

Neighborhood Price Externalities of Foreclosure Rehabilitation: An Examination of the Neighborhood Stabilization Program

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Introduction


- **Market Failure:** Foreclosure activity peaked in the wake of the 2007-2009 Financial Recission
 - Foreclosures often clustered in low-income, minority neighborhoods
 - Foreclosures produced negative neighborhood price externalities
- **Policy response:** public funds to rehabilitate foreclosed properties
 - Neighborhood Stabilization Program (NSP) provides funds to local agencies to acquire and rehabilitate properties
 - Focus on foreclosed properties in low-income neighborhoods

What were the neighborhood effects of the NSP funding?

Foreclosure Externalities


- Robust literature documenting negative price impacts of neighborhood foreclosures ranging from 1% - 9% of home value (Lee, 2008)
 - Consensus: effects are very local—usually within $\approx 200\text{m}$
 - Varied estimated externality effect sizes

Estimated Decrease in Neighborhood Home Prices within $\approx 200m$ of Foreclosed Properties



Harding et al. (2009); Immergluck and Smith (2006); Leonard and Murdoch (2009); Rogers and Winter (2009); Schuetz et al. (2008);

Negative Neighborhood Price Externalities Also Vary Within A Single Market



Leonard and Murdoch (2009); Zhang and Leonard (2014); Zhang et al. (2015)

* Average effect averages across foreclosures and time;
other effects are maximum effect in 0-6 months after foreclosure

Mechanisms Driving Foreclosure Externalities

1 Blight

- NSP-funding targeted at removing blight
- When will neighborhood prices respond?... *expectations of or actual* blight reduction?

2 Valuation

- Foreclosed properties sell at a discount
- Rehabilitated properties expected to sell at market
- Valuation channel should decay rapidly over time

3 Supply

- Both foreclosed homes and rehabilitated properties increase housing supply
- Negative price externalities that decay rapidly over time expected in both cases.


Neighborhood Stabilization Program (NSP)

- **Funds must go to neighborhoods where foreclosures and vacancies were severe:** Foreclosure risk score data part of requirement for NSP2 and 3.
- **Funds must go to low-income households and neighborhoods:** required to target households making below 120% of Area Median Income (AMI), with at least 25% of funds allocated to households making less than 50% of AMI.
- **Funded programs varied:** home financing (e.g., down payment assistance), acquisition and rehabilitation, and land banking


NSP was rolled out in 3 phases and included ~ \$7 billion in funding

- **NSP1:** Part of the Housing and Economics Recovery Act (HERA) and allocated \$3.92 billion beginning in *July 2008*;
- Funds were distributed among 309 local and state government entities.
- NSP2: Part of the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act, provided an additional \$1.93 billion which was dispersed to 56 grantees in *January 2009*.
- **NSP3:** Part of the Dodd-Frank Financial Reform Bill, an additional \$1 billion was distributed among 270 state and local agencies through NSP3 in *September 2010*.

NSP1 Provided \$102 Million to Texas



NSP-Properties Rehabilitated by Habitat for Humanity



Properties were Highly Clustered

(Southwestern Cluster)



Data

- **NSP Data:** 48 Properties (37 from NSP1 and 11 from NSP2)
 - dates of acquisition and sell of the rehabilitated property
 - type of rehabilitation work completed
- **Market Sales:** 2006 through 2013
 - temporally and geographically matched to NSP-properties
 - 2201 sales within 0.25 miles of NSP-properties
- **Neighborhood Characteristics**
 - ACS 2006-2010 5-year estimates
 - Proximity to neighborhood foreclosure sales
 - Historical neighborhood price trends


Difference-in-difference Framework

- Goal: Compare change in home prices before and after NSP-funded rehabilitation across “treatment” and “control” neighborhoods


$$\text{NSP Effect} = [P_{treat,after} - P_{treat,before}] - [P_{control,after} - P_{control,before}]$$

- Challenges
 - Non-random assignment of treatment
 - Unknown geographic extent of treatment effects

Similar Price Trends Before NSP-funded Rehabilitation in Treatment & Control Neighborhoods



Unknown Geographic Extent of Treatment Effects




Difference-in-difference


$$Y_{it} = \alpha + \beta Z_{it} + \gamma Treatment_i + \tau After_t + \theta Treatment_i * After_t + \epsilon_{it}$$

- Z_{it} is matrix of controls
 - Housing Characteristics
 - Year and Month Fixed Effects
 - Neighborhood Characteristics
- $Treatment$ identifies houses near to NSP-property
- $After$ identifies observations occurring after NSP-funded intervention
- θ is the **DID estimator**

Treatment Assignment–Baseline Models



After Assignment–Baseline Models



Treatment Period set at 12 months in Baseline Models.

