated as strong and weak by examiners also exhibit significant differences across the study. As shown in Figure 4, in each year, “strong”

Figure 4: Score by Overall CAMELS Rating



institutions (those with composite CAMELS ratings of “1” or “2”) are significantly more efficient than “weak” institutions (rated “3”, “4”, or “5”). These results, discussed in greater detail below, are consistent with the expectation that efficiency and perceived soundness are covariants.




## 6.1 Input and output measures

### 6.1.1 Salary expense

Institution efficiency is a reliable covariant with asset-weighted salary expense for the first eleven years of our study: across that time, the most efficient institutions incur significantly lower salary expenses than the least efficient institutions as shown in Figure 5. From 1984 through 1998, salary expense as a percentage of average assets at the most

Figure 5: Mean Adjusted Salary Expense by Efficiency Quartile




efficient institutions trends gradually upward while the same ratio at the least efficient institutions moderates downward slightly. In 1995, the difference between the two means is no longer significant; by 1997, the averages for the two groups slip by each other. In 1997 and 1998, the most efficient banks have higher salary expenses than the least efficient banks; in 1998, the difference between the two was significant at the 0.05 level.

The first eleven years seem consistent with our hypothesis: the most efficient banks were the ones that were the best at containing costs, in this case, salary expenses. The last four years' results are less clear. It may be that in 1995-1998 the more efficiently managed institutions started paying higher salaries to attract and retain better qualified employees in a more competitive labor environment.<sup>6</sup> At the same time, the lack of growth in mean adjusted salary expense among less efficient institutions may be indicative of efforts to contain or attempt to reduce expenses in order to improve operating efficiencies and profitability.

### 6.1.2 Fixed assets

As shown in Figure 6, in each of the 15 years, the most efficient banks have

Figure 6: Mean Adjusted Fixed Assets by Efficiency Quartile




<sup>6</sup> One indication of the tight labor market can be seen in the U.S. unemployment rate, which steadily declined from 7.8 percent of the civilian labor force in mid-1992 to 4.3 percent by the end of 1998.

significantly lower fixed asset levels than do the least efficient banks. From 1984 to 1998 the difference between the means of the fixed asset ratios of the most and least efficient banks narrows from 1.07 percent of assets to 0.41 percent of assets, but the difference remains statistically significant. In fact, from 1984 through 1992 the differences between each quartile are significant at the 0.01 level. From 1993 through 1998 these differences deteriorate initially for the third most efficient quartile, and then for the second most efficient quartile as well, making this measure much less differentiating of efficiency. From 1993 to 1998, fixed assets as a percentage of total assets increase an average of 2.7 percent for the three most efficient quartiles, while it decreases 0.3 percent for the least efficient quartile. These results are consistent with our expectation that the minimization of fixed (non-earning) assets is among the characteristics that distinguish more efficient institutions.

### *6.1.3 Other noninterest expense*

Other noninterest expense (comprised of noninterest expenses excluding salary expenses) also evidences a strong relationship with our efficiency measure. As shown in Figure 7, the quartile of least efficient banks has significantly higher noninterest expenses than the most efficient banks for all 15 years. Further, the differences between the means of all four quartiles remain statistically significant at at least the 0.05 level. The mean differences are also rank-distinct across the 15 years of the study. Although the difference between most and least efficient quartiles trends moderately toward zero, improving conditions do not seem to have a dramatic effect on other noninterest expenses.


Figure 7: Mean Adjusted Other Noninterest Expense by Efficiency Quartile



#### 6.1.4 Interest expense

As shown in Figure 8, no completely consistent relationship is evident between

Figure 8: Mean Adjusted Interest Expense by Efficiency Quartile



efficiency and interest expense, although there appears to be a slight tendency for less efficient banks to have higher interest expenses. The difference in interest expense between the most and least efficient quartiles is statistically significant at the 0.01 level in 13 of the 15 years. In ten of these years, the less efficient institutions incur higher average interest expenses than their most efficient counterparts; in the other three years (1986, 1992, and 1993), less efficient banks actually incur significantly lower average interest expenses than the most efficient banks in the study. Although failing to be completely consistent, the results overall seem to indicate the highly competitive nature of banks' interest rate management. With very few exceptions, year-to-year changes in interest expense move in the same direction for each quartile for each year of the study.<sup>7</sup>

Contrary to our expectations, more and less efficient banks become more distinct on the interest expense measure after the 1991-1992 “bad-to-good conditions” change. This may be driven in some degree by movement in the purchased funds measure (discussed in the following section) which follows a similar course.


