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Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta

Room to Grow: Housing for a New Economy
FRB Dallas
February 21, 2020
Disclaimer: I do not speak for:

- Raphael Bostic  Atlanta Fed President
- Jerome Powell  Federal Reserve Board Chairman

The views expressed are my own and do not necessarily reflect those of the Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta or the Federal Reserve System.
Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia Annual Report 2010:

What might have happened in the recent financial crisis and recession if regulators and researchers had had better and timelier information about mortgage and credit markets? Could the data have helped prevent the spread of contagion from the subprime mortgage market to the broader economy?
Mostly aggregate information and surveys ⇒ limited administrative micro data.

- Flow of Funds (Federal Reserve) – aggregate statistics on $ flows to different sectors of economy.

- Periodic research-oriented surveys:
  - American Housing Survey (AHS) – longitudinal housing unit survey conducted biennially.
  - Survey of Consumer Finances (SCF) – triennial cross-sectional survey of U.S. families that contains some basic information on mortgage debt and home values.
  - Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID) – longitudinal, biennial survey that includes limited information on housing and mortgages, but rich info. on demographics.
Available Housing Market Data Pre-Crisis

Industry surveys and publications:
- Mortgage Banker’s Association (MBA) – real estate finance industry association that surveys its members on loan originations, delinquencies, etc.
- National Association of Realtors – surveys on home listings, sales, etc.
- Inside Mortgage Finance – industry newsletters that contain basic info. on mortgage market trends.

Limited micro data:
- Home Mortgage Disclosure Act (HMDA) data – lender-reported applications and originations with limited info on borrowers and mortgages.
  - Income, race, sex, loan size, geographic location.
  - No info. on credit scores, LTV ratios, interest rates, or loan performance.
- Non-agency, privately-securitiztized loans (PLS) – only 9–14% of total U.S. mortgage debt.
  - Detailed info. on mortgage characteristics, and monthly performance.
  - But not widely disseminated – Board of Governors and a few researchers.
To sum up, neither borrowers nor lenders appear particularly shaky. Indeed, the evidence points in the opposite direction: borrowers have large equity cushions, interest-only mortgages are not an especially sinister development, and financial institutions are quite healthy. Nonetheless, even the most sanguine analyst quails when contemplating a historically unprecedented drop in nationwide nominal house prices. Such a drop will obviously hurt both borrowers and lenders and will also no doubt expose weaknesses that will only be obvious in hindsight. Thus, perhaps it would be best simply to venture the judgment that the national mortgage system might bend, but will likely not break, in the face of a large drop in house prices.
What Happened Next?

- House prices fell by more than 30% in two years!
- Mortgage defaults and foreclosures more than tripled.
- Unemployment rose above 10%.
- The stock market fell by approximately 50%.
Earlier in the prepared remarks:

- Used this graph to argue that mortgage borrowers were not highly leveraged as most had significant housing equity.
- Significantly understated borrower leverage, because the data did not account for junior liens (i.e. only incorporated LTV of first mortgage) and did not account for massive cash-out refinancing activity!
Glaeser, Gottlieb, and Gyourko (2012):

- Distribution of Loan-to-Value Ratios at Purchase

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th># Observations</th>
<th>50th</th>
<th>75th</th>
<th>90th</th>
<th>Mean</th>
<th>50th</th>
<th>75th</th>
<th>90th</th>
<th>Mean</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2002</td>
<td>1,967,336</td>
<td>80%</td>
<td>95%</td>
<td>99%</td>
<td>70%</td>
<td>85%</td>
<td>96%</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>73%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2003</td>
<td>2,127,516</td>
<td>80%</td>
<td>94%</td>
<td>99%</td>
<td>69%</td>
<td>82%</td>
<td>96%</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>72%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2004</td>
<td>2,751,095</td>
<td>80%</td>
<td>85%</td>
<td>98%</td>
<td>65%</td>
<td>80%</td>
<td>95%</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>69%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2005</td>
<td>3,039,726</td>
<td>80%</td>
<td>80%</td>
<td>95%</td>
<td>65%</td>
<td>86%</td>
<td>99%</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>71%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2006</td>
<td>2,421,704</td>
<td>80%</td>
<td>80%</td>
<td>98%</td>
<td>68%</td>
<td>90%</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>74%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2007</td>
<td>1,777,035</td>
<td>80%</td>
<td>95%</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>69%</td>
<td>90%</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>73%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2008</td>
<td>1,410,082</td>
<td>80%</td>
<td>98%</td>
<td>99%</td>
<td>65%</td>
<td>80%</td>
<td>98%</td>
<td>99%</td>
<td>67%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

“Piggyback” mortgages became common in 2000s, but we didn’t have data on them! ⇒ Underestimates of borrower leverage at origination!
- Duca and Kumar (2014):

- Mortgage equity withdrawal exploded during the boom period, but no good data!
  ⇒ Underestimates of contemporaneous borrower leverage!
Not just a leverage measurement issue.

