Efficient or systemic banks: Can regulation strike a deal?

Tirupam Goel*  
Bank for International Settlements

June 2023

Abstract
Should there be few large or several small banks? Large banks pose scale economies, but their failure can be systemic, posing an efficiency versus financial-stability trade-off. I embed this trade-off in a macroeconomic model with heterogeneous banks, endogenous size-distribution and entry-exit, and calibrate it using micro-data. Capital regulation improves welfare by reshaping banks’ size-distribution. However, regulation that equalises banks’ leverage, default rates or expected default losses is sub-optimal as it does not internalize that both efficiency and financial-stability risks are size-dependent. A hump-shaped welfare response underpins the optimal size-dependent regulation. It induces more medium-sized banks relative to the benchmark.

JEL Classification: G21, G28, L11, E44, C60

Keywords: Heterogeneous Bank Model, Size-distribution, Entry-exit, Size-dependent Policy, G-SIBs, Financial Stability, Scale Economies.

*Corresponding author.  
Address: Bank for International Settlements, Centralbahnplatz 2, 4051, Basel, Switzerland.  
Email: tirupam.goel@bis.org.  
Disclaimer: The views expressed here are mine, and not necessarily those of the Bank for International Settlements.  
Acknowledgements: I am grateful to Assaf Razin, Fernando Alvarez, Pablo D’Erasmo (discussant), Karel Mertens, Eswar S. Prasad, and Maxim Troshkin for insightful discussions. I am also very thankful to John M. Abowd, Viral V. Acharya, Javier Bianchi, Frederic Boissay, Markus Brunnermeier, Julieta Caunedo, Dean Corbae, Christopher Huckfeldt, Benjamin Moll, Guillermo L. Ordonez, Edouard Schaal, Alp Simsek, Julia Thomas, and conference / seminar participants at Cornell, Goethe, Penn-State, Tilburg EBC Conference, Cambridge MMF, Oxford IFABS, AEA, Midwest-Macro, City University of Hong Kong, World Finance and Banking Symposium Budapest, BIS, RBI, IIM Bangalore, and Yale-NUS College for useful comments. Any errors in this paper are my responsibility.  
Disclosure: I declare that I have no relevant material or financial interests that relate to the research described in this paper.  
Notes: A previous version of the paper was titled ‘Banking Industry Dynamics and Size-Dependent Capital Regulation’. Matlab codes used in this paper are available on the author’s website: https://sites.google.com/site/tirupam/.
Figure 1: Left-hand panel: Number of US commercial and savings banks. Centre panel: Concentration of banks’ assets. HH Index stands for the Herfindahl-Hirschmann Index. Right-hand panel: Kernel density of the distribution of assets normalised by US GDP in two distinct years. Sources: FDIC, SNL.

1 Introduction

Should the banking sector be organized as few large or several small entities? The answer is complicated by an efficiency versus financial-stability trade-off.

On the one hand, banks exhibit scale economies [Hughes and Mester, 2013; Wheelock and Wilson, 2018]. The rise of larger banks globally is testimony to the benefits of scale, such as diversification of risks or the ability to engage in multiple business lines with synergies across them. For instance, in the US, there are fewer, larger, and more concentrated banks now as compared to the 1990s (Figure 1, [Corbae and D’Erasmo, 2020]). The fact that alternative measures of profitability (including risk-adjusted ones) are positively correlated with size also suggests likewise (Figure 2, first three panels).\(^1\)

On the other hand, financial-stability risks stem from the fact that default by larger banks is more costly (Figure 2, last panel). There are obvious direct costs associated with default, like resolution losses, logistical expenses borne by the deposit insurer, and fire-sale discounts. But there are systemic costs too that are relevant in the case of default by large banks [Kang et al., 2015], as also evidenced during the Great Financial Crisis of 2008.\(^2\)

\(^{1}\text{Also see Figure 17 in the Appendix.}\)

\(^{2}\text{Larger banks tend to be more complex and more intertwined with the financial system, which means that their default can have knock-on effects. Larger banks may also engage in excessive risk-taking on the back of implicit bail-out guarantees, thus posing the so-called too-big-to-fail externality.}\)
Figure 2: Scatter plot of log assets (x-axis) and various metrics (y-axis) of US commercial and savings banks. Annual data is pooled over 2000-2019, unless mentioned otherwise. Bank and year fixed effects are controlled for. Each metric is winsorized at the 1% and 99% levels. First panel: Return on assets (ROA), defined as net income to asset ratio. Second panel: Return on capital (ROC), defined as net income to total capital ratio. Third panel: Cost-to-income ratio, defined as total operating expenses to total (interest and non-interest) income ratio. Fourth panel: Scatter plot of log losses associated with bank defaults versus log assets since 1934. Sources: SNL, FDIC.

In this paper, I develop a tractable framework to understand how banks should be organised given these opposing forces. Specifically, I conduct a positive and normative analysis of the role that capital regulation can play in balancing the efficiency versus financial-stability trade-off.

To provide formal intuition for the trade-off, I first develop a stylized model. Scale economies stem from diversification of assets, so that larger banks have a more favorable risk-return profile. However, large bank defaults can be disproportionately more costly. In this case, the allocation of bank capital by a benevolent planner’s depends on how scale economies and default costs relate to bank size. When scale economies dominate, it is
better to organise the capital within a few large banks. However, when default costs are
more substantial, setting up numerous small banks is better.\(^3\)

For the main analysis, I use insights from the stylized model and develop a heterogeneous-
agent dynamic general equilibrium model of the banking sector. A crucial feature of this
model is that the bank size-distribution is endogenous, and that it responds to changes in
capital regulation. In addition, a bank-default externality serves as an explicit rationale
for regulation which is necessary for a meaningful welfare analysis. Finally, to ensure
quantitative relevance, I calibrate the model to match important moments in US banking
data such as those related to scale economies, size-distribution and default rates.

I use the model to first conduct a positive analysis of capital regulation. A key insight
is that regulation not only affects individual bank behavior, but also generates general
equilibrium effects via its impact on the dynamics of the banking sector. As regulation
tightens, individual banks are more constrained because capital is sticky. In response, they
preserve capital by paying fewer dividends and simultaneously invest in fewer assets. In
the process, banks become less leveraged and default less often. As a corollary, they spend
more time in incumbency, i.e. their average age increases. That said, lower leverage also
means that banks grow more slowly. The net effect of these opposing forces on the size-
distribution of banks is not obvious qualitatively – it depends on which force dominates
in the calibration.

Through its impact on the bank dynamics, regulation has aggregate implications, in-
cluding on output and welfare. In particular, because each bank retains more capital,
there is an increase in aggregate capital in the steady-state. This is despite there being
no possibility to raise capital externally, and underscores how the adjustment in the dis-

\(^3\)Another important trade-off in banking arises due to competition related issues, i.e. larger banks
may exert greater market power. This paper abstracts away from competition related issues and instead
focuses on one issue, the efficiency versus financial-stability trade-off. This helps keep the models and
the analyses transparent and tractable. See Corbae and D’Erasmo [2021] and Jamilov [2021] for models
of imperfect competition in the banking sector and the analysis of how regulation interacts with bank
competition.
tribution of bank capital can somewhat mitigate the constraining effect of regulation (and lead to a smaller decline in aggregate output).

I refer to the economic implications that regulation has through its impact on bank size-distribution as the banking-dynamics channel of capital regulation. To investigate the relevance of this channel, I recompute the aggregate impact while keeping the bank size-distribution fixed. The response in aggregate output becomes more pronounced while the response in welfare turns opposite, which underscores that the banking-dynamics channel matters both quantitatively and qualitatively. The emphasis on this channel in this paper is in contrast with other studies on optimal regulation that rely on a representative bank model and thus abstract away from the heterogeneous effect regulation can have on different banks and on their overall distribution.

Building on the positive analysis, next I turn to a normative analysis of regulation to characterise the optimum. Specifically, I study the welfare implications of counterfactual regimes that are inspired by the evolution of regulatory practice in the last two decades: a uniform capital-ratio requirement across banks (a la Basel I), a risk-sensitive requirement that ensures that banks’ probabilities of default are equalised (a la Basel II), and a requirement that equalises banks’ expected default losses (a la Basel-III, G-SIB framework). The key insight from these analyses is in showing why none of these regimes are optimal. In each of the above mentioned regimes, a change in regulatory stringency leads to an inverted U-shaped welfare response. The maximum welfare achievable is highest in the third regime. However, these regimes fall short of internalizing the fact that both bank efficiency and financial-stability risks are size-dependent. The regimes focus on mitigating the risks banks pose, but do not simultaneously take into account that differences in efficiency across banks matters for the overall intermediation efficiency of the banking sector and eventually for aggregate welfare. In other words, these regimes strive to reduce

\footnote{The policy dilemma is evident in, for instance, that while the 1994 Banking and Branching Efficiency Act in the US removed hurdles for banks to become larger, the Great Financial Crisis of 2008 led to the introduction of too-big-to-fail reforms [BCBS, 2018] that create dis-incentives for banks to become larger.}
the welfare costs posed by a given size-distribution of banks but do not optimise the welfare benefits. I show that instead of equating a metric like leverage or default across banks, a flexible size-dependent requirement can take into account both legs of the efficiency versus financial-stability trade-off. Such a regime also features a hump-shaped welfare profile, but in contrast to previous regimes, the maximised welfare is higher. In particular, this regime gives rise to more *middle-sized* banks relative to the *heavy-tailed* benchmark distribution.

Zooming in reveals three channels through which regulation impacts welfare. First, tighter regulation translates into lower financial intermediation capacity of the banking sector (ceteris paribus), which lowers output and welfare.\(^5\) Second, regulation impacts the average efficiency of the banking sector by re-shaping the bank size-distribution. The sign of the impact is, however, not obvious. This is because there is a greater mass of middle-sized banks that are *more* efficient than the small-sized banks but *less* efficient as compared to the large-sized banks. Third, the impact of regulation on expected losses (EL) due to bank defaults – which ultimately affects welfare too – is also not obvious. While banks’ probability of default (PD) declines as regulation tightens, changes in the overall exposure-at-default (EAD) of the banking sector depend on how much more (less) costly default by middle-sized banks is relative to small-sized (large-sized) banks. That EL matters for the optimal regulation is reinforced by the fact that a higher loss-given-default (LGD) rationalises more stringent regulation, and also that the welfare gain in this case is greater.

The net welfare effect naturally depends on the relative strengths of these channels. But the fact that these can run in opposite directions is at the core of the regulatory trade-off. It also shows why focusing on some aspects (like PD or EL) of the trade-off while ignoring others (like efficiency) can be sub-optimal.

Turning to the specifics of the model, banks are financial intermediaries that raise

\(^5\)Note that this is despite the fact that the aggregate stock of capital increases as banks retain more earnings and the equilibrium distribution of banks shifts to the *right* in the first order stochastic dominance sense.
deposits and invest in risky assets. They operate a leveraged balance sheet that is not indeterminate (a’la Modigliani-Miller) as capital is a state-variable. Depending on idiosyncratic shocks to their assets, banks grow, shrink, or fail. New banks enter the industry with a random amount of seed capital. There is no aggregate uncertainty, and a stationary (steady-state) distribution emerges in equilibrium despite bank-level dynamics. For the calibration, I use standard data moments or values from the literature for about half the model parameters. For the rest, I use the method-of-moments.

There are two noteworthy aspects of the calibration exercise. First is the emphasis on disciplining parameters that underpin scale economies. To this end, I target the mean and standard deviation of banks’ return on assets and also the difference in these moments across large and small banks. The second novel aspect of the calibration is to match the model-generated and empirical distributions of bank capital. Specifically, I minimise the following two metrics. One is the Kolmogorov-Smirnov (KS) statistic, which is the maximum distance between the model-generated and empirical distribution functions. Another is the absolute difference in the power-law exponent of the two distributions. While the KS statistic helps align the two distributions overall, matching the power-law exponents ensures that the respective heavy-right-tails are aligned in particular.

The calibrated model reveals that compared to the benchmark capital requirement of 4.5%, the optimal uniform requirement across banks is around 5.1%. The corresponding welfare gain in consumption equivalent terms is around 1%. In case of the size-dependent regime, the optimal requirement is much less stringent at close to 1% in case of small banks and more strict at around 7% for the largest banks while varying monotonically in between. This finding lends support to the G-SIB framework which also imposes stricter regulation on the larger banks. Yet, it calls for lower regulatory burden for small banks.