### *6.1.5 Purchased funds*

In our study, the level of an institution's purchased funds is inversely related to efficiency. In each year, purchased funds for the least efficient quartile exceeds that of the most efficient quartile by a significant difference, as shown in Figure 9. The differences for each quartile are clearly rank-distinct. Indeed, purchased funds in the least efficient quartile are always significantly greater than purchased funds in the adjacent (next-most-efficient) quartile. A gross, overall summary of the 15 years of data

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<sup>7</sup> There were three exceptions to this pattern: in 1990 interest expense increased for the most efficient quartile while declining in the others, in 1994 interest expense increased for the least efficient quartile contrary to the other quartiles, and in 1998 interest expense declined slightly for one of the quartiles while the other quartiles increased.

Figure 9: Mean Adjusted Purchased Funds by Efficiency Quartile




indicates that the least efficient banks, on average, have year-end purchased funds equaling 23.3 percent of their total assets; the same ratio for the adjacent quartile and the most efficient quartile is 12.3 percent and 3.5 percent, respectively. This may reflect unwillingness or difficulty on the part of less efficient institutions to access less costly sources of funds (e.g., core deposits).

When examining changes over time, more and less efficient banks become more distinct on this measure after the 1991-1992 “bad-to-good conditions” change. The difference between the adjusted level of purchased funds of the most and least efficient quartiles declines steadily from 1986 to 1992, and rises steadily in each subsequent year. This trend implies more efficient banks are better able (relative to less efficient banks) to utilize less expensive sources of funds in improving economic conditions.

### 6.1.6 Earning assets

As Figure 10 shows, the differences in earning assets between efficiency quartiles are dynamic over time. In each year, the least efficient institutions have significantly lower levels of earning assets than the most efficient institutions. Here again, the efficiency score-derived quartiles yield average earning asset levels that were rank-distinct. These relationships persist even as the average earning asset level of all four

Figure 10: Mean Adjusted Earning Assets by Efficiency Quartile




quartiles improves over time, from 88.7 percent of total average assets in 1984 to 92.0 percent in 1998. The least efficient quartile experiences the greatest improvement, increasing from 86.4 percent in 1984 to 91.7 percent in 1998. By comparison, the most efficient quartile increases its percentage of earning assets from 90.4 to 92.3 across the same period. While the difference between the most and least efficient quartiles steadily

declines over time, the relative movement of the earning assets levels for all of the quartiles generally improves.

### 6.1.7 Interest income

Interest income, an output in our DEA model, exhibits characteristics similar to the related input factor interest expense. As shown in Figure 11, there appears to be no consistent relationship between efficiency and interest income. However, of the 15 years under study, the difference between the most and least efficient quartiles is significant in eight years. In six of these eight years the most efficient group has higher interest income than the least efficient group.

Figure 11: Mean Adjusted Interest Income by Efficiency Quartile





If interest income and interest expense are considered together, an interesting pattern emerges from 1994 to 1998. Across these five years, the relationship between efficiency and interest expense, after having fluctuated considerably, seems to settle into a pattern where the most efficient institutions report consistently and significantly lower interest expenses than the least efficient institutions. During the same time period, however, interest income is actually greater in the least efficient quartile than the most efficient quartile, although the differences failed to reach the 0.01 level of significance<sup>8</sup>. These results are congruent with a scenario wherein less efficient institutions make significantly greater recourse to purchased funds (discussed above) on the expense side, while having a significantly higher percentage of their asset portfolios composed of loans (discussed below), which tend to carry greater risk and greater interest return than other assets.

The longitudinal interaction between the weighted interest income levels of the most and least efficient quartiles is difficult to characterize. The five-year period identified as the height of the banking crisis (1988-1992) witnesses two of the three years of greatest difference in interest income between the most and least efficient quartiles. In 1989, the least efficient quartile has the higher interest income level, and in 1992 the most efficient quartile has the higher interest income level. After 1994, however, the differences between the two quartiles on this measure tend toward zero.


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<sup>8</sup> The differences were statistically significant at the 0.05 level in 1995, 1996, and 1997.

