1969

annual statement

federal reserve bank of dallas

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To the Member Banks in the

Eleventh Federal Reserve District:

The Statement of Condition and the earnings and expenses of the Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas for the year 1969, with comparative figures for 1968, are shown herein. Lists of the directors and officers of the Bank and its branches as of January 1, 1970, are also included.


Additional copies of these publications may be obtained upon request to the Research Department, Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas, 400 South Akard Street (mailing address: Station K, Dallas, Texas 75222).

Sincerely yours,

P. E. COLDWELL
President
# Statement of Condition

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Gold certificate account</td>
<td>$323,829,293</td>
<td>$344,103,657</td>
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<tr>
<td>Federal Reserve notes of other Banks</td>
<td>28,808,750</td>
<td>43,242,700</td>
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<tr>
<td>Other cash</td>
<td>8,355,710</td>
<td>11,513,277</td>
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<tr>
<td>Discounts and advances</td>
<td>17,350,000</td>
<td>5,300,000</td>
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<tr>
<td>U.S. Government securities:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bills</td>
<td>957,783,000</td>
<td>798,246,000</td>
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<td>Certificates</td>
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<tr>
<td>Notes</td>
<td>1,350,352,000</td>
<td>1,221,704,000</td>
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<tr>
<td>Bonds</td>
<td>150,402,000</td>
<td>232,989,000</td>
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<tr>
<td>Total U.S. Government securities</td>
<td>2,458,537,000</td>
<td>2,252,939,000</td>
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<tr>
<td>Total loans and securities</td>
<td>2,475,887,000</td>
<td>2,258,239,000</td>
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<tr>
<td>Cash items in process of collection</td>
<td>713,580,280</td>
<td>577,047,041</td>
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<td>Bank premises</td>
<td>8,241,229</td>
<td>8,664,214</td>
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<tr>
<td>Other assets</td>
<td>130,812,358</td>
<td>137,692,922</td>
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<tr>
<td>TOTAL ASSETS</td>
<td>$3,689,514,620</td>
<td>$3,380,502,811</td>
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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>LIABILITIES</th>
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<tr>
<td>Federal Reserve notes in actual circulation</td>
<td>$1,746,649,895</td>
<td>$1,575,001,366</td>
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<tr>
<td>Deposits:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Member bank — reserve accounts</td>
<td>1,222,308,848</td>
<td>1,229,448,111</td>
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<tr>
<td>U.S. Treasurer — general account</td>
<td>81,124,900</td>
<td>572,920</td>
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<tr>
<td>Foreign</td>
<td>7,410,000</td>
<td>12,540,000</td>
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<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>13,485,313</td>
<td>10,624,865</td>
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<tr>
<td>Total deposits</td>
<td>1,324,329,061</td>
<td>1,253,185,896</td>
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<tr>
<td>Deferred availability cash items</td>
<td>519,426,806</td>
<td>464,327,688</td>
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<td>Other liabilities</td>
<td>24,409,458</td>
<td>16,456,361</td>
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<tr>
<td>TOTAL LIABILITIES</td>
<td>3,614,815,220</td>
<td>3,308,971,311</td>
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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>CAPITAL ACCOUNTS</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Capital paid in</td>
<td>37,349,700</td>
<td>35,765,750</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Surplus</td>
<td>37,349,700</td>
<td>35,765,750</td>
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<tr>
<td>TOTAL CAPITAL ACCOUNTS</td>
<td>74,699,400</td>
<td>71,531,500</td>
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<tr>
<td>TOTAL LIABILITIES AND CAPITAL ACCOUNTS</td>
<td>$3,689,514,620</td>
<td>$3,380,502,811</td>
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</table>
## Earnings and Expenses

### Current Earnings

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Description</th>
<th>1969</th>
<th>1968</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Discounts and advances</td>
<td>$3,116,739</td>
<td>$1,215,553</td>
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<tr>
<td>U.S. Government securities</td>
<td>134,495,990</td>
<td>112,264,985</td>
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<tr>
<td>Foreign currencies</td>
<td>6,941,538</td>
<td>4,364,788</td>
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<tr>
<td>All other</td>
<td>70,455</td>
<td>34,700</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Total Current Earnings</strong></td>
<td><strong>144,624,722</strong></td>
<td><strong>117,880,026</strong></td>
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### Current Expenses

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Description</th>
<th>1969</th>
<th>1968</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Current operating expenses</td>
<td>13,322,637</td>
<td>11,661,711</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Assessment for expenses of Board of Governors</td>
<td>852,600</td>
<td>815,298</td>
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<tr>
<td>Federal Reserve currency:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Original cost, including shipping charges</td>
<td>1,193,511</td>
<td>969,695</td>
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<tr>
<td>Cost of redemption, including shipping charges</td>
<td>20,685</td>
<td>15,960</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>15,389,433</strong></td>
<td><strong>13,462,664</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>Less reimbursement for certain fiscal agency and other expenses</td>
<td>960,534</td>
<td>905,737</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Net Expenses</strong></td>
<td><strong>14,428,899</strong></td>
<td><strong>12,556,927</strong></td>
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### Profit and Loss