Lack of data also led to underestimates of certain “risky” mortgage products that facilitated speculation such as IO mortgages!

- In same FOMC presentation, it was noted that interest-only loans were becoming increasingly popular in private-label securitization deals, but that those deals were only a tiny fraction of the overall market.

- Problem was that volume of IO loans was also increasing in GSE market, which accounted for 30-50% of originations during boom period.

- But we didn’t have the data to see this increasing trend.
Where Did we Drop the Ball?

![GSE Fraction of IO Loans](image)

Source: McDash Analytics and author's calculations.

Kris Gerardi (FRB Atlanta)

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FHFA and CFPB

1. Fannie and Freddie Public Use Database:
   - Created by The Housing and Economic Recovery Act (HERA) of 2008.
   - Detailed, loan-level data on Fannie and Freddie mortgages originated between 2000–present.
   - Includes detailed loan characteristics and performance.

2. National Mortgage Database
   - 5% sample of all first-lien mortgages going back to 1998.
   - Includes detailed info. on loan characteristics and performance.

3. Survey of Mortgage Originations
   - Quarterly survey about borrower’s mortgage origination experiences.
   - How much people shop for mortgages and how much knowledge they have about the overall origination process.
**RADAR** – Risk Assessment Data Analysis and Research

- Goal: Provide the Federal Reserve System with better data and analysis on consumer loans and securities for identifying emerging risks to the financial system.
- Built a vast repository containing micro level datasets on property transactions, mortgages, and other consumer credit products – 16 distinct administrative datasets in total.
- Has been very successful in facilitating:
  1. Research
  2. Bank Supervision and Regulation
Will focus on 4 broad categories of data today:

1. Mortgage servicing data.
2. Property transactions data.
3. Consumer credit data.
4. Property listings data.
Mortgage Servicing Data (McDash Analytics)

- Mortgage-level panel data from large servicers (big banks) going back to 1990s.
- 50–70% of market (depending on the time period).
  - 160 million loans, 7.36 billion observations

Includes data on all market segments:
1. Portfolio loans (banks).
2. GSE/agency (Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac) loans.
3. Non-agency securitized or “private-label” loans (PLS) – “subprime” and “alt-a” loans that triggered financial crisis.

Underwriting characteristics at origination:
- Credit score, LTV ratio, documentation level, occupancy status, interest rate, ARM/FRM, amortization schedule, etc.

- Monthly loan performance.
- Geographic info – state and ZIP code.
Mortgage Servicing Data – Influential Papers

- Foote, Gerardi, and Willen (2009, NBER) – “Reducing Foreclosures: No Easy Answers”
- Elul et al. (2010, AER) – “What Triggers Mortgage Default?”
- Piskorski, Seru, and Vig (2010, JFE) – “Securitization and Distressed Loan Renegotiation: Evidence from the Subprime Mortgage Crisis”
- Fuster and Vickery (2016, RFS) – “Securitization and the Fixed-Rate Mortgage”
Public data on residential property transactions recorded at the county-level.

Coverage for almost all of the 3000+ counties in the U.S. going back to late-1990s/early-2000s.

- Property transactions ⇒ both arms-length and nominal sales.
  - Exact addresses and parcel numbers that are consistent over time.
  - Sale prices (in most states).

- Mortgage transactions.
  - Exact $ amounts.
  - All liens on property including piggybacks and home-equity loans (and lines of credit).
  - Lender identity.

- Foreclosure documents.
  - Foreclosure deeds and court documents (for judicial states).

Foote, Gerardi, And Willen (2008, JUE) – “Negative Equity: Theory and Evidence.”

Campbell, Giglio, and Pathak (2011, AER) – “Forced Sales and House Prices.”

Glaeser, Gottlieb, and Gyourko (2012, NBER) – “Can Cheap Credit Explain the Housing Boom?”


DeFusco (2017, JF) – “Homeowner Borrowing and Housing Collateral: New Evidence from Expiring Price Controls”
Credit registry data.

Quarterly, longitudinal, 5% random sample of all individuals with credit history.

- 1999:Q1 – Present
- 239 million borrowers, 3.31 billion observations.
- Includes credit files of other individuals living in same household ⇒ Possible to conduct both individual-level and household-level analysis.

Data on virtually all forms of consumer debt ⇒ mortgages, credit cards, cars, student loans, personal loans, etc.

- Loan balances, payment status.

Credit scores.

Limited demographic info – age.

Fairly detailed geographic info ⇒ census block (≈ 11 million).
Haughwout, Lee, Tracy, van der Klaauw (2011, NBER) “Real Estate Investors, the Leverage Cycle, and the Housing Market Crisis”

Bhutta (2015, JME) – “The Ins and Outs of Mortgage Debt During the Housing Boom and Bust”

Fulford (2015, JME) – “How Important is Variability in Consumer Credit Limits?”