### 6.1.8 Noninterest income

Noninterest income is another highly reliable covariant with measured efficiency. In each year of our study, the least efficient institutions have significantly higher noninterest income levels (measured as the ratio of noninterest income to average assets)

Figure 12: Mean Adjusted Noninterest Income by Efficiency Quartile



than the most efficient institutions as shown in Figure 12. This measure also yields results that are consistently rank-distinct.<sup>9</sup> This finding suggests that less efficient institutions are more willing to increase earnings by emphasizing this output. This difference is significant: in our study noninterest income averages 1.40 percent of average assets for the least efficient banks, and 0.68 percent for the most efficient banks.


<sup>9</sup> Data for the most efficient quartile in 1989 reflect the removal of two institutions whose reported results were highly anomalous and skewed the data.

## 6.2 Bank performance measures

### 6.2.1 Return on average assets

As shown in Figure 13, return on average assets (ROAA) is positively related to

Figure 13: Mean ROAA by Score Quartile



our efficiency measure. In each year of our study, the differences in ROAA between the most efficient and least efficient groups are significant at the 0.01 level. Moreover, in each year, ROAA for each of the efficiency score-based quartiles remains rank-distinct.

ROAA is also a good barometer of the effect that the banking crisis in the 1980s had on banks of varying efficiencies. The three most efficient quartiles reach their lowest average ROAA in 1986, when average ROAA for the least efficient banks drops just below zero. In 1987, as the first three quartiles' averages begin to rebound, the average for the least efficient group slides further to  $-0.17$  percent. From this low, ROAA for the least efficient quartile begins to climb, slowly closing the gap with the other three groups.


From a maximum deficit of 109 basis points below the most efficient quartile in 1987, average ROAA at the least efficient banks climbs to within 15 basis points in 1994, and averages a difference of 18 basis points from 1994 through 1998.

Perhaps the least efficient banks have the most room for improvement, which enables them to impact their situation more effectively and recover more ground as banking conditions improve. Moreover, as the banking industry consolidated and became more competitive, the differences in performance between the most and least efficient banks would be expected to narrow.

### 6.2.2 Nonperforming loans to gross loans

The percentage of gross loans that are nonperforming reflects a strong difference between relatively efficient and inefficient banks across varying industry conditions. As shown in Figure 14, nonperforming loans in 1984 account on average for 2.58 percent of

Figure 14: Mean Nonperforming Loans to Gross Loans by Efficiency Quartile



gross loans for the most efficient quartile of banks, compared to 2.88 percent for the least efficient banks. The gap between the two widens with the declining conditions for banks until 1987, when nonperforming loans are on average 2.35 percent of gross loans for the most efficient banks, compared to 3.69 percent for their least efficient counterparts.


From 1984 through 1993 the difference between the most and least efficient banks is statistically significant at the 0.01 level, the most efficient institutions having a much lower level of nonperforming loans. After 1987, the gap between the two begins to narrow, with the nonperforming loan ratio decreasing at a faster rate at less efficient institutions than at more efficient institutions. By 1994, the difference is no longer statistically significant, a condition which persists through the end of the study period in 1998.

### *6.2.3 Loan to asset ratio*

The ratio of loans to total assets shows a significant difference between the least and most efficient quartiles, with the least efficient group having a higher concentration of loans as shown in Figure 15. If a higher loan-to-asset ratio is related to a bank's willingness to take on additional risk, these findings are consistent with the view that less efficient institutions are less risk averse than their more efficient counterparts. This may also indicate greater attempts by less efficient banks to improve their operating efficiencies and profitability by increasing revenues through riskier ventures.

Considered over time, these results suggest a banking market that is on the whole growing more amenable to risk, or perhaps better able to manage and control risk through other channels (e.g., financial derivatives and other risk management practices). The two most efficient quartiles reach their lowest loan-to-asset ratio in 1987, after which the

Figure 15: Mean Loans/Assets by Efficiency Quartile



percentage of their assets held as loans increases. The two least efficient quartiles both reach their lowest loan-to-asset ratio in 1993, and increase afterward. It may be that the upward trend by all four groups, and the fact that the loan-to-asset ratios of the second and third quartiles exceed the least efficient quartile’s ratio in 1997 and 1998, indicate improved risk management practices and a highly competitive environment.