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Description</th>
<th>1969</th>
<th>1968</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Current net earnings</td>
<td>130,195,823</td>
<td>105,323,099</td>
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<tr>
<td>Additions to current net earnings:</td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Profit on sales of U.S. Government securities (net)</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>33,593</td>
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<tr>
<td>All other</td>
<td>342,921</td>
<td>461,514</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total additions</strong></td>
<td><strong>342,921</strong></td>
<td><strong>495,107</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>Deductions from current net earnings:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Loss on sales of U.S. Government securities (net)</td>
<td>255,237</td>
<td>—</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>All other</td>
<td>4,304</td>
<td>13,040</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total deductions</strong></td>
<td><strong>259,541</strong></td>
<td><strong>13,040</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Net additions</strong></td>
<td>83,380</td>
<td>482,067</td>
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<tr>
<td>Net earnings before dividends and payments to U.S. Treasury</td>
<td>130,279,203</td>
<td>105,805,166</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dividends paid</td>
<td>2,205,326</td>
<td>2,118,480</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Payments to U.S. Treasury (interest on F.R. notes)</td>
<td>126,489,927</td>
<td>102,384,586</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transferred to surplus</td>
<td>1,583,950</td>
<td>1,302,100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Surplus, January 1</td>
<td>35,765,750</td>
<td>34,463,650</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Surplus, December 31</strong></td>
<td><strong>$37,349,700</strong></td>
<td><strong>$35,765,750</strong></td>
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</table>
directors

FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF DALLAS

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GEORGE F. RUDY, General Counsel
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RICHARD D. INGRAM, Assistant Cashier
JESSE D. SANDERS, Assistant Cashier
C. L. VICK, Assistant Cashier
ROBERT A. BROWN, Assistant General Auditor

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FORREST E. COLEMAN, Cashier

THOMAS H. ROBERTSON, Assistant Cashier

HOUSTON BRANCH

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RASCO R. STORY, Cashier
J. Z. ROWE, Assistant Vice President

JOHN N. AINSWORTH, Assistant Cashier
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THOMAS C. COLE, Assistant Cashier
ROBERT W. SCHULTZ, Assistant Cashier
**Annual Report Issue**

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The 1969 economy — waiting for a slowdown

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The 1969 economy—waiting for a slowdown

The American economy continued to grow in 1969, but rising prices accounted for most of the increase. With undampened expectations influencing the performance of important sectors, industrial production reached new heights, labor markets remained fairly tight, and personal income advanced at a near-record pace. These developments—normally evidence of economic health—would ordinarily have been welcomed as signs of continued improvement in the standard of American life. But behind this facade of growth, imbalances and strains were developing, especially in financial areas, where a heavy demand for funds and a substantial lessening in the growth of bank credit pushed interest rates to record heights.

The rapidity of the expansion—plus the driving force of capital spending, which pushed toward further expansion—created an economic environment that was basically unhealthy. With the economy already strained to capacity, strong aggregate demand, buoyed particularly by business investment, kept persistent upward pressure on prices. Average prices rose faster than in any other year since the early 1950’s.

Fiscal and monetary steps were taken to slow the expansion and thereby reduce inflationary pressures while preserving the basic strength of a growing economy. As a result of spending and taxing decisions, the Federal budget moved from a deficit to a surplus. Government spending was cut back in many areas, especially in defense and federally assisted construction projects.

To reduce private spending and increase Government revenue, the 10-percent tax surcharge on personal and corporate incomes, first passed in mid-1968, was extended through 1969. Advocates of the surtax had thought it would help immediately in curbing aggregate demand, but consumer spending did not slow until late spring and, despite the weakness in consumer spending in the second half of the year, businesses pushed ahead with their expansion plans. The Federal Government persisted with its restrictive fiscal policy in the second half of the year, asking Congress for an extension of the surtax through mid-1970 and continuing its efforts to repeal the 7-percent investment tax credit.

Monetary policy—aimed, like fiscal policy, at slowing expansion by reducing demand—restrained supplies of credit and made business and consumer purchases more costly to finance. Partly reflecting the intensification of monetary pressures, most monetary aggregates recorded slow or even negative rates of growth in the second and third quarters, particularly in the third, and interest rates rose sharply.

Beginning in the second half, there were indications that, under fiscal and monetary restraints, the expansion had started to slow. But the slowdown was still not enough—nor did it last long enough—to appreciably reduce inflationary pressure on the economy. Industrial production eased downward after hitting a peak in July, and the unemployment rate moved irregularly on an upward trend. The rate of growth of personal income eased in the last four months of the year, and retail sales indicated a weakening consumer demand.

These changes in the second half were not strong enough, however, to reverse the basic conclusion that, overall, 1969 was a record year. The economy continued to produce a largely inflated gross national product despite some signs...
of cooling. But the policies pursued in 1969 are generally expected to continue their impact on the economy in 1970, causing the rate of expansion to ease further and eventually slowing the rate of price increase.

**Economic developments**

Gross national product increased rapidly in 1969, registering advances every quarter. There was a decline, however, in the amount of increase that could be attributed to gains in real output and a rapid rise in the amount resulting from higher prices. Based on current prices, GNP rose slightly more than $16 billion in both of the first two quarters and $18 billion in the third quarter. The rate of expansion of total output eased in the fourth quarter, and the gross product for the year increased 7.8 percent, compared with 9.1 percent in 1968. But nearly 70 percent of the gain in current-dollar GNP can be attributed to price increases. Adjusted for the rise in prices, GNP advanced 2.9 percent, compared with 4.9 percent in 1968.