“Anticipated Treatment” Effects–Baseline Models

	Model 3	Interior Renovation Only	Exterior Renovation Only
Treatment	-0.147 (0.154)	0.020 (0.084)	0.023 (0.059)
After	0.082* (0.041)	0.055 (0.062)	0.056 (0.065)
<i>Treatment*After</i>	-0.011 (0.046)	-0.161 (0.109)	0.042 (0.070)
Observations	171	100	134
R-squared	0.867	0.917	0.897

Standard errors clustered at census tract-year level (in parentheses).

“Completed Treatment” Effects–Baseline Models


	Model 3	Interior Renovation Only	Exterior Renovation Only
Treatment	-0.109 (0.131)	-0.036 (0.113)	0.103 (0.065)
After	-0.221** (0.080)	-0.159*** (0.051)	-0.220*** (0.072)
<i>Treatment*After</i>	0.153** (0.061)	0.149 (0.243)	0.162** (0.072)
Observations	138	81	110
R-squared	0.893	0.936	0.918

Standard errors clustered at census tract-year level (in parentheses).

Temporal Decay of Treatment Effects

Length of <i>After</i> period in months	<= 9	<= 18	<= 24	<= 27	<= 30
<i>Treatment</i> [◇]	-0.177 (0.126)	-0.140 (0.123)	-0.155 (0.112)	-0.162 (0.107)	-0.137 (0.113)
<i>After</i> ^{◇◇}	-0.227** (0.082)	-0.210*** (0.073)	-0.195*** (0.063)	-0.195*** (0.062)	-0.184*** (0.059)
<i>Treatment*After</i>	0.149** (0.058)	0.152** (0.056)	0.146** (0.054)	0.152*** (0.053)	0.134** (0.053)
Observations	132	144	150	153	158
R-squared	0.895	0.896	0.899	0.901	0.902


Temporal Decay of Treatment Effects (95% Confidence Interval)



Varying Size of Treatment Area

Treatment Radius (miles)	0.05	0.075	0.10	0.125	0.15
<i>Treatment</i>	0.326 (0.798)	-0.334 (0.274)	-0.109 (0.131)	0.062 (0.078)	0.012 (0.039)
<i>After</i>	-0.201** (0.074)	-0.211*** (0.071)	-0.221** (0.080)	-0.165** (0.075)	-0.152* (0.077)
<i>Treatment*After</i>	0.009 (0.059)	0.082 (0.048)	0.153** (0.061)	0.109 (0.082)	0.095 (0.075)
Observations	85	112	138	174	209
R-squared	0.940	0.907	0.893	0.869	0.865

Varying Treatment and Control Radius



Limitations

- **External Validity:** One county and one non-profit agency
 - Other authors found no price effects in multi-county studies (Schuetz et al., 2015)
 - Because implementation varied widely across the country, no “average” treatment effects exist.
- **Omitted Variables:** Failure to account for other NSP activity and other unobserved neighborhood characteristics
 - Results robust to census tract fixed effects

Conclusions—Magnitude of Neighborhood Price Externalities

Evidence for effective targeting of NSP funding.

- 15% price increase for properties within 0.1 miles (528 feet) of an NSP-property
- Effects last for up to 30 months after the NSP sale
- Magnitude is comparable to the largest negative price impacts associated with Dallas County foreclosures
- Duration is much longer

Conclusions–Mechanisms

Remediation of exterior property blight produced the large and long-lasting neighborhood price effects.

- Effects were long-lasting and largest considering properties receiving exterior repairs.
- Valuation channel cannot be ruled out, but long-lasting effects suggest the blight mechanism.
- Supply channel cannot be ruled out–potential downward bias of estimated treatment effects.

Conclusions—Aggregate Price Impact

“Rough” Assessment of Public Benefits of NSP-funding

- Assumptions:
 - \$109,000 average home price
 - 15% price increase
 - 79 homes in treated area of each NSP property
- \$5.8 million in NSP funding produced **\$60.7 million in property price increases**
- If property prices are realized in property appraisals, assuming a 2% property tax rate, NSP-funding had potential to create **\$1.2 million in additional tax receipts.**
- BUT...property appraisals don't always fully reflect temporary price adjustments...

Thank You !

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