Finally, I consider two extensions of the model. First I endogenize asset returns. In the baseline model, asset returns do not depend on the overall size of the banking sector. In reality, when banks collectively invest in more assets, the return on any individual
bank’s investments is likely to be lower. Incorporating this possibility in the model shows that as banks shrink in response to tighter regulation, asset returns increase, leading to a second-round positive effect on bank behavior. This countervailing effect allows regulation to push harder. Second I endogenize the mass of banks. In the baseline model, the mass of banks is normalised to unity. However, the mass of entrants into the banking sector may vary with bank profitability. Incorporating this mechanism in the model shows that as regulation tightens, it creates disincentives for entry as bank profitability declines. As a result, regulation is more constraining relative to the baseline case and thus the optimal regulation is less stringent.

**Related Literature** The primary contribution of this paper is to the macro-finance literature. Seminal papers in this literature include Bernanke et al. [1999], Kiyotaki and Moore [1997], Gertler and Kiyotaki [2010], Jermann and Quadrini [2012], Brunnermeier and Sannikov [2012] and Boissay et al. [2016], among others. These studies have established the groundwork for studying how the financial sector can exaggerate real sector shocks and thus shape macroeconomic outcomes. Typically, they adopt either a representative-agent model of the banking sector, or take the heterogeneity across banks as given exogenously. However, heterogeneity matters at a deeper level, as shown in the (non-financial) firm dynamics literature (Hopenhayn [1992], Hopenhayn and Rogerson [1993], Asplund and Nocke [2006]). Firm-level differences can evolve over time and shape aggregate outcomes through a variety of channels. For instance, Clementi and Palazzo [2016] show that after a positive aggregate productivity shock, the number of entrants increases and this amplifies the expansion relative to a representative agent model. In this paper, I argue that it is important to consider bank-level heterogeneity in macro-finance studies because in reality size is one of the key factors that drives differences in banks’ efficiency and default costs. To this end, I develop a tractable model with a heterogeneous banking sector where entry-exit and size-distribution are endogenous.
A thin but growing literature shares the appreciation of bank heterogeneity and banking industrial organization more generally. An important early contribution is Corbae and D’Erasmo [2010], where the authors develop an industry dynamics model of imperfectly competitive banks to study the relation between business cycles and banking sector characteristics such as market structure, defaults, risk-taking, and loan supply. In subsequent recent work, Corbae and D’Erasmo [2021] study the effect of capital regulation on such characteristics. Focusing on the link between bank size and market power, Jamilov [2021] develops a model of monopolistic-competitive banks where large banks default less often but charge a higher markup than smaller banks, and investigates how regulation interacts with this trade-off. Whited et al. [2021] documents that banks’ market power varies with size and studies the heterogeneous impact of low interest rates on risk-taking. Bellifemine et al. [2022] and Wang et al. [2021] study the role of bank market power in the transmission of monetary policy, while Jamilov and Monacelli [2021] study how the distribution of market power responds to aggregate shocks. Dávila and Walther [2020] shows that implicit bailout guarantees can lead to strategic leverage spillovers from large to small banks, and Liu [2019] shows that the impact of Dodd-Frank regulation in the US is different for small versus large banks.

The present paper shares some aspects of these studies but also adds to them in the following ways. One is its emphasis on what the financial-stability versus efficiency trade-off means for the optimal organisation of the banking sector. While understandably much attention has been paid to competition issues, the said trade-off remains under-explored. This is despite efficiency being a significant aspect in banking, not least because of how

\begin{itemize}
\item While the pursuits are related, the trade-offs are distinct. In that paper, large banks are more efficient and default less often (also due to an implicit too-big-to-fail guarantee), but charge higher mark-ups. By contrast, in the present paper, the expected default loss posed by large banks as compared to small banks is not obvious because while large banks have a lower default rate, their default is more costly. This distinction leads to a difference in the policy implications. In that paper, the optimal policy is to subsidise all banks (especially larger banks) relative to the benchmark – while in the present paper the optimal policy is the opposite, that is to impose stricter regulation relative to the benchmark, especially on larger banks.
\end{itemize}
data and technological innovations are transforming scale economies and driving financial institutions (banks and also non-banks) to become larger. Second, the paper features not only a positive but also a normative analysis of regulation. Relatedly, to capture potential non-linearities in the model mechanisms, I use global solution methods as opposed to solving a linearised version of the model. Third is the paper’s calibration strategy that, as described above, takes the heterogeneous aspects of the model seriously.

The present paper naturally also relates to a large literature on the assessment of capital regulation. An early contribution in this field is by Van den Heuvel [2008], who shows that a mis-priced deposit insurance creates a moral hazard issue, induces banks to be highly leveraged. This rationalizes regulation, and allows studying the welfare effects of regulation in order to identify the optimal. Relatedly, Christiano and Ikeda [2013] characterize the optimal regulation when the effort that a bank exerts is unobservable by its creditors – another moral hazard issue. Begenau [2020] also evaluates optimal regulation. In that model, households value safe assets, because of which banks’ cost of funding can decrease when higher capital requirements make deposits scarcer. Other related papers include De Nicolo et al. [2014] that studies the effects of higher capital and liquidity requirements on bank lending, efficiency and overall welfare; Nguyen [2015] that characterizes the optimal capital requirements in the presence of government bailouts; and Zhu [2008] that studies the welfare implications of risk-weighted viz-a-viz non risk-weighted capital requirements.

The qualitative predictions about the level of optimal regulation in these papers – namely, the general call for tighter regulation – is similar to the present paper. But the underlying mechanisms are quite distinct. For instance, while the above studies typically use a representative-agent model or one with exogenous heterogeneity, the present paper shows that industry dynamics (i.e. shifts in the bank-size distribution) is a key channel through which the effect of regulation transmits to the overall economy. Another distinction relative to the literature is the emphasis on size-dependent capital requirements.
After the Great-Financial-Crisis, size-dependent regulation – namely the G-SIB framework – became a core element of Basel III. The tractable heterogeneous bank model developed in this paper provides an ideal setup for the assessment of such regulation.\footnote{Passmore and von Hafften [2019] complements the approach adopted in this paper. They also study the issue of optimal size-dependent capital requirements, but using a panel generalised method-of-moments (panel-GMM) framework. The authors show that G-SIB surcharges should be higher based on the idea of equalising social-loss-given-default of banks.}

The paper is organised as follows. I present a stylized model to develop the intuition for the key trade-off in Section 2. Section 3 develops the main model and derives its analytical properties. Section 4 defines the stationary competitive equilibrium and discusses the inefficiency that rationalises regulation in the model. Section 5 presents the calibration strategy, the numerical solution strategy, and presents the model’s quantitative properties. Section 6 pursues a series of counterfactual policy experiments and draws the policy implications of the model. Section 7 considers two extensions of the baseline model and reviews the attendant implications. Section 8 concludes. The Appendix provides the analytical proofs of the propositions in the paper.

## 2 Optimal size-distribution of banks: Intuition

In this section, I present a stylized model to illustrate the social planner’s dilemma when thinking about the optimal distribution of banks in an economy. Insights from this model are then used as a basis for the main model presented in the next section.

Time is discrete and there are two dates, 0 and 1. A benevolent social planner has a fixed amount of capital $K$, and is faced with the following decision problem on date-0: what is the optimal number of banks to setup using this capital? Each bank is setup on an island, where it combines the allocated capital $k_i$ with deposit funding $f_i$ to invest in $s_i = k_i + f_i$ risky projects on date-0. Banks can only invest in projects located on their own island. Each project requires unit investment. All projects (on all islands) have the same date-1 return distribution $N(\mu, \sigma^2)$. And while projects on the same island are potentially
correlated, projects from distinct islands are independent.

The distribution $z_i$ of total return on bank $i$’s assets is normally distributed with mean $\mu s_i$ while the variance that depends on the correlation structure across assets. If the projects are perfectly correlated, the variance is given as $\sigma^2 s_i^2$, while if perfectly uncorrelated, the variance becomes $\sigma^2 s_i$. In case of negatively correlated projects, the variance could even be smaller than $\sigma^2 s_i$. A convenient method to capture the correlation structure between the projects of a bank is via a diversification parameter $d \in [-\infty, 2]$, and posit that

$$z_i \sim N(\mu s_i, \sigma^2 s_i^d).$$

Each bank must satisfy a minimum capital-ratio constraint: $k_i / s_i \geq \chi$. Given proportional returns on assets, the constraint is binding for all banks, and therefore, they all operate with the same capital ratio. Specifically, a bank with allocated capital $k_i$ chooses a balance sheet of size $s_i = S(k_i) := k_i / \chi$.\(^8\)

Deposit funding costs $R < \mu$ for all banks. A bank defaults if it cannot cover its deposit liabilities i.e. if $z_i < R(s_i - k_i)$. The probability of default $p_i$ can be written as:

$$p_i = Pr\left(z_i \leq R(s_i - k_i)\right) = \Phi\left(\frac{R(s_i - k_i) - \mu s_i}{\sigma s_i^d/2}\right)$$

(1)

where $\Phi$ is the cumulative distribution function (CDF) of the standard Normal random variable.\(^9\) That all banks have the same leverage implies that a bank with more capital allocation $k_i$ would have a larger balance sheet. And because of greater diversification

\(^8\)In this section, I take the capital-ratio constraint as exogenously given, and establish an endogenous rationale for it in the main model. Also, to keep the exposition in this section tractable, I assume a non-risk weighted constraint here, and consider risk-weighted or other types of constraints in the main model.

\(^9\)As long as there are some diversification benefits, i.e. $d < 2$, the probability of default as a function of the size of the bank $s_i$ for a given level of capital $k_i$ goes to zero as $s$ goes to infinity. If $d = 2$, then $p_i$ converges asymptotically to $\Phi(\frac{R - \mu}{\sigma})$.\(^12\)
benefits, it would have a smaller probability of default.\textsuperscript{10}

Finally, I assume that bank default is socially costly. I consider $\Delta(s)$ as the \emph{loss-rate}, i.e. the loss incurred per unit of assets when a bank with total assets $s$ defaults. I allow losses to be greater in case of larger banks: $\Delta'(s) \geq 0$, to reflect the fact that default by a larger, systemically more important bank can be disproportionately more costly.

I now turn to the problem of a benevolent social planner that needs to decide the number $M$ of banks across which to distribute the capital endowment $K$ while maximising the net expected return of the banking sector:

$$\max_M NR(M) = \sum_{i=1}^M \left( \mu s_i - R(s_i - k_i) \right) \text{ s.t. } \sum_{i=1}^M k_i = K.$$

Here $NR(M)$ is the net expected return, which is expected return $ER(M)$ net of expected losses $EL(M)$, as a function of the number of banks $M$ in the economy. For analytic tractability, I assume that capital is distributed equally across the banks, so that $k_i = K/M = k$. And since the capital ratio constraint binds for each bank, $s_i = s = k/\chi$.

As a result, $ER(M)$ is independent of $M$, and equals $(\mu - R)K/\chi + RK$. The planner’s objective reduces to minimising $EL(M)$.

Since projects across islands are uncorrelated, bank defaults are also uncorrelated. This

\textsuperscript{10}To show this, I replace $s_i = k_i/\chi$ in Equation (1) and take the derivative w.r.t. $k_i$:

$$\frac{\chi^{d/2} \left[ \frac{R - \mu}{\chi} - R \right] k_i^{(1-d)/2}}{\sigma} < 0.$$
simplifies the calculation of expected losses $EL(M)$:  

$$
EL(M) = \sum_{m=0}^{M} \Delta(ms)msB(m; M; p(M)) = \sum_{m=0}^{M} \Delta(ms)ms \frac{M!}{m!(M-m)!} p(M)^m (1-p(M))^{M-m}
$$

Here $B(m; M; p(M))$ is the binomial probability density function which denotes the probability that $m$ banks default at the same time with $p(M)$ being the probability of default of an individual bank when there are $M$ banks in total.  

The expression for $EL(M)$ embeds an *efficiency versus financial-stability* trade-off for the social planner. On the one hand, diversification benefits means that larger banks are more efficient. Assuming that leverage remains same, as size increases (i.e. lower $M$), the probability of default declines, meaning banks are less risky. Despite defaults across banks being uncorrelated, this means the following:

**Remark.** *If the loss-function $\Delta(s)$ is independent of $s$, the optimal decision is for the planner to setup one large bank with all the capital $K$.***

*Proof.* To show this, let $\Delta(s) = \delta$. Then $EL(M)$ resolves to $\delta K p(M) / \chi$, which is minimised when $M = 1$. ■

On the other hand, having one or few very large banks may be inefficient when large

---

11 It is possible to generalise the model by having correlated bank defaults, such as by using the setup in Gărleanu et al. [2015]. In their paper, investors located on a circle choose projects that are also located on the circle. Projects that are closer to each other in terms of the shortest arc length between them are more correlated. Because of information frictions or acquisition costs, investors end up choosing projects that are closer to their own position on the circle. As a result, projects within the portfolio of an investor are more correlated than projects across portfolios of investors in Gărleanu et al. [2015]. As a special case of the model in Gărleanu et al. [2015] while maintaining the same spirit, in the stylized model in this paper, projects held by a bank are correlated, but projects across banks are not. I take this approach to maintain analytic tractability. Computing the expected loss function when bank defaults are correlated can be handled using the “correlated” binomial distribution, but then a closed form expression for $EL(M)$ is not available. The likely effect of correlated bank defaults on the main takeaways of the model in this section would be that the optimal number of banks would be smaller.