All major categories of spending contributed to the gain in national product, but the rate of gain varied among the components of GNP, with gross private domestic investment rising at the fastest rate. Net exports were less than in 1968, as exports in the first and second quarters were reduced by a dock strike that tied up shipping from December 1968 through April 1969. Final sales increased slower in 1969, even though private sales continued to make strong gains. Most of the weakness in final sales can be traced to government spending, which (except for the Federal pay raise July 1) was curtailed sharply in the last three quarters of the year. Also, inventory accumulation accounted for a larger proportion of the gain in GNP than in 1968.

Rising 7.3 percent last year, expenditures on personal consumption increased slower than GNP. While stronger than expected early in the year, personal spending slowed considerably in the third quarter and maintained a relatively small rate of advancement in the fourth quarter. Consumers were able to maintain a high level of consumption in the first half as personal income rose and a smaller proportion of disposable income was saved. The increase in personal income last year, while not as fast as in 1968, was more pronounced in the first half. By contrast, the proportion of personal income saved in the first half of the year was sharply lower than in the second half of 1968, falling from an average of 6.5 percent in the second half of 1968 to 5.3 percent in the first half of 1969.

The impact of the surtax apparently began to fall heavier on consumer spending in the second half. Personal consumption expenditures advanced at an annual rate of only 5 percent in the third quarter and only slightly faster in the fourth quarter. The increase in personal income also slowed, especially in the fourth quarter, and the proportion of personal income saved rose, reaching 6.7 percent of disposable income in the third quarter. The slowdown in consumer spending in the second half was particularly evident in expenditures for durable goods.

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**GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT**

(Seasonally adjusted annual rates)

<table>
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<tr>
<th>BILLIONS OF DOLLARS</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>CURRENT DOLLARS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CONSTANT DOLLARS (1958 PRICES)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Fourth quarter 1969 estimated.

SOURCES: U.S. Department of Commerce.
Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas.
Much of the exuberant strength in business fixed investment was in expenditures for new plant and equipment. Business spent about $71.2 billion on new plant and equipment last year. That represented a gain of 11.2 percent over spending the previous year, and the rate of increase was more than twice the rate in 1968.

Unlike 1968, when significantly larger proportions of the additional outlays for new plant and equipment were made by public utilities and transportation other than railroads, the increases in outlays last year were spread over many industry groups. Manufacturing registered a significant gain, with industries producing durable goods investing faster than industries producing nondurables. Among nonmanufacturing industries, the largest gain of any industrial group was made in communications, with an annual increase of 21.8 percent. Except for public utilities and transportation other than railroads, all industry groups made larger gains in expenditures for new plant and equipment last year than in 1968.

The rate of increase in spending on plant and equipment weakened in the fourth quarter, although total outlays continued to rise. In some industries — particularly durable manufacturing and total nonmanufacturing — such spending declined slightly. Despite the slowing in the advance of capital spending in the fourth quarter, businessmen expect outlays on fixed investment to continue upward in the first half of 1970 to a level 11 percent higher than in the first half of 1969 and 6 percent higher than in the second half. Most of the increase will probably be in spending on plant and equipment for such nonmanufacturing industries as utilities, communications, and mining. Manufacturers expect to increase their outlays about 3 percent.

The high rate of inventory accumulation was also a stimulant to the economy in 1969, though generally a moderate one. While the rate of accumulation probably leveled off in the fourth quarter, inventories were built up in the first
PRIVATE RESIDENTIAL CONSTRUCTION AND HOUSING STARTS
United States

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>STARTS MILLIONS OF UNITS</th>
<th>CONSTRUCTION BILLIONS OF DOLLARS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1.8</td>
<td>28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.4</td>
<td>36</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Seasonally adjusted annual rates

Three quarters at annual rates that rose from $6.6 billion in the first to $10.7 billion in the third. The rate of buildup was particularly stimulative in the third quarter, when inventory accumulation accounted for more than a fifth of the increase in current-dollar GNP.

One component of gross private domestic investment did weaken last year. Outlays for residential construction slowed considerably in response to tighter monetary policy and the reduced availability of mortgage funds. On a year-to-year basis, spending on residential construction increased, advancing about 7 percent over 1968. But this gain was very small compared with the 21-percent gain registered in 1968. Under the restraints of higher construction costs, rising mortgage rates, and reduced availability of funds, private housing starts declined sharply, falling from an annual rate of 1.9 million units in January to 1.3 million units in November. The weakness in housing affected both single-family and multifamily starts.

Government spending increased only a little over 7 percent last year, which was well below the gain posted for 1968. The slower rate of increase resulted directly from the Administration's efforts to ease inflationary pressures by cutting back on Federal outlays. In contrast to other recent years, when increased public spending was attributed to all components of government — Federal, state, and local — the largest proportion of the gain last year was made by state and local governments. But the high cost of borrowing, along with the ceiling on rates many municipalities could pay, apparently dampened the flow of funds to state and local governments to slow the increase in their spending in the second half. In Federal purchases, the increase in defense spending dropped from nearly 8 percent in 1968 to less than 2 percent in 1969. There was less weakness in other areas of Federal spending, but they, too, advanced much slower than in previous years.

Net exports continued to deteriorate, following the pattern set the year before. Some of the weakness in the first half can be attributed to the dock strike, which affected exports more than imports. The merchandise export surplus improved significantly in the third quarter, however — partly because of the backlog of shipments built up during the strike. On a balance-of-payments basis, the surplus rose in the third quarter at an annual rate of $1.3 billion. This gain, which followed a small deficit in the first half, was the largest surplus in nearly two years.

