

The Effect of Instant Payments on the Banking System: Liquidity Transformation and Risk-Taking

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Motivation

- **Instant payment systems (IPS):** real-time interbank transfers, spreading globally
 - **For customers:** faster, more convenient payments (similar to CBDCs)
 - **For banks:** deposits stay on balance sheets (\neq CBDCs)
- **Key change in payment systems:**
 - Traditional: settlement delayed until end of day or more — payment netting possible
 - IPS: settlement immediate — **no delay \rightarrow no netting**
- \Rightarrow IPS exposes banks to more volatile **intraday payment shocks**
- **Research question:** How do banks adapt to loss of payment netting?
 - Do they still perform liquidity transformation?
 - What happens to credit supply and risk-taking?

This Paper

- **Setting:** Brazil's Pix (Nov 2020)
- **Approach**
 - Stylized facts on banks' transition to IPS
 - Theoretical model: netting loss → liquidity shift → risk-taking in lending
 - Empirical IV specification:

$$Y_{it} = \beta \cdot \text{PixNettable}_{it} + \gamma' X_{it} + \beta_i + \beta_t + \varepsilon_{it}$$

- **PixNettable_{it}:** Bank i 's nettable Pix flows / total assets
- **Instrument:** Bank i 's exposure to timeouts at counterparty banks

- **Main effects (β)**
 - **Balance sheets:** liquid assets \uparrow ; loans \downarrow ; demandable deposits \uparrow
 - **Loan portfolio:** prime \downarrow ; subprime \uparrow ; defaults \uparrow ; loss reserves \uparrow
 - **Income:** loan income \downarrow ; total income \uparrow (gov. bonds + fees)

All are ratios per total assets, except loan portfolio (per total loans).


Roadmap

1. Paper's Strengths
2. Regressor of Interest: **PixUsage** vs. **PixNettable**
3. Model Predictions vs. Empirical Design
4. Instrumental Variable Strategy

#1: Paper's Strengths

- **Important and timely question with relevance beyond Brazil**
- **Exceptional setting + ambitious empirical aim**
 - Near-universal Pix adoption (85-88% of bank assets) with substantial cross-bank variation in customer usage
 - Transaction-level Pix data including timeout information
 - Empirical approach aims to estimate causal effects of instant settlement
- **Rich theoretical framework**
 - Testable predictions for liquidity, deposits, lending, and income
 - Novel mechanism: loss of payment netting → ↑ liquid buffers → ↑ credit risk-taking

#2: Regressor of Interest: *PixUsage*



$$\begin{aligned} \text{PixUsage}_{it} &= \text{Outflows}_{it} + \text{Inflows}_{it} \\ &= \text{NettablePayments}_{it} + \text{UnnettablePayments}_{it} \end{aligned}$$

#2: Regressor of Interest: *PixUsage*

- Pix usage (customers' Pix activity) can be expressed as:

$$\text{PixUsage}_{it} = \text{NettablePayments}_{it} + \text{UnnettablePayments}_{it}.$$

where:

$$\text{NettablePayments}_{it} = 2 \times \sum_{d \in t} \min(\text{Outflows}_{id}, \text{Inflows}_{id}),$$

$$\text{UnnettablePayments}_{it} = \sum_{d \in t} |\text{Outflows}_{id} - \text{Inflows}_{id}|.$$

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- The paper's regressor of interest (scaled by total assets) is defined as:

$$\text{PixUsage}_{it} = \frac{\sum_{d \in t} \min(\text{Outflows}_{id}, \text{Inflows}_{id})}{\text{TotalAssets}_{it}}. \quad (3.1)$$

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- Equation (3.1) captures the **bank's nettable payment ratio** (i.e., the **loss of netting ability**), not the **customers' Pix activity**.
- These are distinct concepts that can be measured directly—there is no need to conflate them under the same label.