12 Note that the social cost depends on the total assets of all $m$ banks that defaulted. This is an important feature to have because when several banks default at the same time, this can reinforce default-related costs, say due to fire-sale externalities. Alternatively, it is possible to assume that the social cost when $m$ banks of size $s$ each default is given as $m\Delta(s)s$. In this case, the computations are actually simpler, and the qualitative takeaways continue to hold.
bank defaults are disproportionately costly. In this case, breaking down larger banks could be desirable from a financial-stability point of view – even though this would mitigate some of the diversification benefits larger banks pose. While proving this point generally using closed-form solutions is not possible, I consider a specific case below.

**Remark.** If the loss-rate $\Delta(s)$ depends on $s$, and is given as $\delta s$ for instance, the optimal decision for the planner is not obvious, and depends on how large diversification benefits are.

The expression for $EL(M)$ in this case is given as:

$$EL(M) = \sum_{m=0}^{M} \delta \left( \frac{K}{MX} \right)^2 m^2 B(m; M; p(M)) = \delta \left( \frac{K}{MX} \right)^2 \left( M p(M)(1 - p(M)) + M^2 p(M)^2 \right)$$

where we use the result that if $X$ is a binomial random variable with parameters $(M,p)$ then $E[X^2] = Mp(1 - p) + M^2 p^2$. This leads to:

$$EL(M) = \delta \left( \frac{K}{X} \right)^2 \left( p(M) + (M - 1)p(M)^2 \right)$$

The profile of $EL(M)$ is not obvious. Even a general comparison of $EL(1)$ and $EL(M)$ for large $M$ (which can then help shed light on whether one large or many smaller banks is more desirable) is not possible. Specifically, $EL(1) = \nu p(1)$, while $EL(M)$ tends to $\nu p(M)^2$ as $M \to \infty$. Depending on how flat or steep $p(M)$ as a function of $M$ is, $p(1)$ could be higher or lower than $p(M)^2$ for large $M$. Moreover, setting $EL'(M)$ to zero implies that an interior solution for $M$ may also exist. While it is not possible to derive further insights analytically, numerical simulations help illustrate the point that the optimal number of banks is not obvious (see Figure 3). When diversification benefits are high ($d = 1.84$), setting up one large bank is optimal. For lower diversification benefits ($d = 1.86$), the fact that large bank default is more costly begins to matter, and setting up several smaller banks can improve the return of the banking sector by minimising expected losses.
The stylized model presented in this section illustrates why the choice of the socially optimal size distribution of banks is not obvious, and underscores the importance of taking into account the fact that both efficiency gains and financial-stability risks posed by banks depend on their size.

To make the exposition in this section concise and transparent, I made several assumptions. These include the use of a static partial equilibrium setup, and that the planner can dictate the allocation of capital across banks. These features naturally render this model less realistic: for instance, policymakers do not dictate capital allocation across banks and rather use capital-ratio requirements to influence and hopefully achieve the socially optimal behavior of banks. Moreover, banks are not one-period entities – instead they optimise over a long horizon over which they can grow, shrink, or exit the industry. In the next section, I consider a richer framework that overcomes these stylized features and helps conduct a more realistic analysis of the trade-off highlighted in this section.
3 Model

The overarching goal in this paper is to understand how capital regulation can balance the efficiency versus financial-stability trade-off by shaping the dynamics of the banking industry, and what this means for the optimal level of regulation. To this end, I develop a dynamic general equilibrium model of an economy with a heterogeneous banking sector. The model draws inspiration from two seminal papers. First is Gertler and Kiyotaki [2010], which introduces a role for banks in a standard macro-economic framework. Second is Hopenhayn [1992], which develops a model of firm-level heterogeneity. I combine elements from the macro-finance framework in the former paper with bank-level heterogeneity in the spirit of the latter paper. Naturally, in the process, I pursue innovations that lead me to an ideal model for investigating the issues of interest.

For one, I use elements from the stylized model in the previous section to introduce a novel efficiency versus financial-stability trade-off in the main model. Next, in contrast to Hopenhayn [1992], the balance-sheet leverage (capital structure) decision of banks (firms) in this paper is non-trivial – this allows for amplification of idiosyncratic shocks that drive exits, which is an important stylized feature in the case of banks. Moreover, a mis-priced deposit insurance and limited liability imply that banks assume higher leverage than what is socially desirable, and this rationalizes a regulatory constraint on banks’ leverage. This constraint not only alters individual bank behavior, but it also affects industry dynamics and aggregate outcomes such as welfare. Taken together, these features of the model enable both positive and normative analyses of capital regulation.

The model is cast in discrete time and the horizon is infinite. The economy consists of a household, a banking sector with heterogeneous atomistic banks, the government, and a benevolent regulator. There are bank-level dynamics, but there is no aggregate uncertainty. In what follows, I describe the various agents in the model economy.
Household  The household consists of a representative worker and a unit mass of bankers. The worker receives a fixed wage income $W$ each period. The bankers manage the banking sector and bring back dividend income $E$ to the household. Collectively, the household consumes $C$ and saves $D$ in the form of bank deposits. To help keep the household’ problem tractable, I assume that there is perfect consumption insurance between the two types of agents (as also in Gertler and Kiyotaki [2010]). Deposits are risk-free due to a deposit insurance scheme, and offer an interest rate $R$. The household has a utility function $u$ and is subject to a lumpsum tax $T$. The decision problem of the household, taking wage and dividend incomes as given, and assuming $\beta$ to be the discount factor, is as follows:

$$\max_{C_t, D_t} \mathbb{E}_0 \sum_{t=0}^{\infty} \beta^t u(C_t) \quad s.t. \quad C_t + D_t = W_t + E_t + R_{t-1}D_{t-1} - T_t.$$  

Bankers and banks  Each atomistic banker manages a bank. Banks differ in terms of their size, that is the amount of capital $n$ it has. They raise deposit funding $d$ and invest in $s$ one-period lived assets. Assets generate a risky return $\psi$. For tractability, I assume that the returns on assets across banks and across time are independently and identically distributed. To ensure viability of banks, I focus on the case where the expected return on assets is higher than the cost of deposits: $\mathbb{E}[\psi] > R$.

Scale efficiency  I extend the idea in Section 2 and allow larger banks to have a higher expected and less volatile return on assets. Several empirical studies support this assumption. For one, large banks may be able to better overcome fixed operating costs, including compliance costs Hughes et al. [2019]; Wheelock and Wilson [2012]. In addition, they are

---

13I assume that banks cannot issue outside equity, which means that capital is a state-variable. This assumption violates a pre-condition for the Modigliani-Miller capital structure irrelevance result (MM), and thus allows the capital structure of the bank to be determinate.

14Banks typically hedge some of their risks – all risks cannot generally be hedged (and it may not be desirable to do so either). I consider $\psi$ to capture the idiosyncratic risks that remain after any hedging.

15Considering serially correlated return on assets at the bank level or assuming correlated returns across banks are both interesting extensions. They, however, increase the state-space of the bank’s problem and reduce the analytical and computational tractability of the model.
better positioned to invest in a more diversified set of assets (Hughes and Mester [2013]; Beccalli et al. [2015]).

**Dividend preferences** Bankers have concave preferences \( H \) over the stream of dividends they pay, as also in Bianchi and Bigio [2022]. These preferences are not necessarily the same as the household’s preferences over consumption. Two well-known regularities rationalise this distinction. First, bankers, or entrepreneurs more generally, tend to be less risk-averse as compared to workers and households (see for e.g. Kihlstrom and Laffont [1979]). Second, managers – the agents – despite having some ownership stake, may not act in the best interest of the shareholders – the principal (see for e.g. Jensen and Meckling [1976]).

**Deposit insurance** Banks pay an insurance premium that is proportional to the level of deposits they have. The deposit insurance fund, which is run by the government, covers the shortfall in liabilities of defaulted banks as well as any resolution related losses. In case the insurance premium is insufficient (surplus) to cover the resolution process, a lump-sum tax (subsidy) is imposed on (passed to) the household. I assume that the insurance program is mis-priced in the sense that insurance premiums do not adequately reflect banks’ riskiness. This, as I show below, leads to an inefficiency in banks’ decisions and rationalises capital regulation in the model.

**Default and resolution** A bank defaults when its capital falls below a cutoff \( \tau \geq 0 \).

Bankers have limited liability, which means they simply walk away from a failed enterprise

---

16 Larger banks may also be able to offer a wider range of products with synergies between them, and thus reap the benefits of economies of scope, although the evidence on this in the literature is somewhat mixed (Gambacorta and van Rixtel [2013]; Baele et al. [2007]; Van Lelyveld and Knot [2009]).

17 Typical reasons for a mis-priced deposit insurance include the inability of the insurer to observe banks’ risk profiles or impose risk-sensitive premium payments. See Flannery et al. [2017] for a discussion.

18 While \( \tau = 0 \) corresponds to default in the strict sense, \( \tau > 0 \) denotes bank distress more realistically. Indeed, banks are often considered insolvent before their net-worth actually falls below zero.
with zero value in hand. Defaulted banks’ balance sheets are resolved by the deposit insurer.

I assume that bank default is costly. In practice, this cost can stem from several channels. First is the obvious resolution related operational expenses incurred by the deposit insurance agency, including verification costs (see Cooley and Quadrini [2001]). Second, a forced sale of the defaulted bank’s assets may fetch a discount relative to market prices, either because of intrinsic uncertainty about the quality of these assets, or because of fire-sale effects more generally (see Shleifer and Vishny [2011]). Third, one bank’s default can spillover, lead to contagion or knock-on effects, and thus generate losses for the wider financial system (e.g. Caballero and Simsek [2013]). This can be a major cost in the case of large too-big-to-fail banks. Such indirect costs may be even higher during a crisis when many banks are in trouble at the same time. For the sake of brevity, I abstract from the micro-foundations of these costs. Instead, like in the previous section, I assume that the sale of assets $s$ of a defaulted bank results in a loss-rate $\Delta(s)$ that may depend on the amount of assets being resolved. Total loss in case of default by a bank of size $s$ is given as $\Delta(s)s$.

**Entry** Insolvent banks are rarely dissolved in practice. Instead they are typically merged with a healthy bank, say following a bidding process. To keep the model tractable, I do not explicitly model mergers, and instead assume that defaulted bankers re-enter the banking industry next period with a random seed capital $n_e \sim G(n_e)$ from the deposit insurance fund. Given that the deposit insurance is funded via premiums imposed on banks – the above specification captures the spirit of bank entry and exit in practice. Crucially, to abstract away from potential adverse ex-ante incentives, I assume that bankers do not internalise any of the post default dynamics.\(^{19}\)

\(^{19}\)In the case of large banks, implicit bail-out guarantees can have a material impact on their risk-taking ex-ante, as discussed in Dávila and Walther [2020] and Nguyen [2015] for example. These considerations, however, are outside the scope of this version of the paper.
Bank-specific asset return shocks \( \psi \) realised, payoff from assets determined.

Solvent banks pay depositors. Net cash-flow \( n \) is the working capital. New banks enter the industry with seed capital. Bank size distribution determined.

Insolvent banks (cannot pay depositors) resolved by deposit insurance program.

Banks pay dividends. Then raise deposits, cover the deposit insurance premium, and invest in risky assets subject to the capital constraint.

Figure 4: Intra-period sequence of events

**Capital-ratio constraint** Limited liability combined with a mis-priced deposit insurance generate the rationale for a capital-ratio constraint on banks. Indeed, because deposits are risk-free, depositors do not charge the bank a risk premium. This reduces the cost of deposit funding for the bank. Combined with limited liability, this creates incentives for the bank to assume a higher leverage than what is socially efficient. In turn, this inefficiency rationalises a minimum capital-ratio constraint on the bank.\(^{20}\) A more elaborate discussion of this point is in Section 4.

I allow the regulatory constraint to be specified quite generally, from being cast simply in terms of a minimum capital to asset ratio, to one that depends on the riskiness of the bank (as in the case of Basel III, BCBS [2011]) or the size of the bank (as in the case of the G-SIB framework, BCBS [2018]).