Although the demand placed on resources continued to increase sharply over the previous year, a slowing in the rate of increase in most sectors in the second half of 1969 eased the pressure on some primary resources, especially employment and industrial production. Indus-
trial production averaged almost 4.2 percent higher than in 1968 — a gain slightly less than in 1968. All the increase came in the first seven months, however, as production increased from 168.7 percent of its 1957-59 base in December 1968 to 174.6 percent in July — an annual gain of 7 percent. The upward trend in the index of industrial production was reversed in August, and output declined for the rest of the year.

Production gains in the first half were led by advances in the output of business equipment, industrial materials, and some consumer goods — particularly autos, auto parts, and allied products. Weakness in the second half was concentrated in industries producing such finished goods as autos, apparel, and furniture and such materials as textiles, paper, rubber, chemicals, and building supplies. With auto sales failing to show the buoyancy expected at midyear, auto assemblies were readjusted sharply downward in the last months of the year.

Employment followed much the same pattern as production. Conditions were firm in labor markets in the first half of 1969, with employment levels moving upward and the unemployment rate holding between 3.3 and 3.5 percent of the labor force. The market was even tighter for married men and experienced workers. But there were signs of easing in the demand for labor after midyear, particularly in manufacturing. Although total employment continued to increase, employment in some industries eased and the unemployment rate for all workers moved up around the 4-percent level before declining again in November. The reduced pressure on labor markets was also reflected in fourth-quarter declines in both the average workweek for factory workers and the overtime hours worked.

Despite fiscal and monetary restraints and their impact on the real-goods economy, prices continued to advance throughout the year.
Wholesale prices averaged 3.9 percent higher, compared with a gain of 2.5 percent in 1968. The fastest advance was made in the first half, when wholesale prices rose at an annual rate of 4.9 percent. In the second half, the rate slowed to 3.7 percent. Wholesale prices for industrial products trended upward throughout the year, and prices for farm products remained unseasonably high in the second half of the year, after showing unusual strength in the first half.

Consumer prices advanced even faster, rising about 5.4 percent compared with 4.2 percent in 1968. The increase was the largest since 1951, when the Korean war provoked a sharp speculative rise in prices. Services continued to pace the advance of consumer prices last year, but food prices also rose sharply, particularly in the first half, and did not show as much weakness as usual in the second half.

**Financial developments**

Major developments in the nation's financial markets last year were shaped by sustained monetary restraint, heavy demand for funds (especially from corporate borrowers), a diminished flow of funds into financial institutions, and a substantial reduction in the growth of bank credit. As a result, interest rates in money and capital markets advanced to record heights. In international finance, the dominant developments were parity adjustments in the French franc and German mark, a sharp decline in the free-market price of gold, the adoption of a new international reserve asset, and a material weakening in the U.S. balance-of-payments position.

Bank reserves were under pressure as the Federal Reserve increased monetary restraint to control the inflationary boom. Bank deposits declined, with the heaviest losses coming in the third quarter. Reflecting these trends and the intense competition for funds, banks began to rely heavily on sources of funds other than deposits to meet the demand for loans. Eurodollar borrowing by American banks rose sharply most of the year, and affiliates of banks increased their sales of commercial paper in the open market. Although banks were able to offset a large part of the decline in total deposits by tapping these nondeposit sources of funds, it was still necessary for banks to liquidate large amounts of U.S. Government and other securities and sell loans to investors. In reaction to these adjustments and the increase in direct borrowing in the market, most interest rates rose to new highs.

All three of the Federal Reserve's tools of general monetary control were applied in an effort to reduce inflationary pressures and moderate the demand for credit. Through its open market operations, the Federal Reserve absorbed a substantial volume of available reserves, particularly in the third quarter, forcing a moderate decline in both total reserves and nonborrowed reserves. Total reserves available to the banking system declined an estimated 1.2 percent in 1969, while nonborrowed reserves fell 3.7 percent. Excess reserves held by member banks declined about 50 percent. As a result, the net borrowed reserve position of member
banks continued to deepen through May, averaging close to $1 billion for the rest of the year.

In another move against inflation, the Board of Governors raised reserve requirements on demand deposits half a percentage point at both reserve city and country banks. This change, made in April, boosted required reserves an estimated $650 million. The discount rate Federal Reserve banks charge on loans to member banks was also increased in April. This increase, from 5.5 percent to 6 percent, brought the discount rate to the highest level since 1929.

Pressures on reserves applied through general monetary controls — open market operations, reserve requirement changes, and changes in the discount rate — were further augmented by a heavy runoff in time deposits. Despite rapid increases in market yields on competing investments, no changes were made in Regulation Q, the Federal Reserve regulation setting the maximum rates banks can pay on time and savings deposits. As a consequence, these deposits declined sharply — especially large negotiable certificates of deposit, which are highly sensitive to shifts in interest rates.

To help offset their losses in time deposits, large banks increased their borrowings in the Eurodollar market and, through bank holding companies and other affiliates, stepped up their sales of commercial paper in the open market. The Board of Governors responded by amending its regulations governing the reserve requirements and foreign activities of member banks. Effective July 31, member banks were required to include in their demand deposits subject to reserves “bills payable checks” and “London drafts” issued in settling transactions with foreign branches.

A further step in limiting Eurodollar borrowings was taken in August, when the Board of Governors imposed 10-percent marginal reserve requirements on member bank borrowings from their own foreign branches or from other banks abroad. Sales of assets by member banks to their foreign branches were also brought under the 10-percent marginal reserve requirement, as was credit extended by the branches to residents of the United States.