Bhutta and Keys (2016, AER) – “Interest Rates and Equity Extraction During the Housing Boom”


Foote, Loewenstein and Willen (2018, ReStud) “Cross-Sectional Patterns of Mortgage Debt during the Housing Boom: Evidence and Implications”
Property Listings Data (CoreLogic MLS)

- Realtor data.
  - Covers ~ 60% of all active U.S. property listings, and contains 10–20 years of historical data, depending on the market.

- Information taken directly from the electronic system that most realtors enter property listing information into.
  - Detailed property characteristics.
  - Listing price(s)
  - Transaction price (for properties that sell).
  - Dates – listing date, contract date, closing date.
  - Identity of realtor and brokerage house.
  - Realtor description of property.
  - Realtor commissions.

- Includes rental listings.
Is being used to look at numerous policy-relevant research questions.

Example: New measure of price-to-rent ratios.

- P/R is a popular statistic to assess whether house prices are “overvalued”.
- Significant measurement issue with current measures ⇒ theory tells us that we need prices and rents for same properties.
- But current measures impute rents for owner-occupied houses using various, imperfect methods.
- Federal Reserve economists are developing a measure using MLS data based on sample of properties where we see both rents and transaction prices.

  - Begley, Lowenstein, and Willen (2019) – “The Price-Rent Ratio During the Boom and Bust: Measurement and Implications”
In addition to collecting data for research purposes, RADAR also collects data for bank stress-tests.

Began in 2009 with the Supervisory Capital Assessment Program (SCAP).

- Stress tests conducted by Federal Reserve to determine if the largest banks had sufficient capital buffers to withstand the recession and further financial market turmoil.

- RADAR used CCP data to construct loss models.

- 10/19 largest U.S. commercial banks were deemed under-capitalized ⇒ infusions of $75 billion of capital into banks.

- Widely viewed as credible and as having reduced uncertainty about the financial strength of covered institutions (see 2010 speeches by Govs. Bernanke and Tarillo).
SCAP success led to Congress formally sanctioning this approach into the Dodd-Frank Act Stress Tests (DFAST).

Beginning in 2012, RADAR began collecting detailed data directly from the largest banks for their loan portfolios of credit cards, 1st lien mortgages and home equity loans ⇒ “Y-14M” data.

Data is used to estimate loss models, and produce bank-by-bank forecasts of future losses under severe macroeconomic scenarios.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>First Lien Mortgage</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>21 million</td>
<td>2.2 billion</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Home Equity</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>6 million</td>
<td>662 million</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Address Match</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>27 million</td>
<td>2.8 billion</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Credit Card</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>541 million</td>
<td>43 billion</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Data on private market securities – Intex.

Details on security characteristics (subordination, cash flow triggers, etc.) that allow one to value bonds under range of scenarios.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Asset Class</th>
<th>Active Deals</th>
<th>Paid Off Deals</th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>Sectors Included</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Non-Agency RMBS</td>
<td>8,872</td>
<td>6,265</td>
<td>15,137</td>
<td>RMBS, Home Equity, NPL/RPL</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-Agency CMBS</td>
<td>1,389</td>
<td>1,243</td>
<td>2,632</td>
<td>CMBS, CRE CDO</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Student Loan ABS</td>
<td>634</td>
<td>299</td>
<td>933</td>
<td>Student Loans</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Auto ABS</td>
<td>449</td>
<td>1,555</td>
<td>2,004</td>
<td>Auto Lease, Auto Loan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Credit Card ABS</td>
<td>147</td>
<td>1,280</td>
<td>1,427</td>
<td>Credit Card</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CDO/CLO</td>
<td>1,853</td>
<td>1,739</td>
<td>3,592</td>
<td>CDO, Balance Sheet CLO, CLO</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Cordell, Feldberg, Sass (2019) - “The Role of ABS CDOs in the Financial Crisis”

- Show that it was losses on CDOs collateralized by lower-rated (BBB) subprime mortgage securities that brought financial system to its knees in 2008.
- Losses on AAA subprime securities were extremely low ⇒ < 1% of principal outstanding (∼ $5 billion)
- Losses on lower-rated securities were much larger ⇒ > 50% of principal outstanding (∼ $100 billion)
- Losses on AAA CDOs were 80% ⇒ $325 billion and concentrated on balance sheets of largest investment + commercial banks.

With Intex data, the Fed would have been in much better position to identify systemic risks in the private securities market.
Dearth of quality micro data on U.S. housing and mortgage markets in the pre-crisis period.

- Aggregate data and limited survey information from Census and industry publications.
- Led policymakers to falsely believe that the mortgage market was more resilient to price declines than it really was in reality.

Since the crisis, significant efforts to address the data issue by constructing detailed micro data on mortgages and housing transactions.

- Federal Reserve System has been front and center in this initiative through RADAR.
- Has fueled high quality research and policy contributions.
- Hopefully will help to prevent a future crisis or at least help produce a more focused response to one that does occur!