\(^{20}\) The rationale for regulation in this paper is related to that in Kareken and Wallace [1978], Santos [2001], and Van den Heuvel [2008]. A large related literature provides alternative rationales for regulation, namely fire-sale externalities [Kara and Ozsoy, 2020], implicit government guarantees [Nguyen, 2015], and household preference for safe and liquid assets [Begenau, 2020]. Creditors (instead of regulators) may also impose a constraint due to information frictions Clementi and Hopenhayn [2006]; Goel et al. [2017], limited enforcement in Albuquerque and Hopenhayn [2004], or moral hazard issues Adrian and Boyarchenko [2012]; Christiano and Ikeda [2016].
3.1 Bank’s problem: Recursive formulation

Bankers wake up each period with a pre-determined balance sheet, i.e. assets and liabilities. The sequence of events that follow during the period are noted in Figure 4. In a nutshell, first, each bank receives a random payoff from its assets depending on the $\psi$ shock. Some bankers are unable to cover their deposit liabilities and exit the industry. Subsequently, new bankers enter the industry with seed capital. The (non-defunct) incumbents realise their net cash flow (revenue from assets minus payment to depositors) which becomes their current period capital $n$. Finally, banks pay dividends, pay insurance premium, raise fresh deposits and invest in assets for next period.

Given aggregate certainty, it is feasible to assert that a steady-state equilibrium exists where aggregates (such as $R$) are constant, and verify this assertion later. This allows me to write the problem of a bank recursively with a single state variable, i.e. capital $n$:

$$V(n) = \max_{s,d,e} \left( \mathcal{H}(e) + \beta \int_{\psi_c} V(n') f(\psi'; \theta(s), \sigma(s)) d\psi' \right) \quad \text{where} \quad n' = \psi's - Rd; \quad \psi_c = \frac{Rd + \tau}{s};$$

$$s.t. \quad n + d = s + e + td; \quad \chi \leq \frac{n - e}{s}; \quad 0 \leq e; \quad 0 \leq d.$$  

The cash flow identity reflects that each bank uses its capital and deposit funding to

---

Here $V(.)$ is the value function. Dividend payments are denoted $e$. The discount factor is $\beta$. A ‘prime’ is used to denote the next period. $f(\psi'; \theta(s), \sigma(s))$ is the density function of the return on bank’s assets $\psi'$, where $\theta(s)$ is the mean return while $\sigma(s)$ is the standard deviation, both of which are allowed to depend on $s$ to reflect the possibility that a larger bank has a higher mean and/or a lower variance of return on assets. The expected continuation value of the bank (i.e. the integral term) depends on the distribution of bank’s capital next period, denoted as $n'$, and the probability that it defaults. A bank defaults when the asset return shock $\psi$ is below the cutoff $\psi_c$.
invest in assets, pay dividends, and cover the deposit insurance premium, where $t$ is the deposit insurance premium rate.

$\chi$ is the regulatory minimum capital-ratio requirement. The constraint is expressed in terms of post-dividend capital $n - e$.\(^{21}\)

**Properties of the bank’s problem**  To characterise some important properties of the bank’s problem, it is easier to re-write the problem in terms of a single decision variable $e$. Also, to make the analytical exposition tractable without losing generality, I assume that deposit premium is null, $t = 0$, and that the default size cutoff is zero, $\tau = 0$. Also note that the capital-ratio constraint is binding given proportional return on assets and the fact that expected return on assets is higher than the cost of deposits. It follows, then, that $s = (n - e)/\chi$, $d = (n - e)/(1/\chi - 1)$, $\psi_c = R(1 - \chi)$, and $n' = [(\psi' - R)/\chi + R](n - e)$, and implies that:

$$V(n) = \max_e \left( H(e) + \beta \int_{R(1-\chi)} V \left( \left[ \frac{(\psi' - R)/\chi + R}{n - e} \right] f(\psi'; \theta(s), \sigma(s))d\psi' \right). \right)$$

The problem statement above captures the following trade-offs a bank faces:

1. A higher dividend payout increases current period payoff, but it reduces the current capital position, relatedly the ability to generate dividends in the future, and thus decreases the expected future value of the bank.

2. A lower capital-ratio, i.e. higher leverage, increases the bank’s expected return on capital and enables it to grow faster (i.e. the capital growth factor (CGF) increases since $\mathbb{E}[\psi > R]$), but it also increases the variance of its future cash flows and the probability of default.

\(^{21}\)This is because post-dividend capital is what matters for the default risk of the bank. Otherwise, a bank may *window-dress* by first reporting a higher capital ratio in terms of $n$ and then paying out a large dividend.
Next, I show that the bank’s problem is well defined:

**Proposition 1.** There exists a unique value function \( V(n) \) that solves the bank’s problem, and \( V(n) \) is increasing in \( n \).

*Proof.* See Appendix B.

Intuitively, the proof hinges on the fact that \( \beta \) is less than unity, that dividends cannot exceed the beginning of the period capital position of the bank, and the concavity of preferences over dividends.

Given that the bank’s problem cannot be solved analytically, Proposition 1 is an important existence result. It implies that the Value Function Iteration algorithm can be used to compute arbitrarily accurate estimates of \( V \) and the corresponding policy functions \( s, d, \) and \( e \). I describe the attendant computational method in Appendix G. Next, I present two characteristics of the bank’s problem that reflect the planner’s trade-off.

**Proposition 2.** Banks with greater post-dividend capital \( n - e \) have a smaller default rate.

*Proof.* See Appendix C.

Intuitively, a bank with a higher \( n - e \) will have more assets given the capital constraint is binding: \( s = (n - e)/\chi \). The lower probability of default of such a bank follows from the fact that more assets on a bank’s balance sheet implies, ceteris paribus, lower riskiness on the back of higher expected return on assets and a lower standard deviation. Next, consider the following remark.

**Remark.** As long as \( \Delta(s) > 0 \), the deposit insurance agency’s cost of resolving a defaulted bank – given as the total shortfall in its liabilities – is an increasing function of the size of the bank.

Proposition 2 and the remark above together highlight the efficiency versus financial-stability trade-off that the benevolent planner faces when determining the optimal size-distribution of banks (similar as in the stylized model in Section 2): a larger bank is more
efficient and has a lower probability of default, ceteris paribus, but it also poses a larger social loss conditional on default.

### 3.2 Distribution of bank capital

Let the cumulative distribution of bank capital be given as $\mu$. That is, $\mu(N)$ denotes the mass of banks that have capital $n \leq N$ in the middle of the period. The distribution of banks evolves from one period to the other as follows. In a given period, banks choose their balance sheet components $s(n)$ and $d(n)$ depending on their respective capital amounts $n$. In the next period, banks grow, shrink, or exit depending on their asset return shocks $\psi$. Finally, new banks enter the industry with a random seed capital distributed according to $G(.)$. Formally, the evolution is given as follows:

$$
\mu'(N) = M' \int_{N}^{\infty} dG(n_e) + \int_{\tau} \left( \int \left[ \tau \leq \psi' s(n) - Rd(n) \leq N \right] f(\psi'; \theta(s(n)), \sigma(s(n))) d\psi' \right) d\mu(n)
$$

The first term on the right captures the mass $M'$ of entrant banks that enter next period and have start-up capital less than $N$. The second term represents the flow of incumbent banks into the $[\tau, N]$ subset of the state space, net of those that default. It is useful to express the evolution of bank capital distribution in terms of an operator: $\mu' = T(\mu, M')$. $T$ admits the following property:

**Proposition 3.** $T$ is linearly homogeneous in $(\mu, M)$. That is if $\mu_M$ is a fixed point of $T$ corresponding to an entry mass $M$, $\mu_M = T(\mu_M, M)$, then:

$$
\mu_M \times \frac{\hat{M}}{M} = T \left( \mu_M \times \frac{\hat{M}}{M}, \hat{M} \right).
$$

**Proof.** See Appendix D.

Intuitively, the key to the linear homogeneity of $T$ is that the default rate of banks
does not change with the mass of entrants. When the mass of entrants increases for a
given steady state distribution, the mass of incumbents increases in a way that the mass of
defaulting banks always matches the mass of entrants. Next, note the below proposition
which ensures that a stationary distribution exists.

**Proposition 4.** For any given $M > 0$, $\mathcal{T}$ has a fixed point.

$$
\mu_M = \mathcal{T}(\mu_M, M)
$$

*Proof.* See Appendix E.

---

**How does tighter regulation impact banks?** Tighter regulation affects banks in
three ways. First, a larger $\chi$ lowers the capital growth factor (CGF) of banks:
$$(\psi' - R)/\chi + R \downarrow.$$ Second, it improves the default cutoff and thus lowers the default rate of
banks: $\psi_c = R(1 - \chi) \downarrow \Rightarrow Pr(\psi' \leq \psi_c) \downarrow$. Third, banks lower their dividend payouts.
This is because as the capital constraint binds more strongly, the opportunity cost of
paying dividends (i.e. distributing capital) increases.

The combined effect of these mechanisms on the dynamics of the banking industry –
the size distribution in particular – is not obvious *ex-ante*. For one, the expected capital
growth factor (ECGF) of a bank of size $n$:

$$
ECGF(n) = \int_{R(1-\chi)} \left( \frac{\psi' - R}{\chi} + R \right) f(\psi'; \theta(s(n), \sigma(s(n)))) d\psi'
$$
can increase or decrease as $\chi$ increases. This is because as regulation tightens the growth
factor becomes smaller but default also becomes less likely. That said, assuming for the
sake of simplicity that the distribution of $\psi$ does not depend on $s$ leads to the following
result.

**Proposition 5.** If the distribution of $\psi$ does not depend on $s$, then tighter regulation
lowers the expected capital growth factor (ECGF) of banks.

Proof. See Appendix F.

Second, conditional on survival, the impact of tighter regulation on how the net worth of banks evolves is also not clear. For a bank with current period capital $n$, the capital position in the next period is given as:

$$n' = \left[\frac{(\psi' - R)}{\chi + R}\right] (n - e).$$

As regulation tightens, banks pay less dividends, so $n - e$ increases, but the capital growth factor (CGF) becomes smaller, making the impact ambiguous. Part of the problem in signing the impact is that a closed form solution for banks’ dividend policy function $e(n)$ is not available. That said, intuitively, for larger banks (as compared to smaller ones), cutting dividends is less costly due to the concavity of preferences over dividends. Thus, larger banks are likely to experience a smaller impact on their growth prospects.

Given the limits to obtaining further analytical insights due to unavailability of closed form solutions (which is typical in the case of heterogeneous agent models), I use numerical methods to solve the model in Section 5, and conduct counterfactual policy experiments on that basis.

4 Stationary competitive equilibrium

I focus on the stationary competitive equilibrium (SCE) of the economy where despite bank level dynamics, aggregates – including the size-distribution of banks – are time-invariant.

Definition For a given capital constraint $\chi$, an SCE consists of (i) bank value function $V(n)$, (ii) bank policy functions $s(n), d(n), e(n)$, (iii) bank capital distribution $\mu(n)$, (iv)
entrant mass $M$, (v) aggregate bank capital $N$, bank dividends $E$, consumption $C$, deposits $D$, output $Y$, taxes $T$, bankruptcy costs $O$ and interest rate $R$ such that:

1. $V(n), s(n), d(n)$ and $e(n)$ solve the bank’s problem given $R$;

2. $C$ satisfies the household’s first-order-condition given $R$;

3. Deposit market clears at interest rate $R$:

$$\int d(n)d\mu(n) = D;$$ (2)

4. Goods market clears: $W + Y = C + S + O$ where:

Output: $Y = E[\psi] S$

Consumption: $C = E + W + (R - 1)D - T$;

Dividends: $E = \int e(n)d\mu(n)$;

Bank Assets: $S = \int s(n)d\mu(n)$;

Bankruptcy cost: $O = \int \left( \int \psi \left( \psi' \Delta(s(n))s(n) - Rd(n) \right) f(\psi'; \theta(s(n)), \sigma(s(n))) d\psi' \right) d\mu(n)$;

5. The distribution of bank capital is the unique fixed point of the distribution evolution operator $\mathcal{T}$ given entrant mass $M$:

$$\mu = \mathcal{T}(\mu, M);$$

6. And the government runs a balanced budget:

$$T + tD = M \int n_e dG(n_e) +$$

$$\int \left( \int \psi \left( (1 - \Delta(s(n))) \psi' s(n) - Rd(n) \right) f(\psi'; \theta(s(n)), \sigma(s(n))) d\psi' \right) d\mu(n)$$
where the left-hand side terms denote the lump-sum tax and deposit insurance premium proceeds respectively, while the right-hand side terms denote the total start-up funding cost and the shortfall in liabilities of defaulted banks respectively.

The existence of an equilibrium is facilitated by the fact that the bank’s problem is well defined and admits unique value and policy functions, and that an invariant distribution of bank capital exists. The equilibrium can be solved for as follows. First, the household’s first-order condition implies that \( R = \frac{1}{\beta} \) since \( C \) is time-invariant in a stationary equilibrium. Given \( R \), the bank’s problem is solvable, and policy functions are determined. In turn, the steady-state distribution of capital as well as the equilibrium mass of entry-exit are obtained. Finally all other aggregates are pinned down using the expressions noted in the definition of the SCE above. I note this existence result in the proposition below:

**Proposition 6.** Given a capital constraint \( \chi \), the model economy admits a unique stationary competitive equilibrium.