Restraints on the further issuance of commercial paper by bank subsidiaries were also proposed in late October. The Board of Governors held that commercial paper issued by bank subsidiaries was subject to reserve requirements and interest rate limitations as if it were issued directly by the parent bank. Subsequently, however, the Board extended until January 15, 1970, the time in which banks were to comply with this new requirement, provided the amount of commercial paper issued by a bank subsidiary...
With the availability of loanable funds sharply reduced and the cost of funds rising, banks reacted to the persistent demand for loans by increasing the prime loan rate. This rate—the long-term interest rates—rose to record levels, with only brief deviations from the upward trend. The effective rate on Federal funds—which is especially sensitive to monetary pressures—advanced steadily through early June, then dipped slightly in July. Beginning in August, however, the funds rate rose above 9 percent, on a monthly average basis, and tended to remain near that level for the rest of the year.

Treasury bill rates showed more erratic movements, but later in the year they, too, rose to record levels, with the rate on three-month bills moving up close to 8 percent. After sharp increases in the first quarter, yields on Treasury bills eased a few basis points in April and May, largely because of strengthening in investment demand as funds were shifted out of large negotiable CD's into bills but also because of uncertainties about future rates and stock prices. Spurred primarily by banks' liquidating their holdings of Treasury bills, the rate rose again in June and July, reaching new record levels. Bill rates surged upward again late in the fourth quarter, reflecting market congestion stemming from a large volume of borrowings by corporations, Federal agencies, and the Treasury, coupled with heavy sales of Treasury bills by the German central bank.

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rate banks charge their most creditworthy borrowers for short-term loans — was increased three times: to 7 percent in January, 7.5 percent in March, and 8.5 percent in June.

Interest rates also rose in the capital market, largely as a result of the limited availability of funds to institutional investors and expectations of higher rates in the future. Most long-term rates rose sharply in the first quarter, with gains ranging from 40 to 50 basis points, and then eased slightly in April and May. In the third quarter, however, rates surged again as banks continued to sell municipals and other issues in the face of continuing demand for funds. Rates advanced 20 to 30 basis points above their June levels.

Following a brief rally in the bond market in October, yields in the capital market rose to record highs in response to market congestion and a pessimistic outlook for the economy resulting in part from the growing belief that the effectiveness of fiscal restraint might be waning. By year-end, new high-grade corporate issues were offered at more than 8 percent, with some selling at more than 9 percent, while seasoned Aaa municipal issues were well above 6 percent.

Growth of bank credit slowed drastically after the rapid pace set in 1968. Total bank credit increased an estimated 1 percent in 1969, compared with 11 percent in 1968. Bank credit advanced in the first half at an annual rate of 3.0 percent, which was less than half as fast as in the same period a year earlier, and actually declined in the third quarter as monetary pressure on bank reserve positions mounted and banks liquidated investments faster than they could increase loans.

Loan demand was strong, with total loans increasing early in the first half at an annual rate of 9 percent, compared with 7.2 percent in the first half of 1968. But as the sharply reduced availability of bank reserves began to be felt in the second half, the increase slowed to an estimated annual rate of 4 percent, compared with 15.5 percent in the second half of 1968. Business loans, which rose at an annual rate of 14 percent in the first half and an estimated 5 percent in the second half, accounted for most of the difference. Several factors were reflected in the slower growth of business loans: the restrictive monetary policy, bank sales of commercial loans to secure additional funds (which removed these loans from bank balance sheets), and heavier corporate borrowing from the commercial paper market.

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Other types of loans also made strong gains in the first half and showed marked slowing in the second. Real estate loans increased particularly fast in the first half, rising $3.4 billion, but this robust growth diminished rapidly in the second half as high interest rates and the reduced
availability of mortgage funds together dampened construction. In the third quarter, real estate loans increased at less than half the annual rate recorded for the first half. Growth in consumer loans at banks also slowed as the year progressed, with the gain in the final quarter about half the advance of a year earlier. As weakness in the stock market combined with record interest rates to reduce the demand for funds to carry both equity and debt issues, security loans declined from their December 1968 level.

Total investments at the nation's commercial banks were sharply reduced in 1969. Where investments had increased almost 10 percent in 1968, they declined an estimated 9 percent in 1969. The decline varied considerably from quarter to quarter as the impact of monetary policy became more intense and deposit inflows fluctuated, but the trend was always downward. Most of the attrition in bank-held securities was in holdings of U.S. Government issues, which declined an estimated $10 billion. Holdings of other securities, mostly municipals, dropped only about $2 billion.

Bank liquidity, as measured by the loan-to-deposit ratio, fell substantially in 1969, reinforcing the trend established in 1968. Reflecting the rise in deposit runoff, the ratio surged to 73.3 percent at the end of the third quarter. Although the loan-to-deposit ratio eased slightly toward year-end — as deposit inflows increased faster than bank loans — it was still considerably above the 64.7 percent recorded for December 1968. Bank liquidity had deteriorated far less in 1968, when the loan-to-deposit ratio rose from 63.8 percent at the beginning of the year.

After very rapid growth in 1967 and 1968, the money supply — conventionally defined as demand deposits adjusted plus currency in the hands of the public — rose far slower in 1969, advancing an estimated $5 billion, or 2 percent. This gain was less than half the gain a year earlier. Since currency in the hands of the public

![Graph of selected commercial bank loans](image1)

![Graph of money supply](image2)
increased only slightly slower than in 1968, rising an estimated $2.5 billion, most of the slowdown in growth of the money supply resulted from the slower growth in demand deposits. Where demand deposits increased $10.1 billion in 1968, they increased only about $2.5 billion in 1969.