### 6.3 Examiner ratings

In the early 1970s regulators of federal financial institutions, realizing the advantages of a standardized framework for the examination process, developed a rating system whereby the most critical components of a financial institution’s overall safety and soundness could be identified, measured, and quantified. In 1979, the Uniform Financial Institutions Rating System was adopted. Commonly referred to by the acronym of its component parts, the CAMEL rating, the outcome of an on-site examination of a

financial institution, has become a concise and indispensable tool for examiners and regulators.

The evaluation factors that comprise an institution's CAMEL rating are:

**Capital adequacy**

**Asset quality**

**Management quality**

**Earnings ability**

**Liquidity**

*Note: In 1997, a sixth component was added – Sensitivity to market risk*

Each of the factors is scored from 'one' to 'five', with 'one' being the strongest rating. Additionally, a single composite CAMELS rating is determined from these components, and represents the findings of the examination for the institution as a whole. The *Commercial Bank Examination Manual* produced by the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System describes the five composite rating levels as follows:

CAMELS = 1 An institution that is basically sound in every respect.

CAMELS = 2 An institution that is fundamentally sound but has moderate weaknesses.

CAMELS = 3 An institution with financial, operational, or compliance weaknesses that give cause for supervisory concern.

CAMELS = 4 An institution with serious financial weaknesses that could impair future viability.

CAMELS = 5 An institution with critical financial weaknesses that render the probability of failure extremely high in the near term.

Research involving efficiency and CAMELS ratings is somewhat limited, due in large part to the restricted nature of the ratings themselves.<sup>10</sup> DeYoung (1998), using the management component of the rating, found that, when comparing well and poorly

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<sup>10</sup> The CAMELS rating of an institution is held in strictest confidence by regulators. The composite rating is divulged only to the management of the examined entity; the six component ratings are kept internal to the regulatory agencies.

managed banks, well-managed banks had lower estimated unit costs and higher raw (accounting-based) unit costs, suggesting that cost-efficient management does involve expenditures that poorly managed banks tend to fail to make.

We evaluate our DEA results against the CAMELS ratings of banks from 1984 through 1998, anticipating that more efficient institutions would tend to have higher CAMELS ratings than less efficient institutions. CAMELS ratings, assigned by examiners at the end of an on-site examination, are “snapshot” evaluations of a given bank at a given point in time, and are thus perishable quantities (see Cole and Gunther, 1995). Given the dynamic nature of the financial industry, the underlying factors on which the ratings are based begin to change in some ways immediately after the rating is given. An example of this might be a poorly rated institution that begins immediately to implement directives for improvement imposed by its examiners. We therefore wanted to carefully match our year-end data with CAMELS ratings, ensuring that each was pertinent and referred to “the same bank.”

To do this, we limit the CAMELS portion of our analysis to banks that received a rating within a twelve-month window beginning six months before the year-end data under consideration. To compensate for the fact that in many years there are too few institutions with lower ratings to construct a statistically adequate sample, we divide the ratings into two groups. Institutions with composite ratings of “1” or “2” are considered strong banks and institutions with composite ratings of “3”, “4”, or “5” are considered weak banks. As shown in Figure 4 (earlier in the text), banks with strong CAMELS ratings have significantly higher efficiency scores than banks with weak ratings. This relationship was constant across all 15 years in the study.



## **7. Conclusion**

In this study, we employ a constrained-multiplier, input-oriented DEA model to evaluate the relative productive efficiency of U.S. commercial banks across a 15-year period. The DEA model offers numerous benefits, including the ability to target areas of relative efficiency between banks. Perhaps most importantly, it allows analysis of multiple aspects of a financial institution's performance, unlike more common benchmarking methodologies that focus on only one of many interrelated measures at a time. DEA creates an analysis that is broader without sacrificing depth of insight, an analysis that is more pertinent and hence applicable to the real-world operations of complex financial institutions.

We divide commercial banks into quartiles based on their DEA-derived efficiency score, and find that in each year of our 15-year review each quartile has significantly higher efficiency scores than the quartile beneath it. A similar, rank-distinct relationship is discovered between efficiency quartiles on the weighted measures of noninterest income, other noninterest expense, and purchased funds (all three inversely related to efficiency), as well as earning assets and return on average assets (both positively related to efficiency). The relationship between efficiency and interest income and expense is not as pervasive, perhaps as a result of market competition, but there is still a noticeable tendency for efficiency to be positively correlated with interest income and negatively related to interest expense. There is also a strong negative relationship between the most efficient and least efficient quartiles of banks on the percentage of assets that were fixed assets and the percentage of total assets that were loans.