#2: Regressor of Interest: *PixUsage* (cont.)

$$\text{PixUsage}_{it} \Rightarrow \frac{\text{NettablePayments}_{it}}{2 \times \text{TotalAssets}_{it}} = \frac{\sum_{d \in t} \min(\text{Outflows}_{id}, \text{Inflows}_{id})}{\text{TotalAssets}_{it}}. \quad (3.1)$$

- Even if (3.1) is appropriate for studying **loss-of-netting** effects, it is misleadingly interpreted as literal **Pix usage** in some sections:

1. Effect of Pix on bank deposit ratios:

- "We also find that Pix usage increases the ratio of demandable deposits, consistent with our model prediction that **demandable deposits become more attractive** with instant payments."
- If **NettablePayments** is a pure **bank-level** treatment, it should not directly affect customers' choices.

2. Instrument validity (timeouts):

- "Therefore, banks with more timeouts should have lower Pix usage not only because failed transactions directly reduce **Pix usage**, but also because, more importantly, frequent timeouts make Pix **less attractive to customers** and thereby reduce their adoption of the system."
- The instrument's **relevance** is ex ante weaker for **NettablePayments** than for overall Pix usage, since timeouts may also disrupt unnettable flows. If unnettable flows affect outcomes, the **exclusion restriction** will also be violated.

#3: Model Predictions vs. Empirical Design

- **Institutional setting:** Since November 2020, Pix participation has been mandatory for large institutions (> 500,000 accounts), optional for small ones.

Actual transition: Traditional → Mixed (Traditional + Instant)

- **Extensive margin:** within-bank variation in losses around Pix entry.
- **Intensive margin:** across- and within-bank variation in losses from customer Pix adoption.
- **Theoretical model** compares equilibrium outcomes across two distinct regimes:

Model comparison: Traditional → Instant

- Captures **extensive-margin effects** from the shift of payments from traditional to instant system.
- **Empirical design** exploits within-bank variation in loss intensity, *conditional on a mixed system*:

Empirical variation: Δ_t in nettable Pix payments

- **Mismatch with model predictions:** banks' response to marginal changes in loss intensity within a mixed system does not necessarily capture their response to the one-time losses at Pix entry.

#3: Model Predictions vs. Empirical Design (cont.)

Suggestions to strengthen empirical design

- Exploit Pix entry as a regime shift

$$Y_{it} = \beta_1 \widehat{\text{PixExposure}_i} \times \text{PostAnnounce}_t + \beta_2 \widehat{\text{PixExposure}_i} \times \text{PostImplement}_t + \dots$$

- $\widehat{\text{PixExposure}_i}$ predicted using pre-Pix payment connectivity, two-sidedness, digital adoption, client mix, bank size, etc.
- β_2 directly tests the **model's** predictions
- Separate key channels through which Pix affects banks:
 1. Loss of **netting** ability (Nettable payments)
 2. Loss of discretion over **outflow settlement timing** (Pix share in total outflows)
 3. Customers demand shift toward **demandable deposits** (Total Pix activity)Paper's current regressor (nettable payments) targets #1 yet its interpretation *also* bundles #2–#3.
- **Clarify substitution patterns:** To what extent does Pix substitute vs. complement traditional instruments (TED, DOC)? Effects may vary with substitution intensity.

#4: Instrumental Variable Strategy

- **Instrument definition:** Bank i 's exposure to counterparty timeouts, weighted by share of bilateral payment flows:

$$\text{Timeout}_{it} = \sum_{j \neq i} \underbrace{\frac{\text{Inflows}_{ijt}}{\text{Inflows}_{it}}}_{\text{time-varying weights}} \times \underbrace{\frac{\text{Inflows}_{ij}^{\text{timeouts}}}{\text{Inflows}_{ij}}}_{\text{cumulative?? timeout rate}} + \sum_{j \neq i} \underbrace{\frac{\text{Outflows}_{ijt}}{\text{Outflows}_{it}}}_{\text{time-varying weights}} \times \underbrace{\frac{\text{Outflows}_{ij}^{\text{timeouts}}}{\text{Outflows}_{ij}}}_{\text{cumulative?? timeout rate}}.$$

- **Identifying assumption (exclusion restriction):**

"Timeouts induced by other banks affect bank i only through their impact on its customers' Pix usage, and not through any direct influence on bank i 's balance sheet composition."