**Rationale for regulation** Before closing this section, a few comments on the social efficiency of the stationary competitive equilibrium (SCE) are in order. The goal is to show that there is a role for regulation in the model, that regulation has meaningful welfare implications, and that a positive analysis of regulation is possible.

To this end, I compare the problem of a constrained social planner’s problem with that of the banks, and provide intuition for why the planner’s choices differ from the banks’ privately optimal choices. I consider a planner that wishes to maximize the lifetime utility of the representative household in the steady-state: \( u(C)/(1 − \beta) \), but is constrained in its planning abilities in the following sense. While it can dictate decision rules \( s(\cdot), e(\cdot) \) to incumbent banks, it does not interfere with government’s budget constraint or dictate consumption rules to the household. Planner’s decision rules \( s(\cdot), e(\cdot) \) map to household consumption \( C \) exactly like in the SCE, that is: \( C = W + Y - S - O = W + (E[\psi] - 1)S - O \).
Since $W$ is given exogenously, the planner’s problem is effectively:

$$\max_{s(n), e(n)} (E[\psi] - 1) \int s(n) d\mu(n) - \int \left( \int_{\psi_c}^{\psi_e} \Delta(s(n)) \psi'(s(n)) f(\psi'; \theta(s(n)), \sigma(s(n))) d\psi' \right) d\mu(n)$$

Note that the choice of $s(n), e(n)$ by the planner shapes $\mu(n)$, and ultimately affects both the value added of bank intermediation (first term) as well as the bankruptcy cost (second term). The above expression thus highlights the wedge between the planner’s objective (which takes into account bankruptcy costs) and the banks’ objectives (which ignores bankruptcy costs). I refer to this wedge as a default externality posed by the banks. This externality stems from the fact that banks assume higher leverage (than what is socially optimal) due to a mis-priced deposit insurance, which in turn increases their default probabilities, and therefore increases the social cost of their default which they do not internalize. The default externality rationalises regulatory intervention in this model.\textsuperscript{22}

5 Quantitative Analysis

In this section, I first describe the calibration of the benchmark model. I then describe how I solve the stationary competitive equilibrium numerically while employing global (non-linear) solution methods.

5.1 Calibration

I calibrate the benchmark model to data on the US commercial banks during the period 2000 to 2019. I obtain bank-level micro-data (i.e. balance sheet and profitability metrics)

\textsuperscript{22}Proving formally that the stationary equilibrium is constrained inefficient is beyond the scope of this paper. The main reason is that closed form solutions for bank policy functions and equilibrium distribution of capital are not available. In the next section, I confirm the intuition provided here by showing via numerical methods that tighter bank regulation can indeed lead to non-trivial welfare improvements in this economy.
from the FDIC Call and Thrift Financial (CTR) reports (via S&P Global SNL database). I use the FDIC’s Failed Banks and Historical Statistics on Banking databases for information on bank defaults.

As regards the various functional forms used in the model, in line with standard practice, I assume that households have a standard constant relative risk aversion (CRRA) utility function with a risk-aversion parameter equal to 2. On the bankers’ side, I assume that preferences over dividends are given as \( H(e) = \log(1 + e) \), which reflects their lower risk aversion relative to that of the household’s. To flexibly embed variation in bank efficiency by size, I assume that bank asset returns are normally distributed with both the mean and the standard deviation of returns being functions of the level of assets of the bank: mean \( \theta(s) = \theta_0 - \theta_1/(1 + s) \) and standard deviation \( \sigma(s) = \sigma_0 + \sigma_1/(1 + s) \). The distribution of start-up capital for entrant banks is assumed to be log-normally distributed as \( G(\theta_G, \sigma_G) \).

I divide the model parameters into two sets. As regards the first set of parameters (first block in Table 1), I use standard values from the literature or directly calibrate the parameter using its empirically observed value. I set the discount factor \( \beta \) to 0.99, which is consistent with an annual risk free interest rate of around 1%. In line with the Basel III minimum common-equity Tier-1 capital ratio requirement, \( \chi \) is set at 4.5% for all banks. The loss-rate \( \Delta \) is set at 22% for all banks. This value is based on the average losses incurred by the FDIC in resolving defaulted banks’ assets. Finally, the deposit insurance premium rate is set to 20 basis points (bps), which is guided by the FDIC deposit insurance premium rate that typically varies between 2 to 40 bps. Labor income endowment \( W \) is set to unity, and it serves as the numeraire.

The second set of parameters (second block in Table 1) are less standard, and are estimated jointly using the Method of Moments (MM). These are parameters that determine the profile of banks’ return on assets, namely \( \theta_0, \theta_1, \sigma_0, \sigma_1 \), the distribution of start-up capital, namely \( \theta_G, \sigma_G \), and the bank default threshold \( \tau \). To estimate these, I target a
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Parameters (value set individually)</th>
<th>Symbol</th>
<th>Value</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Discount factor</td>
<td>$\beta$</td>
<td>0.99</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Benchmark regulation</td>
<td>$\chi$</td>
<td>4.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Loss-rate of failed banks’ assets</td>
<td>$\Delta$</td>
<td>22%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Deposit insurance premium</td>
<td>$t$</td>
<td>20 bps</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Parameters (value set jointly using Method of Moments)</th>
<th>Symbol</th>
<th>Value</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Mean asset pay-off: common component</td>
<td>$\theta_0$</td>
<td>1.0201</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mean asset pay-off: size dependence</td>
<td>$\theta_1$</td>
<td>0.051</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>S.d. of asset pay-off: common component</td>
<td>$\sigma_0$</td>
<td>0.0195</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>S.d. of asset pay-off: size dependence</td>
<td>$\sigma_1$</td>
<td>0.0055</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mean size of entrant</td>
<td>$\theta_G$</td>
<td>165.02</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>S.d. of size of entrant</td>
<td>$\sigma_G$</td>
<td>7.4954</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Default threshold</td>
<td>$\tau$</td>
<td>7.0114</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Moments</th>
<th>Data</th>
<th>Model</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Mean of ROA</td>
<td>0.776%</td>
<td>0.803%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>S.d. of ROA</td>
<td>0.914%</td>
<td>2.208%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mean of ROA, larger versus smaller banks</td>
<td>23.8 bps</td>
<td>27.5 bps</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>S.d. of ROA, larger versus smaller banks</td>
<td>-25.5 bps</td>
<td>-29.7 bps</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dividend payout to capital ratio</td>
<td>4.996%</td>
<td>3.603%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Exit rate</td>
<td>3.966%</td>
<td>2.461%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ratio to smallest to median bank</td>
<td>1.453%</td>
<td>1.003%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KS statistic (relative to data distribution)</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>0.0515</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Power-law exponent of bank-size distribution</td>
<td>-0.7715</td>
<td>-0.7186</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 1: Summary of parameter values (first two blocks), and a comparison of data and model moments (third block). ROA = return on assets. S.d. = standard deviation. KS = Kolmogorov-Smirnov (KS) statistic, which is equal to the maximum distance between the model and data implied cumulative distributions of bank capital. The maximum distance is computed using the point-wise distance between the two distributions on a grid. See appendix G for details on the grid.

The number of moments computed from bank-level micro data. The goal is to target those moments that are more informative about the parameters that underpin how efficiency may vary by bank size and how the bank size distribution is shaped.

The first two moments are the mean and standard deviation of return on assets (ROA) – which relates to the overall profitability of banks. Next, to discipline the profitability of large banks relative to small banks in the model, I target the difference in mean ROA across larger and smaller banks, and similarly the difference in standard deviation of ROA.

I classify banks as larger or smaller based on the median bank size. Third, I target the dividend payout to capital ratio, which is another gauge of bank profitability. All these
moments are based on the pooled data during the period 2000 to 2019 (one period in the model is considered equivalent to one year in the data). Finally, I target the exit rate, a key aspect of the dynamics of the banking industry. I define the exit rate in the data as the ratio of annual number of defaults and mergers to the number of incumbent banks, averaged across 2000 to 2019.

Finally, I ensure that the model-implied and empirical bank-size distribution are aligned. For this, I adopt a two-pronged strategy. First, I minimise the Kolmogorov-Smirnov (KS) statistic that captures the maximum distance between the empirical cumulative distribution function obtained from the model-implied distribution and from the data. Second, I minimize the distance between the power law (PL) exponent estimated on the model-implied distribution and its empirical counterpart.\footnote{To estimate the PL component, I regress the log density on the log size of banks for when size is above a certain threshold. The threshold itself is chosen so that the Kolmogorov-Smirnov goodness-of-fit statistic is optimised.} While minimising the KS statistic helps align the overall model-implied distribution to the empirical one, minimising the distance between the PL exponents helps ensure that the respective heavy-tails of the distributions – an important empirical regularity in banking – are also aligned. I pursue these two minimization within the MM approach, i.e. these two statistics are minimized alongside minimizing the distance between the other model and data moments.

The third block in Table 1 describes the results of the MM approach. Overall, I estimate 7 parameters using 9 moments. It is useful to note that two of the targets, namely the KS statistic and the PL exponent, are effectively multiple moments because the entire empirical distribution (as opposed to some specific moments such as percentiles or the mean) is a target. As such, it is natural that the data and model moments are not exactly equal. That said, the approach delivers a reasonably close fit and helps ensure that the model is adequately disciplined by stylized facts in the data.
5.2 Assessing the stationary competitive equilibrium

I solve the stationary competitive equilibrium of the model economy using global solution methods that I describe in Appendix G.\footnote{Matlab codes used in this paper are available on the author’s website.} The equilibrium value and policy functions of the banks are plotted in Figure 5. The value function $V$ is concave and increasing in bank capital $n$, which is the state variable (panel 1). This is expected, not least given the concavity of preferences bankers have over dividends. Dividend policy is shown in panel 2. The convexity of dividend policy underscores that when capital is low, banks choose a lower dividend to capital ratio given that capital is more valuable to preserve (in order to meet the capital constraint). A larger bank, by contrast, can afford to pay an increasingly larger fraction of their capital as dividends because the marginal value of retained earnings is lower (due to the concavity of the value function). Panels 3 and 4 show that because banks are capital constrained by regulation, those with more capital are able to acquire
more deposit funding and more assets.

A key feature of the model is to incorporate differences in bank efficiency by size. Figure 6 shows how mean return on assets (ROA) and its standard deviation vary with bank size: larger banks have a higher and less volatile ROA. This not only reflects the empirical regularity that underpins our calibration, but is also consistent with empirical studies on scale economies in banking, such as Wheelock and Wilson [2018], and Hughes and Mester [2013] who show that even after adjusting for potentially greater risk-taking, bigger banks pose higher efficiency.

Another key aspect of the model is the endogenous size distribution of banks. In Figure 7, I compare the model generated distribution with that in data. The first panel shows the density, while the second panel shows the cumulative distribution function. The close alignment of the model and empirical distribution is not unexpected given that the distribution is one of the targets of the calibration. But this is not guaranteed ex-ante either, and reflects the strength of an otherwise parsimonious model.

The bottom panels of Figure 7 estimate a power law on the right-tail of the model and data distributions respectively. These panels underscore the ability of the model to not only generate a heavy tailed distribution of bank capital, but also one that is closely aligned with its empirical counterpart (compare the slopes of the fitted line in the
A good match of the model-implied and empirical distributions serves two important purposes. It allows for a quantitatively relevant assessment of the effect of changes in regulation on banking industry dynamics. Relatedly it facilitates an understanding of what changes in banking dynamics implies for optimal regulation. I pursue these analyses in the next section.

6 Counterfactual regulation

The goal in this section is to understand how changes in capital requirements affect banking dynamics, and to derive the optimal regulation. To this end, I consider counterfactual policy experiments where I perturb the benchmark regulation in various ways.
6.1 Uniform capital-ratio requirement

In the benchmark economy, all banks face the same non-risk-sensitive minimum capital-ratio requirement $\chi$ of 4.5%. In this section I study the case where $\chi$ increases uniformly for all banks. As $\chi$ increases, a bank with a given amount of capital is obviously more constrained and is able to invest in fewer assets (first panel of Figure 8). At the same time, banks pays smaller dividends (second panel). This is because as regulation tightens, the shadow value of capital increases, and retained earnings become more important. In addition, banks’ default probabilities decline (third panel). Indeed, as banks become less leveraged, deposit liabilities relative to expected payoff from assets become smaller, and so does the likelihood that banks are unable to cover their liabilities.

The impact of tighter regulation on the distribution of banks is more interesting (first panel of Figure 9, also recall discussion in Section 3.2). On the one hand, since banks default less often, they spend more time in incumbency and their average age increases (Proposition 2). On the other hand, since banks are less leveraged, they grow at a slower rate (Proposition 5). The combined effect is that as regulation tightens, the mass of middle-sized banks increases (second panel).