The level of nonperforming loans to total loans is significant and negatively related to the efficiency scores of the most and least efficient quartiles from 1984 through 1993. The relationship of efficiency to salary expense is similar from 1984 through 1994. It is likely that nonperforming loans and salary expense lose their predictive power vis-à-vis efficiency as a result of the same external forces: the improving economy, improving conditions of financial institutions after the difficulties of the 1980s, and financial industry consolidation.

We examine the change in our independent variables over time, particularly noting the change in the difference between the most and least efficient quartiles. We find that only return on average assets, the ratio of nonperforming loans-to-gross loans, and the relative level of purchased funds seem to be impacted by improved economic conditions. The “most-efficient-to-least-efficient” differences of the other variables in the study seem to trend across the 15-year period independent of economic conditions.

Consistent with previous research, we find a significant relationship between CAMELS ratings and efficiency scores: institutions rated by examiners as the strongest have higher efficiency scores than those institutions rated as the weakest in each year of our study. This finding suggests that DEA might be a useful off-site bank surveillance tool to monitor banks between on-site examinations.

DEA represents a potential for significant advance in the comparative analysis of financial institutions. Limited until fairly recently by the lack of affordable, large scale computational resources, frontier estimation techniques such as DEA offer analysts the ability to appreciate an organization in greater depth by enabling the concurrent study of the multiple variables that impact a firm’s efficiency, and hence its competitiveness,

potential, and even viability. As already noted, DEA models can be used to develop off-site monitoring tools for use by regulators and examiners. Banks can employ such models internally to benchmark their own processes, finding potential areas for improvement as well as gauging the potential and efficacy of their efforts as they operate in an industry which is increasingly characterized by accelerating change and competition. Finally, industry analysts and policymakers can use DEA as a powerful tool for understanding more about the behavior of institutions and markets in this rapidly changing and increasingly complex industry.

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Table 1

Variable Definitions

	<u>Call Report Item Code</u>
<b>INPUTS</b>	
Salary Expense	RIAD4135
Premises and Fixed Assets	RCFD2145
Other Noninterest Expense	RIAD4093 – RIAD4135
Interest Expense	RIAD4073
Purchased Funds *	RCFD0278 + RCFD0279 + RCON2840 + RCFD2850 + RCON6645 + RCON6646
<b>OUTPUTS</b>	
Earning Assets **	RCFD2122 – (RCFD1407 + RCFD1403) + RCFD0390 + RCFD0071 + RCFD0276 + RCFD0277 + RCFD2146
Interest Income	RIAD4107
Noninterest Income	RIAD4079

\* Purchased Funds are federal funds purchased and securities sold under agreement to repurchase, demand notes issued to the U.S. Treasury, other borrowed money, time certificates of deposit of \$100,000 or more, and open-account time deposits of \$100,000 or more.

\*\* Earning Assets are total loans less loans past due 90 days or more and loans in nonaccrual status, plus total securities, interest-bearing balances, federal funds sold and securities purchased under agreements to resell, and assets held in trading accounts.

Table 2

Constraints for the Multipliers (Weights) in the DEA Model

	<u>Lower Bound</u>	<u>Upper Bound</u>
<b>Inputs</b>		
Salary Expense	15.8%	35.9%
Premises/Fixed Assets	3.1%	15.7%
Other Noninterest Expense	15.8%	35.9%
Interest Expense	17.2%	42.8%
Purchased Funds	12.1%	34.0%
<b>Outputs</b>		
Earning Assets	40.9%	69.5%
Interest Income	25.7%	46.9%
Noninterest Income	10.2%	20.2%

Table 3

Hypotheses: Relative Characteristics of More Efficient Banks

Characteristic	More Efficient Institutions	Less Efficient Institutions
Salary expense	Lower	Higher
Other noninterest expense	Lower	Higher
Noninterest income	Higher	Lower
Interest expense	Lower	Higher
Interest income	Higher	Lower
Fixed assets	Lower	Higher
Earning assets	Higher	Lower
Purchased funds	Lower	Higher
ROAA	Higher	Lower
Nonperforming loans	Lower	Higher
Loans to assets	Lower	Higher
CAMELS ratings	Stronger	Weaker