Total time and savings deposits actually declined, falling an estimated $11 billion, or 5.5 percent. This was in sharp contrast to the gain of $21.2 billion made in 1968. Virtually all the decline resulted from the runoff in large negotiable CD’s (those issued for $100,000 or more). While the attrition was fairly even through the first three quarters of the year, averaging $3.5 billion to $4 billion a quarter, the rate of decline slowed markedly in the fourth quarter. A large portion of the highly interest-sensitive CD’s ran off early in the year. By the fourth quarter, the outflow began to slow as New York City banks began selling large CD’s to foreign official institutions. These sales, made largely in response to new regulatory limitations on Eurodollar borrowings, were possible because issuances of CD’s to foreign official institutions were not subject to Regulation Q.

Where liquid assets held by the public increased substantially in 1967 and 1968, the gains in 1969 were only marginal. Holdings of short-term marketable Government securities increased much faster than in 1968, but more attractive money and capital market rates cut into the flow of funds to financial intermediaries. Not only did time deposits at commercial banks decline, but share accounts at savings and loan associations increased only $4 billion, compared with more than $7 billion in 1968, and deposits
at mutual savings banks rose only $2 billion, less than half the 1968 increase. Holdings of U.S. savings bonds declined slightly.

Although credit costs were high and rising, net corporate long-term borrowing continued to increase, reaching an estimated $27 billion in 1969 — a gain of about $2 billion over the record 1967 volume. Several factors contributed to the heavy volume of new corporate offerings: the wide gap between capital expenditures and internally generated funds, the possibility of changes in the investment tax credit, and expectations — despite restrictive stabilization measures — of further inflation and still higher interest rates. In the first half, emphasis was on stock issues as a means of raising new capital, but as the market for equity issues weakened in the second half, there was a shift to fixed-income securities. Even so, corporate stocks outstanding increased an estimated $7 billion, compared with $4.6 billion in 1968.

About three-fourths of the new corporate securities represented debt financing. Publicly offered bonds increased faster than privately offered issues. Public offerings increased an estimated $13 billion, or about $2 billion more than in 1968, while private placements rose only slightly faster.

State and local governments broke their pace of borrowing in the capital market. Reflecting the pressure of record-high interest rates, which often exceeded the legal ceilings on tax-exempt issues, new municipal offerings totaled an estimated $12 billion, or about 25 percent less than the record 1968 volume. As in the past, most state and local borrowings were earmarked for public improvements and expansion of school facilities.

Particularly significant for the municipal market were the cutback in demand for these issues by commercial banks, which liquidated large amounts of state and local obligations to provide funds for loans, and congressional debate earlier in the year on a proposal to tax interest on municipal bonds. These two factors contributed greatly to the increase in municipal rates, particularly in the third quarter. A brief price rally in the municipal market was set off in October, when the Senate Finance Committee finally rejected the proposal to tax interest on municipal bonds; but amid heavy market congestion, municipal rates continued to climb in November and December, together with other capital market rates.

Treasury demands on money and capital markets were considerably less in the first half than in early 1968, but the rate of Treasury cash borrowings accelerated in the second half, bringing borrowings of new money to about $18.5 billion for the year. While this totaled $6.5 billion less than in 1968, approximately $14 billion was raised in the second half of the year.

In addition to raising a substantial volume of new cash in the second half, the Treasury also carried out two major refunding operations. In August, it offered an 18-month (7\%\text{-percent}) note to holders of $3.4 billion of maturing notes. Investors exchanged $2.9 billion for the new notes. In October, it refunded $8.9 billion of maturing notes and bonds through the issuance of 20-month (8\%\text{-percent}), 3-year and 8-month (7\%\text{-percent}), and 6-year and 11-month (7\%\text{\frac{1}{2}-percent}) notes. The passage of time more than offset the lengthening effects of these refunding operations, however. As a result, the average maturity of the marketable Federal debt declined slightly from four years in December 1968 to three years and ten months in September 1969.

Federal agencies borrowed heavily in 1969, especially in the second half, applying additional upward pressure on money and capital market rates. Borrowings by the Federal Home Loan Bank and the Federal National Mortgage Association were particularly important. While these agencies were able to curtail their borrowing early in the year by reducing their liquid assets,
they borrowed a record total of $4.2 billion in new money in the second and third quarters, paying progressively higher interest rates.

**International developments**

Last year was a critical period in international finance. Tensions carried over from the previous year grew into crises of major proportions. But to ease the strain, more innovations were made than in the previous two decades, and the year ended on a calm note.

Signs of strain appeared early in the Eurodollar market—the market in dollar deposits outside the United States. As sources of loanable funds in this country contracted under restrictive monetary policy, American banks increased their demand for Eurodollars, raising their borrowings (measured as liabilities to their foreign branches) from $7.5 billion at the start of the year to $14.4 billion in late July. With the increase in borrowings by American banks and the continued strong demand for Eurodollars elsewhere in the world, interest rates on Eurodollar deposits soared to heights at midyear that would have seemed highly improbable a year earlier. To moderate Eurodollar takings by American banks, the Federal Reserve imposed a 10-percent marginal reserve requirement on net liabilities to foreign branches. This requirement, which became effective in September, raised the cost of taking Eurodollars and thereby contributed to a slowing in borrowings by U.S. banks.