The welfare implication of tighter regulation is not obvious. There are three channels that work in potentially different directions and pose trade-offs. First, tighter regulation
Figure 9: Response in bank distribution as a function of the minimum capital-ratio requirement $\chi$.

reduces banks’ probability of default (PD), which is also welfare improving. Second, tighter regulation makes each bank more constrained, and leads to lower bank intermediation per unit of capital, which is welfare reducing. Third, as a result of the rightward shift (in the first order stochastic dominance sense) in the distribution of bank capital, average efficiency of the banking sector increases (welfare improving) but at the same time exposure at default (EAD) also increases (welfare reducing).

To assess which effect dominates, I consider the problem of a benevolent regulator that strives to maximize overall welfare by adjusting minimum capital-ratio requirement $\chi$. Welfare in this economy is measured by the household’s lifetime utility $u(C)/(1 - \beta)$ where $C$ is the aggregate consumption of bankers and workers in the household. I focus on comparing welfare across steady states, i.e., before and after an unanticipated change in regulation.\footnote{I abstract away from welfare dynamics during the transition from one steady-state economy. In large part, this is due to the computational challenges associated with computing the transition of the entire distribution of bank capital. For example, it is not obvious if the approach in Krusell and Smith [1998] (where the entire distribution can be adequately summarized by a few moments) can be used given that the bank distribution in this paper is heavy tailed. A potential caveat of comparing welfare in steady-states is that banks’ adjustment to new regulation may initially lead to lower welfare, which can make the transition to the new steady-state prohibitively costly. However, given that in practice major reforms are typically phased-in gradually, giving banks time to adjust, this caveat is likely to be less relevant.}

The transmission chain I am interested in is as follows. As regulation tightens, indi-
Figure 10: Aggregate outcomes as a function of the minimum capital-ratio requirement $\chi$.

Individual banks adjust their behavior. This leads to shifts in the dynamics of the banking sector, especially the size-distribution. In turn, the various macroeconomic aggregates, including output and bankruptcy costs, also adjust. And this has implications for how much households eventually consume, and therefore their welfare. In Figure 10, I present a series of computations to show exactly how a change in regulation transmits through the model economy.

For one, average profitability increases as $\chi$ increases (first panel). This has to do with a rightward shift in the distribution of banks, and the fact that larger banks pose efficiency gains.

Second, the total amount of bank capital in the economy increases (second panel). This finding underscores that even when banks cannot raise capital externally, the banking sector as a whole responds to tighter regulation by accumulating more capital via retained earnings. This increase in aggregate capital acts as a counteracting force to regulation,
and uncovers a *banking-dynamics channel* of regulation.

Third, the total amount of financial intermediation in the economy declines. This is because while aggregate capital increases, the fact that each bank is more constrained is the dominating force. Accordingly, aggregate assets of the banking sector (or total bank credit) declines (third panel). Relatedly, as banks become less leveraged, the average default rate among banks drops (fourth panel).

Bankruptcy costs, i.e. expected losses due to bank defaults, also declines (fifth panel), although this is not obvious ex-ante. On the one hand, banks’ probability of default (PD) declines as regulation tightens. On the other hand, as the distribution of banks shifts and there are fewer smaller-sized and more middle-sized banks, the exposure-at-default (EAD) for the banking sector increases. The combined impact on bankruptcy cost, which is formally given as $EL = PD \times EAD \times LGD$, is therefore ambiguous.\(^{26}\) Nonetheless, the simulations reveal that the former, i.e. PD effect, dominates. The observed decline in bankruptcy costs is an important channel via which tighter regulation produces welfare gains.

The welfare-improving and welfare-decreasing effects of tighter regulation, taken together, result in an inverted *U-shaped* response in aggregate welfare (sixth panel). The welfare maximising level of $\chi$ is around 5.1%, tighter relative to the benchmark of 4.5%. While not directly comparable, this result points in the same direction as that suggested in Begenau [2020], Admati and Hellwig [2014], Nguyen [2015] and Fender and Lewrick [2016].

The gain in welfare from a tightening of regulation from 4.5% to 5.1% can be expressed in terms of consumption equivalence (CE), defined as the fractional increase $\nu$ in consumption that the household would receive should it live in the optimal regime forever. That is, if A denotes the benchmark regime and B denotes the optimal capital regulation regime,

\(^{26}\)LGD is loss-given-default, which is given as $\Delta$ in the model, the loss-rate on a defaulted bank’s assets.
then $\nu$ is given as:

$$u\left((1 + \nu)C^A\right)/(1 - \beta) = u\left(C^B\right)/(1 - \beta)$$

The value of $\nu$ in this case is 1.09%, suggesting that tighter regulation leads to a material improvement in the household’s consumption.

**Role of industry dynamics** A natural question that arises is how important is the banking-dynamics channel – i.e. the endogenous response in the size-distribution and entry-exit of banks – for welfare and policy implications. To assess this, we consider a counterfactual setting where the distribution of banks is kept fixed as in the benchmark, and only individual banks’ behaviour is allowed to respond to a change in $\chi$. The first two panels of Figure 11 show how two key macroeconomic aggregates response to higher $\chi$ in this setting. Because the distribution of banks remains fixed, and because for each given level of capital the corresponding bank is more constrained in its ability to invest in assets, aggregate assets decline by more as compared to the baseline case (first panel). The reason is that, unlike in the baseline, now there is no countervailing force to regulation in the form of a rightward shift in the bank size distribution and the attendant increase in aggregate capital (recall Figure 10, second panel). As a result, in this setting, welfare declines precipitously as regulation tightens, whereas in the baseline setting, it followed an inverted U-shape.

**Role of the loss-rate** A higher loss-rate on defaulted banks’ assets, i.e. a higher $LGD$, can strengthen the case for regulation. This is because when the loss-rate $\Delta$ increases, bankruptcy costs increase (*ceteris paribus*). And reducing bankruptcy costs is a crucial channel via which regulation improves welfare. Indeed, in line with this intuition, we find that as $\Delta$ becomes larger, the optimal policy becomes more stringent, as shown in the third panel of Figure 11. Moreover, the welfare gain in going from the benchmark to the optimal policy regime is greater when the loss-rate is larger. This can be seen
Figure 11: First two panels: The response in aggregate outcomes, comparing the baseline case with a counterfactual one where the distribution of bank capital is held fixed as in the benchmark economy. Last panel: The implications of a change in the loss-rate $\Delta$ for the effect of regulation on welfare, and ultimately for optimal regulation.

by comparing the vertical distance between the black and red dots when $\Delta = 0.2$ versus when $\Delta = 0.4$. The figure also illustrates that as $\chi$ increases beyond optimal levels, the welfare difference between alternative $\Delta$ regimes becomes smaller. This is because as banks’ default probabilities approach zero due to a higher $\chi$, any change in the loss rate $\Delta$ becomes less relevant.

6.2 Equating the probability of default across banks

Thus far I considered a regulatory regime where all banks face the same minimum capital-ratio requirement, and therefore, are equally leveraged. However, regulation can be imposed differently. A common approach is imposing risk-sensitive capital requirements (such as in case of the Basel III framework), wherein the requirement is more stringent for banks whose assets are more risky. A perfectly risk-sensitive requirement may, in fact, equate banks’ probability of default ($PD$).

To assess the implications of such a requirement, I consider $\chi(.)$ to be such that for any given bank size $n$, $Pr_n(\psi' < \psi^c(n)) = \alpha$ where $\psi^c(n)$ is the default cutoff, and the subscript $Pr_n$ reflects the fact that the distribution of $\psi'$ potentially depends on $n$. $\alpha$
can be thought of as a Value-at-Risk (VaR) parameter that governs the stringency of the requirement: lower value of $\alpha$ implies tighter regulation. As the first two panels in Figure 12 show, the capital requirement needed to equalise PD across banks is one that is less stringent for larger banks. This is because larger banks have an inherently more favorable risk-return profile, and thus can satisfy the same PD as a smaller bank while maintaining a lower capital-ratio (i.e. higher leverage). As regulatory stringency captured by $\alpha$ changes, welfare traces an inverted U-shaped profile, as in the previous analysis (third panel). However, the maximum welfare achieved in this regime in lower than that achieved in the previous analysis. The reason for this sub-optimal welfare result in this case is that while large and small banks have the same PD, the expected loss ($EL$) of large banks is higher. Because EL is a key input to welfare in the economy, an unbalanced EL distribution leaves scope for welfare to be improved. By contrast, in the previous regime, where all banks are equally leveraged, larger banks end up having a smaller PD, which makes their EL relatively more comparable to that of smaller banks.
6.3 Equating expected losses across banks

Inspired by the insight from the previous analysis, I now consider the case where \( \chi(.) \) is such that the expected loss (EL) posed by each bank, given as \( PD \times EAD \times LGD \) where \( EAD = s \) and \( LGD = \Delta \), is equalised. Although not explicitly stated as such, this is roughly the idea behind the G-SIB framework (see BCBS [2018]) that strives to mitigate systemic risks posed by large banks by imposing a greater capital requirement on them.\(^{27}\)

In contrast with the previous analysis, larger banks face a more stringent requirement in this regime, irrespective of the targeted level of EL (first panel of Figure 13). The implied PDs and ELs are plotted in the second panel. By design, EL is the same across banks, but because EAD of larger banks is greater, this must be compensated by a smaller PD.

As regulatory stringency increases in this case, welfare traces an inverted U-shaped profile, similar to both previous analyses. Interestingly, however, the maximum welfare achieved in this regime is the highest so far. The intuition for this result is that equating EL across banks takes into account the fact that the distribution of default probabilities and exposure at default – both which underpin the overall EL of the banking sector – depend on the distribution of banks.

6.4 Size-dependent policy

The three alternative regulatory regimes considered so far equalise a specific metric across banks. These are (i) the non-risk-weighted capital-ratio (i.e. leverage), (ii) the probability of default PD, or (iii) the expected loss EL, respectively. The shortcoming of these rules, however, is that they do not fully internalize the efficiency versus financial-stability trade-off.

To see this, consider the first regime studied above. In that regime, the capital require-
ment is the same for all banks, and does not take into account any differences across banks. In the second regime, a perfectly risk-sensitive requirement takes into account that large banks are more efficient and thus less likely to default \((PD)\), but abstracts away from how overall exposure at default \((EAD)\) depends on the distribution of banks. The third regime improves upon the first two by taking both \(PD\) and \(EAD\) into account and equalising \(EL\) across banks. In doing so, the third regime acknowledges that larger banks are less likely to fail \((\text{ceteris paribus})\) but also more costly to resolve when in default. Yet, it is not obvious why equalising \(EL\) across banks should be the principal criteria behind setting \(\chi\). \(EL\) is only one determinant of aggregate welfare in the economy – the value of financial intermediation in the economy, underpinned by the aggregate assets of the banking sector, is another key component of overall welfare. This component also depends on how banks respond to regulation, and therefore, only optimising on the basis of \(EL\) falls short off fully optimising the efficiency versus financial-stability trade-off. In other words, equalising \(PD\) or \(EAD\) across banks optimises aspects of the costs the banking sector poses, but does not take into account the benefits it brings. To this end, in this section I consider a fully flexible size-dependent capital requirement, and assess the welfare implications of such a
Formally, I assume that \( \chi(n) \) can vary depending on the amount of capital a bank has at the beginning of the period.\(^{28}\) To strike a balance between retaining a flexible specification and avoiding dimensionality issues, I consider \( \chi(n) \) to have a quadratic form with three free parameters:

\[
\chi(n) = \chi_0 + \chi_1 n + \chi_2 n^2
\]

To further discipline the optimisation problem of the regulator striving for the welfare maximising \( \chi(n) \) profile, I restrict attention to \( \chi(n) \in [0\%, 100\%] \). This ensures that the minimum requirement does not diverge to absurd values. I also assume the following limiting condition, \( \lim_{n \to n^*} \chi'(n) = 0 \), to ensure that as bank size increases regulation stabilises at a certain level, which could even be a 100\% capital requirement.\(^{29}\) The

\(^{28}\)Recall that size is measured by the amount of capital banks have. Alternatively, size could be measured by the amount of assets and regulation could be set on that basis. However, capital is a state variable for banks’ decisions, and banks’ assets are uniquely determined by the amount of capital they have. This means that in this model regulation that varies across banks on the basis of their assets would be equivalent to the one that varies on the basis of their capital.