- **Key concern—conditional independence violated:**

Identifying variation comes from within-bank changes in **payment-flow weights** over time, not from *plausibly exogenous timeout rate shocks*. Payment weights reflect bank i 's network position and customer behavior, both likely endogenous.

#4: Instrumental Variable Strategy (cont.)

- Suggested fix—use predetermined weights:

$$\text{Timeout}_{it} = \sum_{j \neq i} \underbrace{\frac{\text{Inflows}_{ij, t_0}}{\text{Inflows}_{i, t_0}}}_{\text{fixed weights (pre-Pix)}} \times \underbrace{\frac{\text{Inflows}_{ijt}^{\text{timeouts}}}{\text{Inflows}_{ijt}}}_{\text{time-varying timeout rate}} + \sum_{j \neq i} \underbrace{\frac{\text{Outflows}_{ij, t_0}}{\text{Outflows}_{i, t_0}}}_{\text{fixed weights (pre-Pix)}} \times \underbrace{\frac{\text{Outflows}_{ijt}^{\text{timeouts}}}{\text{Outflows}_{ijt}}}_{\text{time-varying timeout rate}}.$$

where t_0 is a pre-Pix period (e.g., 2019 average). This ensures variation comes from counterparty timeout shocks rather than bank i 's endogenous network evolution.

- Remaining validity concerns:

- **Relevance:** Timeout_{it} reduces *total* Pix usage; potentially weaker instrument for *nettable* Pix flows
- **Exclusion restriction**—timeouts at bank j may affect bank i 's outcomes through:
 - Unnettable Pix flows (if these also affect outcomes)
 - Traditional payment channels (if timeouts reflect bank-wide IT problems affecting TED/DOC)
 - Customer responses (switching banks or payment methods, directly affecting deposits)

#4: Instrumental Variable Strategy (cont.)

- **To assess validity, characterize timeout patterns:**
 - Frequency, duration, and persistence over time (autocorrelation of timeout rates)
 - Whether outages are transaction-specific, Pix-specific, or bank-wide
 - Cross-bank correlation (shared infrastructure concerns)
 - Do Pix timeouts predict failures in TED/DOC or other payment channels?
 - Do timeouts predict customer switching (deposit flows, account closures)?
- **If validity concerns persist:**
 - Only report OLS estimates with rich controls and explicitly discuss the likely direction of bias
 - Pursue alternative identification using predicted Pix exposure and entry timing (slide #3)

Other Suggestions

- **Clarify sample composition:** Number of banks and data frequency. Current number of observations appears low.
- **Define participating banks:** Exclude or separately analyze non-participant small banks. Describe participation determinants and timing.
- **Use loan origination data:** Analyze new issuance to isolate effects on illiquid assets. Effects of banks' lending policies may be diluted in full loan portfolio.

Conclusions

- **Timely and important topic:** IPS are rapidly expanding. Understanding bank adaptation matters for stability
- **Unique setting and clear mechanisms**
 - Near-universal Pix adoption + granular payment data
 - Mechanism: loss of netting → liquidity buffers → risk-taking
 - Informative patterns on banks' adjustments when transitioning to IPS
- **Areas to strengthen evidence**
 - Distinguish customer Pix usage from banks' nettable payment exposure
 - Consider exploiting Pix entry to align with model predictions
 - Revise and enhance the identification strategy
- **Bottom line:** Strengthening the empirical implementation would position this paper to make a substantial contribution to the banking literature.

Best of luck!