In the foreign-exchange market, the position of the French franc weakened. The stability of the franc had been slipping since May 1968, when strikes and student revolts forced sudden increases in wages. As wages increased, higher incomes and production costs forced prices up; and as rising prices and soaring consumption brought ever-larger increases in imports, the French trade balance deteriorated, giving rise to widespread speculation that the franc would be devalued. Capital poured out of the country at accelerating rates—mostly to Germany, on the basis of market expectations that the mark would be revalued. Faced with an outflow of funds they could not stem—even with strict exchange controls—the newly elected French government, in August, quietly devalued the franc more than 11 percent.

Devaluation of the franc did not remove another point of strain that was becoming increasingly apparent. Because the German mark was expected to be revalued once national elections were held in September, it continued to attract speculative flows of funds into Germany, even after devaluation of the franc. When this flow increased before the September 28 election, German authorities first closed the foreign-exchange market briefly and then allowed the value of the mark to float when the market was reopened after the election. In this period, the value of the mark gradually rose by about 7.5 percent, and on October 24, for the second time in the 1960's, the German government formally revalued the mark at a fixed rate, raising its par value 9.3 percent.¹

From a structural point of view, the major innovation in the world payments system was the agreement in the International Monetary Fund in September to begin the distribution of a new form of international reserve—Special Drawing Rights, or SDR's. On January 1, 1970, the first allocations of SDR's were to be made to member countries for use as reserve assets to help in adjusting their international reserve positions. The IMF agreement provides for the creation of $9.5 billion of SDR's over the next three years. In addition, negotiations that are underway are expected to lead to an agreement in 1970 to increases of some $7 billion in IMF quotas (capital contributions from member countries).

¹ The value of the mark was increased 5 percent in 1961. The only other convertible currency to be revalued in the 1960's was the Dutch guilder, also in 1961.
The U.S. balance of payments was adversely affected by a number of developments, worsening sharply, on the liquidity basis, from the small surplus registered in 1968. Factors contributing to the deterioration in the U.S. position included (1) a reversal of “special” financing arrangements with foreign governments, (2) large outflows to the Eurodollar market, (3) much lower foreign inflows into U.S. equity securities and new issues sold abroad to finance direct investments, and (4) larger interest payments on the greatly enlarged borrowing abroad by U.S. banks.

Another factor pressing on the balance of payments was the still-small surplus in the non-military trade balance recorded for the first three quarters of 1969, though the balance improved in the fourth quarter. The trade balance was hard hit by the dock strike. In addition, strong consumer demand continued to attract more merchandise imports.

In contrast to a surplus of $168 million in 1968, on a liquidity basis, the balance of payments showed a deficit in the first three quarters of about $8 billion. The annual rate of deficit in the third quarter was less than in the second, however, and a much smaller deficit is expected in the fourth quarter.

The official settlement balance showed a surplus in the first three quarters of about $1.3 billion, compared with more than $1.6 billion for all of 1968. This surplus reflected the extraordinary rate at which private foreigners were providing funds to U.S. banks through the Eurodollar market. These borrowings slowed down after July, however, and deficits on this balance emerged again.

Despite the deterioration in the balance-of-payments position, U.S. reserve assets — the gold stock, convertible foreign currencies, and the U.S. reserve position at the IMF — increased slightly in 1969. Moreover, foreign official holdings of dollars were much less than they were even two years ago.

**Regional situation**

The five states of the Eleventh Federal Reserve District — Arizona, Louisiana, New Mex-
ico, Oklahoma, and Texas — continued to share in the nation's economic expansion in 1969. Although the percentage increases in some measures of economic activity — industrial production, construction contracts, and retail sales — were smaller than in 1968, the increase in employment was slightly larger and unemployment was low all year.

Texas industrial production increased 5.2 percent last year — a sizable gain and better than the national average but 1 percent less than the increase made in 1968. Where national output peaked at midyear and then eased downward, production in Texas continued to climb. Utilities made the strongest advance, led by electrical utilities. Mining and manufacturing remained strong in 1969 but were up less than in 1968.

Manufacturing output, at an average nearly double the 1957-59 base, was up 5.9 percent in 1969, compared with 6.9 percent in 1968. Production of durable goods increased more than production of nondurables, as has been the pattern of recent years in Texas. Nondurables still account for the largest share of manufacturing in Texas, despite the growth in durable goods. The production of all durable goods increased, but the strongest gains were made in fabricated metal products and machinery. Production of nondurable goods also increased overall, but the gains were uneven. The strongest advances were made in apparel and paper products. Textile mill production declined.

Mining, up 1.8 percent compared with 3.2 percent in 1968, averaged about 26 percent higher than the 1957-59 base. Growth in mining was held back by sluggishness in crude petroleum production. Production of crude petroleum exceeded year-earlier levels in the last half of 1969 but did not match the 1968 output in the first half. Although much slower than the growth in manufacturing, the advance in mining was a healthy continuation of the recent trend in Texas.

To hold crude petroleum production in line with demand, Texas oil allowables were changed considerably during the year. The lowest allowable was in February — 42.8 percent of the maximum efficient rate of production. In June, the allowable was raised to an all-time high of 63.5 percent. In New Mexico, allowables for both the southeastern and northwestern parts of the state were increased to all-time highs in November and December.

The total value of construction contracts in both District states and the United States increased less than in 1968. The weakness in the District was more pronounced, however, as construction contracts were up only about 2 percent, compared with more than 15 percent in 1968. Since construction costs continued to spiral upward in 1969, this small increase in the dollar value of construction contracts probably meant that less physical construction was initiated than in 1968.