\(^{29}\)I consider this parametric form for \( \chi \) for tractability. Otherwise, the space of functions over which to optimise can become high dimensional. For instance, in principle, the model can admit the analysis of a
condition reduces the number of free parameters in \( \chi(n) \) from three to two. In turn it allows \( \chi(n) \) to be expressed in terms of \( \chi_s \) and \( \chi_l \), the minimum requirement applicable to the smallest and the largest banks (i.e. \( n = \overline{n} \)) respectively:

\[
\chi(n) = (\chi_s - \chi_l) \left( \frac{n}{\overline{n}} \right)^2 - 2(\chi_s - \chi_l) \left( \frac{n}{\overline{n}} \right) + \chi_s
\]  

(3)

The welfare profile as a function of \((\chi_s, \chi_l)\) is hump-shaped as shown in Figure 14, left-hand panel. This is similar in spirit to the inverted U-shaped profile in previous regimes. The welfare maximizing regulation profile is shown in right-hand panel. Compared to the benchmark of 4.5\%, and the optimal size-independent regulation of 5.1\%, the optimal size-dependent regulation features a relatively stringent requirement of around 7\% for the largest banks. Even though the rationale for regulation and underlying mechanisms are different, this result points in the same direction as Dávila and Walther [2020]. It also supports the spirit of the G-SIB framework in terms of imposing tighter regulation on the larger banks. In fact, quantitatively, the model implied requirement of 7\% is close to what the G-SIB framework has set in place for the largest G-SIB (namely J. P. Morgan, which faces a surcharge of 2.5\% on top of the baseline requirement of 4.5\%). That said, in contrast to the G-SIB framework, the analysis suggests a much relaxed requirement in case of the smaller banks, close to 1\%.

The economic rationale for such a regime may be understood as follows. On the one hand, this regime allows smaller banks to assume higher leverage, which has the benefit that they can potentially grow faster and rapidly benefit from scale economies. Obviously, this means that small banks default somewhat more often, but then, small bank defaults are socially less costly. On the other hand, once banks become large and their default more costly, this regime limits the expected loss posed by them by lowering their default rate via a higher capital requirement.

\textit{step function} \( \chi(n) \) – as in the case of the G-SIB framework – but this requires many more free parameters to optimise on and is computationally challenging.
Qualitatively, this regime is comparable to the previous one in the sense that the optimal regulation is tighter for larger banks (recall first panel of Figure 13). However, a flexible size-dependent regime can achieve higher welfare. While this result is mathematically obvious since the regulator is less constrained in this regime, the main insight is about where the welfare gain comes from. As discussed above, the gain stems from the fact that a policy rule that only equates $EL$ or $PD$ across banks misses on the size-dependency of both efficiency and financial-stability. Quantitatively, the welfare gains from adopting a flexible regime are substantial, at 11.5% in consumption equivalence terms.\footnote{That said, a more flexible policy rule may be more difficult to implement in practice. Simpler rules that equate some tangible metric across banks can be easier to state, implement, and ensure compliance as compared to a more complex rule that imposes bank-specific requirements based on, say, their performance in a stress test.}

7 Endogenous returns on assets and mass of banks

Thus far I have assumed that the return on banks’ assets is given exogenously, and that the mass of banks is fixed at unity. While these assumptions make the model more tractable, they abstract away from two potential channels through which regulation can transmit. In this section, I relax these assumptions and reassess the regulatory and welfare implications.

7.1 Response of returns on assets to regulation

I first endogenize the return on assets. To this end, I assume that the banking sector as a whole faces a downward sloping demand for bank credit. That is, when banks collectively invest in more assets, the return on any individual bank’s investments is lower. This means that as regulation tightens and alters the level of banks’ aggregate investment, the return on assets also changes. This then triggers a second-round effect on individual banks’ behaviors, which is new relative to the channel in the benchmark model. Ultimately, this has implications for aggregate welfare and optimal regulation.
To analyse the role of this channel, I assume that $\theta$, the expected return on any individual bank’s assets, is a decreasing function of aggregate bank assets $S$ in the economy:\footnote{The reduced form approach to modeling the relation between $\theta$ and $S$ in this paper is similar to the one adopted in the seminal Monte-Klein model (Klein [1971]; Monti [1972]), and also more recently in Liu [2019]. That said, this relation can be micro-founded by assuming a representative firm that seeks bank funding and exhibits decreasing returns to capital, like in Gertler and Kiyotaki [2010] for example.}

$$\theta(S) = \rho_0 + \frac{\rho_1}{(1 + S/S_{\text{benchmark}})},$$

where I assume that $\theta(S)$ is such that $\theta(S_{\text{benchmark}}) = \theta_0$ where recall that $\theta_0$ (Table 1) is the component of $\theta$ that does not depend on an individual bank’s size. For tractability of studying this new channel, I switch off bank-level economies of scale, so that $\theta_1 = 0$. One parameterization that is consistent with this condition is $\rho_0 = 1.0191, \rho_1 = 0.002$. With that, I assess the implications of an increase in the minimum capital-ratio requirement above its benchmark value of 4.5%.$^{32}$

\footnote{The algorithm to solve the model for a given level of regulation in this case is more involved as compared to the one in the benchmark. For a guessed starting value of return on assets, $\theta_{\text{guess}}$, I solve the model and compute the corresponding $S$. Then, I compute the $\theta_{\text{implied}}$ implied by the $S$ according to the assumed functional relation between them. Finally, I adjust the guess as follows: $\theta_{\text{guess}} \rightarrow (1 - \omega)\theta_{\text{guess}} + \omega\theta_{\text{implied}}$ where $\omega$ is the adjustment weight that I set to 0.33 (to keep the updating process stable).}
As shown in the first panel of Figure 15, as $\chi$ increases, total assets of the banking sector declines (blue line). But compared to the benchmark economy, the decline is smaller (compare blue line with red line). This is because as aggregate assets decline, return on assets increases (second panel), which improves the ability of banks to generate earnings and build capital. This further pushes the bank size-distribution rightwards (in a stochastic dominance sense). The extended model, therefore, embeds an additional countervailing force in response to tighter regulation. In turn, this allows regulation to push harder as the welfare cost of tighter regulation – which comes from the fact that banks become constrained and can intermediate less – is lower in a ceteris paribus sense. Indeed, as the third panel shows, optimal $\chi$ as well as the maximised welfare in the endogenous $\theta$ case are higher than in the exogenous $\theta$ case.\(^{33}\)

7.2 Response of mass of banks to regulation

In the benchmark economy, recall that insolvent banks re-enter the industry upon receiving a random amount of seed capital. This captures the spirit of bank entry-exit in practice wherein insolvent banks are typically merged with incumbent banks after some capital injection by the acquirer, but abstracts away from the possibility that an additional mass of banks may enter the industry each period depending on how profitable it is to do so. To allow for this profitability-dependent entry in the model, and therefore to have an endogenously determined equilibrium mass of banks, I consider the following extension of the benchmark model.

I assume that there is a mass of potential entrants whose opportunity cost of entering the banking sector is randomly distributed as per $\mathcal{F}_e(\cdot; \theta_e, \sigma_e)$, where $\mathcal{F}_e$ is a cumulative normal distribution with mean $\theta_e$ and standard deviation $\sigma_e$. The opportunity cost can be thought of as the value of an investment project that the entrant has access to – the

\(^{33}\)Note that the exogenous $\theta$ case is not identical or directly comparable to the benchmark regime as $\theta_1$ is assumed to be zero in this case in order to focus on the role that an endogenous theta plays.
so-called *outside option*. This means that a potential entrant enters the banking industry if the expected present discounted value of entering:

$$EV_e = \int V(n_e) dG(n_e)$$

is greater than their opportunity cost (as also in Hopenhayn [1992]). So, when $EV_e$ increases, there are more entrants. The relationship between $EV_e$ and entrant mass can then be expressed as follows:

$$M(EV_e) = \alpha_e F_e(EV_e; \theta_e, \sigma_e),$$

where $M$ is the mass of entrants and $\alpha_e$ is a scaling factor. What this specification means is that as $EV_e$ increases relative to $\theta_e$, the mass of entrants increases asymptotically to a maximum of $\alpha_e$. To facilitate a comparison with the benchmark economy, I impose the condition that $M(EV_e^{benchmark}) = M_{benchmark}$, and consider the following parameterization that is consistent with the above specification: $\alpha_e = 1.01 \times M_{benchmark}$, $\theta_e = EV_e^{benchmark}/1.05$, and $\sigma_e = 0.02 \times EV_e^{benchmark}$.

Next, I assess the implications of a change in the minimum capital-ratio requirement from its benchmark value of 4.5%. As regulation tightens, banks become more constrained, and the expected present discounted value of all banks declines. As a result, the expected value of entry into the banking sector also declines, and fewer entrants enter the industry (first panel of Figure 16). The total mass of incumbent banks, however, follows an inverted U-shaped pattern (second panel). This non-monotonic response is because the mass of incumbent banks depends on how fast the mass of entrants declines *relative* to the drop in incumbent banks’ average default rate.

---

34The solution algorithm in this case is similar to the one where return on assets is endogenous, except that in each iteration, there are three additional steps. For a given value of $\theta_{guess}$, first $EV_e$ is computed. Then the mass of entrants $M$ is back out. Correspondingly, the mass of incumbents is obtained, which in turn is used to compute the model implied value of $S$ and eventually $\theta_{implied}$. 

51
To illustrate this point via an example, let the mass of entrants be $M$, the mass of incumbents be $M^I$, and the default probability be $p$. In the stationary competitive equilibrium, these quantities must satisfy the relation $p = M/M^I$. When regulation tightens, $p$ drops since banks are better capitalised, while $M$ drops since expected value of entry is lower. Then, if $p$ drops by a lot more (less) relative to $M$, mass of incumbents would increase (decrease).

Relatedly, it is useful to note that initially the decline in default rate is rapid, driving up the mass of incumbents, while once there is a more rapid decline in expected value of entry, entry also drops substantially, which brings down the equilibrium mass of banks. Aggregate capital, which is closely related to the mass of incumbent banks, also follows an inverted U-shaped pattern (third panel). This is in contrast to the benchmark where aggregate capital increased monotonically for the range of $\chi$ considered (recall Figure 10).
The policy implication in this case is that the optimal regulation (fourth panel) is less stringent as compared to the optimal in the benchmark economy (where it was close to 5.1%). Indeed, by constraining banks, tighter regulation creates disincentives for potential entrants to enter the banking sector, and makes regulation more costly than in the benchmark economy.

8 Conclusion

This paper is concerned with the efficiency versus financial-stability trade-off in banking—the fact that larger banks may be more efficient but their default can be socially more costly. It strives to understand how capital regulation can help balance this trade-off. The goal is both positive and normative analysis of capital regulation in this regard.

To achieve its goal, the paper develops a tractable general equilibrium model of a heterogeneous banking sector with endogenous size-distribution and entry-exit. Two core aspects of the model are that the organisation of the banking sector features a non-trivial response to regulation, and that there is an explicit welfare rationale for regulation, namely the bank default externality.

The paper shows that banking industry dynamics is an important channel through which capital regulation operates. While individual banks are obviously affected by regulation, regulation also shapes the overall dynamics of the banking sector, especially the size-distribution of banks. In turn, this has aggregate implications that do not necessarily go in the same direction and thus pose a trade-off for the regulator. For instance, tighter regulation leads to a rightward shift in the size-distribution of banks and at the same time a less heavy right-tail. While this leads to an increase in the aggregate capital stock, the impact on aggregate efficiency and expected default losses is ambiguous.

The paper uses a series of counterfactual experiments to determine the optimal regulation. It shows that a capital requirement regime that equates leverage, default rate, or
expected default losses across banks falls short of balancing the efficiency versus financial-stability trade-off. This is because such regimes focus on minimising the costs posed by the banking sector, but fail to take account of how bank efficiency and thus their added-value responds to regulation. The paper shows that the optimal regulation should, therefore, be size-dependent.

The paper lends support to the idea of imposing tighter regulation on larger banks, as in case of the G-SIB framework, but it also stresses that regulation can do better by taking into account the fact that both efficiency and financial-stability risks vary as a function of bank size. Taking differences in bank efficiency seriously is increasingly relevant for policy design today as established technology companies and start-ups tend to gain financial-sector market share rapidly on the back of data-driven scale economies. The tractable model developed in this paper can facilitate the analysis of these issues in subsequent research.