Developments in petroleum and agriculture last year are reported in the Business Review, December 1969.
The two basic types of construction — building and nonbuilding — moved in opposite directions, with contracts for residential and nonresidential building increasing while nonbuilding contracts declined. Contracts for residential construction increased nearly 5 percent in the five states in 1969, a gain that was slightly more than the increase for the nation. The increase is attributable to a gain in contracts for multifamily projects. Single-family contracts showed some decline. Higher interest rates and more stringent borrowing conditions restricted construction of single-family homes more than the commercial development of apartment complexes. Financing to build apartments was often made available through equity agreements that gave the lender a percentage of return on the property. Only slightly more housing units were contracted for in 1969, and more of them were apartments than in 1968.

Contracts for construction of nonresidential buildings — new or remodeled commercial, industrial, educational, religious, and governmental facilities — increased more than 7 percent in these states. Although less than half the increase nationally, the gain was greater in these states than in 1968.

In sharp contrast to 1968, when contracts for nonbuilding construction increased 30 percent in the Southwest, awards of these contracts declined in 1969. Nationwide, nonbuilding construction increased more than 10 percent. The decline in the Southwest resulted primarily from a reduction in the value of new contracts for electrical utility construction, which had been particularly strong in 1968; there was more construction of streets and highways than in 1968.

Because of adverse weather, crop production in states of the District fell below the record levels reached in 1968, more than offsetting gains made in cattle production. Higher beef prices and increased marketings of cattle probably offset the decline in crop receipts, however, leaving net farm income in the District at about the 1968 level.

Total nonagricultural employment increased more than 4 percent in the five states last year, compared with slightly less than 4 percent in 1968. While the rate of growth in these two years was fairly similar, there were marked differences in the sources of growth. Where manufacturing employment increased faster than total employment in 1968, the largest gains in 1969 were made in nonmanufacturing. Following the trend
toward greater consumer spending on services, nearly 50,000 new jobs opened in services in 1969, providing an increase of more than 5 percent. In addition to the service increase, the nonmanufacturing increase included sizable advances in transportation, trade, finance, and government. Where substantial gains were made in mining and construction employment in 1968, there were only marginal advances in 1969.

Expanding job opportunities in these states continued to absorb increments in the labor force, as they have for several years, creating a generally tight labor market. The unemployment rate still averaged about 3.4 percent, as it had in 1968. The rate was higher in New Mexico and Louisiana and slightly lower in Arizona, Oklahoma, and Texas.

Despite the impressive gains in employment and income, retail sales in the five District states edged up only about 2 percent in 1969, and much of this increase came in the first half of the year. Since the gain in the dollar value of sales was considerably less than the average increase in prices, the real quantity of goods sold probably declined. Part of the lag was undoubtedly due to the increasing proportion of income spent on services, but much of it was also probably due to consumer resistance to spiraling prices. An increase in the rate of personal saving in the second half of the year suggests consumers were postponing purchases.

Sales seem to have held up better at large department stores than sales of all retailers would indicate. Department store sales increased about 8 percent in 1969, and, in some of the metropolitan areas of the Southwest, sales were up more than 10 percent.

During the course of 1969, banking developments in the Southwest were generally consistent with those that occurred in the nation. The expansion of credit at member banks in the Eleventh District slowed, and total investments and time deposits declined. With loans still expanding, however, and deposits declining, the loan-to-deposit ratio at member banks rose, reaching its high point in December.

Total credit at these banks — loans and investments — increased an estimated 3.5 percent for the year, or at only slightly more than a fourth the rate of gain in 1968. Loans expanded 8.0 percent last year, which was significantly less than the 14.7-percent increase in 1968. But most of the slowdown resulted from a 6-percent decline in total investments.

The decline in total investments can be traced primarily to a 16.5-percent reduction in bank holdings of U.S. Government securities. This
reduction was more than enough to offset the small gain in holdings of other securities. The decline in investments contrasts sharply with increases of 9.8 percent in 1968 and 14.1 percent in 1967.

Total demand deposits declined an estimated 9.0 percent at banks in the District. This was opposed to a moderate gain posted for banks nationwide and to a 15-percent gain posted for banks of the District in 1968. Total time deposits declined 4.5 percent in the District, which was only about a third of the rate of decline nationwide. Most of this decline resulted from the persistent attrition of large CD's, which reached a maximum at midyear and then continued at a diminishing rate for the rest of the year. Negotiable certificates of deposit in denominations of $100,000 or more dropped from $1.6 billion at weekly reporting banks in the District at the end of 1968 to about $1.0 billion at the end of 1969. The loan-to-deposit ratio was above 60 percent throughout 1969, climbing steadily to a peak of about 66 percent in December. Only in two months did the ratio reach 60 percent in 1968, and it never reached that level during the credit crunch of 1966.

Responding to the deposit runoff and strong demand for credit, member banks in the District turned to various sources for funds. Net purchases of Federal funds increased, especially during the summer, when purchases reached record levels. Borrowings from the Federal Reserve Bank increased. On the basis of monthly averages, the high in bank borrowings came in June, when borrowings reached $92.7 million. That was almost twice the monthly peak reached in 1968. Banks also obtained funds by issuing commercial paper, selling loans from their portfolios, and borrowing Eurodollars. The volume of funds from these nondeposit sources peaked in August and then declined until December, when the volume began rising again.