Acknowledgements

I am grateful to Assaf Razin, Fernando Alvarez, Pablo D’Erasmo (discussant), Karel Mertens, Eswar S. Prasad, and Maxim Troshkin for insightful discussions. I am also very thankful to John M. Abowd, Viral V. Acharya, Javier Bianchi, Frederic Boissay, Markus Brunnermeier, Julieta Caunedo, Dean Corbae, Christopher Huckfeldt, Benjamin Moll, Guillermo L. Ordonez, Edouard Schaal, Alp Simsek, Julia Thomas, and conference / seminar participants at Cornell, Goethe, Penn-State, Tilburg EBC Conference, Cambridge MMF, Oxford IFABS, AEA, Midwest-Macro, City University of Hong Kong, World Finance and Banking Symposium Budapest, BIS, RBI, IIM Bangalore, and Yale-NUS College for useful comments. Any errors in this paper are my responsibility.
References


*Society for Economic Dynamics Meeting Papers 268.*


Appendices

A Risk-adjusted profitability metrics versus bank size

Figure 17: The panels show a scatter plot of log assets (x-axis) and risk-adjusted profitability metrics (y-axis) of US commercial and savings banks. Annual data is pooled over 2000-2019, bank and year fixed effects are controlled for, and each profitability metric is winsorized at the 1% and 99% levels. **Left-hand panel:** Return on risk-weighted assets, defined as net income to risk-weighted asset ratio. **Right-hand panel:** Risk-adjusted return on assets, defined as net income to assets ratio divided by its standard deviation. **Source:** SNL.

B Characteristics of the bank’s problem

**Proof.** To keep the proof tractable and analytically feasible, I assume that deposit premium \( t = 0 \), default size cutoff \( \tau = 0 \), and that the capital constraint is not sensitive to size or riskiness of a bank, i.e. \( \chi = (n-e)/s \). With these simplifications, I note that \( s = (n-e)/\chi \), \( d = (n-e)/(1/\chi - 1) \), \( \psi_e = R(1-\chi) \), and \( n' = \left[\psi'/\chi - R(1/\chi - 1)\right](n-e) \). The bank’s problem can thus be written in terms of a single decision variable \( e \) as follows:

\[
V(n) = \max_e \left( H(e) + \beta \int_{R(1-\chi)} V\left(\left[\psi'/\chi - R(1/\chi - 1)\right](n-e)\right)f(\psi'; \theta, \sigma)d\psi' \right)
\]
I follow the strategy in Stokey and Lucas [1989] to prove that the Bellman operator underpinning the above equation has a unique fixed point. First note that the payoff $H(e)$ is bounded since $0 \leq e \leq n$. Next, I show that the Blackwell Conditions are satisfied. Let $C$ be the class of continuous functions on the non-negative real line $\mathbb{R}_+$, and define the Bellman operator $Q$ for an arbitrary value function $q \in C$ as:

$$Q(q(n)) = \max_e \left( H(e) + \beta \int_{R(1-\chi)} q \left( \left[ \psi' / \chi - R(1/\chi - 1) \right] (n - e) \right) f(\psi'; \theta, \sigma) d\psi' \right)$$

The first Blackwell Condition has to do with the Monotonicity of the Bellman operator $Q$, that is:

$$\forall l, q \in C \text{ s.t. } l(n) \leq q(n) \forall n \in \mathbb{R}_+ \implies Q(l(n)) \leq Q(q(n)) \forall n \in \mathbb{R}_+$$

Let $e^l$ and $e^q$ be the maximands of $Q(l(n))$ and $Q(q(n))$ respectively. Crucially, $e^l$ is a feasible choice for the Bellman operator on $q$ at $n$. This implies that:

$$Q(l(n)) \bigg|_{\text{at } e^l} \leq Q(q(n)) \bigg|_{\text{at } e^l} \leq Q(q(n)) \bigg|_{\text{at } e^q}$$

where the $|_{\text{at } e}$ notation stands for the computation of the Bellman operator at $e$. The first inequality follows simply from the fact that $l(n) \leq q(n)$, while the second one follows from the fact that $e_q$ maximises $Q(q(n))$. The second Blackwell Condition has to do with the Discounting property of $Q$:

$$\exists \Delta \in (0, 1) \text{ s.t. } \forall q \in C, \forall a \geq 0, \forall n \in \mathcal{N} \implies Q(q(n) + a) \leq Q(q(n)) + \Delta a$$

To show this, consider:

$$Q(q(n) + a) = \max_e \left( H(e) + \beta \int_{R(1-\chi)} \left( q(n') + a \right) f(\psi'; \theta, \sigma) d\psi' \right)$$
\[
\leq \max_e \left( \mathcal{H}(e) + \beta \int_{R(1-\chi)} q(n') f(\psi'; \theta, \sigma) d\psi' \right) + \max_e \beta a \int_{R(1-\chi)} f(\psi'; \theta, \sigma) d\psi' \\
\text{probability of solvency: } 0 < \zeta < 1
\]

The inequality follows from the fact that the maximized sum of two or more functions cannot exceed the sum of the maximized values of those functions. In the second maximization, \( e = 0 \) is the optimal choice since it results in the smaller variance in \( \psi' \) and thus a higher probability \( \zeta \in (0, 1) \) of remaining solvent. In turn, this implies that the second term is equal to \( \beta \zeta a \). With \( \Delta = \beta \zeta \), this verifies the second Blackwell condition. Thus, the Bellman operator has a unique fixed point, say \( V \), which corresponds to the bank’s value and policy functions.

To show that \( V \) is increasing, let \( n_1 < n_2 \) be two potential states for the bank’s problem, and let \( e_1 \) be the corresponding policy choice when state is \( n_1 \). Then choosing \( e_2 = n_2 - n_1 + e_1 > e_1 \) effectively keeps the post dividend capital in state \( n_2 \) the same as that in state \( n_1 \). As a result, the policy choices namely \( s \) and \( d \) and endogenous variables \( n' \) and \( \psi_c \) are also the same across the two states since all of them depend on post dividend capital. Finally, since a feasible dividend choice in case of state \( n_2 \), i.e. \( e_2 \) achieves strictly greater payoff relative to \( n_1 \) (\( \mathcal{H} \) is an increasing function), the maximized value at \( n_2 \) i.e. \( V(n_2) \) is greater than \( V(n_1) \).

\[ \blacksquare \]

### C Leverage and default

**Proof.** The default probability of a bank with post dividend capital \( \hat{n} \) can be written as:

\[
p(\hat{n}) = \int_{\psi_c} f(\psi'; \theta(s), \sigma(s)) d\psi' = F(\psi_c; \theta(s), \sigma(s))
\]

where \( F(.) \) is the cumulative distribution function of \( \psi' \). Under the simplifying assumptions considered for this proposition, the default cutoff is the same for all banks and is given as \( \psi_c^e = R(1 - \chi) \). The dependence of \( p \) on \( \hat{n} \), therefore, results from the fact that
\( \theta(s) \) increases and \( \sigma(s) \) decreases as \( \hat{n} \) increases. This is because a larger \( \hat{n} \) leads to a larger \( s = \hat{n}/\chi \), and that \( \theta'(s) > 0 \) and \( \sigma'(s) < 0 \). Therefore, \( p'(%2000*\hat{n}) < 0. \)

\[ \text{D Homogeneity of distribution evolution operator } T \]

\textit{Proof}. Let \( \mu_M \) be the stationary distribution corresponding to \( M : \mu_M = T(\mu_M, M) \). Next, define a transition function \( W(n, N) \) which denotes the probability that a bank of size \( n \) on date \( t \) evolves into a bank of size in the range \([\tau, N]\) on date \( t + 1 \). Note that this implicitly means that defaults are excluded when accounting for the transition. Then,

\[
\mu_M(N) = M \int_{0}^{N} dG(n_e) + \int_{\tau}^{N} W(n, N) d\mu_M(n)
\]

(4)

Multiplying both sides by \( \hat{M}/M \) gives the following

\[
\mu_M(N) \frac{\hat{M}}{M} = \hat{M} \int_{0}^{N} dG(n_e) + \int_{\tau}^{N} W(n, N) d\mu_M(n) \frac{\hat{M}}{M}
\]

But this means that the measure \( \mu_M \) scaled by \( \frac{\hat{M}}{M} \) is a new measure that is invariant under the operator \( T \) and entry mass \( \hat{M} \). This proves the proposition. \[ \text{E Fixed-point of the distribution evolution operator } T \]

\textit{Proof}. The proof closely follows corollary 4 in Hopenhayn and Prescott [1992]. As shown there, a sufficient condition for the existence of a fixed point is that the distribution evolution operator \( T \) is \textit{increasing}: that is, if \( \mu' \succ \mu \) then \( T\mu' \succ T\mu \), where \( \succ \) stands for stochastic dominance.

I proceed as follows. Let \( \mathcal{A} \) be an \textit{increasing set}, that is \( \mathcal{A} \) equals the set of all
elements of the state space that are larger than some element of \( \mathcal{A} \). Then, for any \( n' > n \), the transition function satisfies \( W(n', \mathcal{A}) > W(n, \mathcal{A}) \). This is because in the context of the model economy, any increasing set is basically the entire state space beyond a certain point, say \( n \), in which case \( W(n, \mathcal{A}) \) is the probability that a bank evolves to become larger than that point. But following the intuition behind proposition 2, this probability is higher for larger banks.

Now let \( f \) be any increasing, non-negative, and bounded function. Without loss of generality, \( f \) can be cast as a measurable indicator function of some increasing set \( \mathcal{A} \). This implies that \( \int f d[\mathcal{T}\mu'](n) = \mathcal{T}\mu'(\mathcal{A}) \). Next, given that in equation (4) in Appendix D the term due to entrants remains unaffected when applying \( \mathcal{T} \) on two alternative distributions \( \mu' \) and \( \mu \), we can focus on the term due to incumbents, in particular the transition function \( W: \mathcal{T}\mu'(\mathcal{A}) = \int_{\mathcal{T}} W(n, \mathcal{A})d\mu'(n) \). Then, since \( W(.,\mathcal{A}) \) is increasing as we showed above, we get the following result, where the first inequality follows from the fact that \( \mu' \succeq \mu \):

\[
\int_{\mathcal{T}} W(n, \mathcal{A})d\mu'(n) \geq \int_{\mathcal{T}} W(n, \mathcal{A})d\mu(n) = \mathcal{T}\mu(\mathcal{A}) = \int fd[\mathcal{T}\mu](n)
\]

\[\blacksquare\]

F Impact on expected capital growth factor

Proof. The expected capital growth factor (ECGF) is given as:

\[
ECGF = \int_{R(1-\chi)} \left( \frac{\psi' - R}{\chi} + R \right) f(\psi') d\psi'
\]

The derivative w.r.t. \( \chi \) (while applying the Liebniz rule) is given as follows:

\[
\frac{\partial ECGF}{\partial \chi} = - \int_{R(1-\chi)} \left( \frac{\psi' - R}{\chi^2} \right) f(\psi') d\psi' - \left[ \left( \frac{\psi' - R}{\chi^2} + R \right) f(\psi') \right]_{\psi'=R(1-\chi)} (-R)
\]
The second term is zero, and the first term is negative since $E[\psi'] > R$, which completes the proof.

\section*{G Computational details}

\textbf{Solving the bank’s problem (Bellman equation):} I use value-function iteration to obtain the value and policy functions of the bank’s problem. The state-space, which is bank capital, is discretized using 50 log-spaced grid points on the interval $[\tau, 5000]$ where $\tau$ is the smallest possible size of the bank – a bank with capital below this threshold is considered defaulted. Note that the upper limit on the grid is set arbitrarily, and can be adjusted without material consequences for the conclusions in this paper. I use cubic-spline interpolation and linear extrapolation to evaluate the value functions at off-grid points. Starting with an initial guess for the value function, I iterate on the solution to the bank’s problem subject to the various constraints. I continue to update the value function until the maximum difference (at any grid point) between the old and updated value functions is smaller than a threshold. I then obtain the policy functions on a grid with 1000 equally spaced points using spline interpolation.

\textbf{Computing the stationary distribution:} To obtain the invariant distribution of bank capital, I construct a state-transition matrix using banks’ policy functions. The transition matrix denotes the probability that a bank transitions from the neighbourhood of one grid point to the neighbourhood of another grid point in the state space. The neighbourhoods are chosen to be of equal size across grid points, so that the entire state space is covered. To handle entry and exit of banks, I introduce a so-called \textit{dump-state} in the state-space. The dump-state corresponds to $n < \tau$. A bank whose capital drops below $\tau$ (due to low return on assets) defaults and enters this dump-state from one of the \textit{incumbent states}. 

66
An entrant bank is one that leaves the dump state to enter one of the incumbent states. This approach works precisely because in the stationary equilibrium, the mass of entrants equals the mass of defaulters. The ergodic distribution of the transition matrix gives the stationary distribution of the state variable, that is, the steady-state distribution of bank capital. Essentially, this distribution is one that is invariant when operated upon by the transition matrix. The mass of banks in the dump state in the steady-state distribution denotes the mass of defaulting banks.

**Computing aggregates including welfare:** Next, I use the stationary distribution of compute overall bank capital, deposits, dividends, and assets in the economy using the set of equations that describe the equilibrium (see Section 4). Using the same set of equations, I then compute total output in the economy, insurance premium receipts, and the shortfall in liabilities of defaulting banks. In turn, this pins down the government budget constraint. Finally, I obtain household consumption and welfare.