Lawrence Christiano (Northwestern University), Roberto Motto (ECB) and Massimo Rostagno (ECB)

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- Model used in analysis:
 - A DSGE model, as in Christiano-Eichenbaum-Evans or Smets-Wouters
 - Financial frictions along the line suggested by BGG.

Outline

- Rough description of the model.
- Estimation results.
- Explanation of the basic results.











































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iid statistical innovation

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unanticipated component anticipated component of
$$u_t$$
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$$u_t = \underbrace{\xi_t^0}_{\xi_t^0} + \underbrace{\xi_{t-1}^1 + \xi_{t-2}^2 + \ldots + \xi_{t-8}^8}_{\xi_{t-1}^1 + \xi_{t-2}^2 + \ldots + \xi_{t-8}^8}$$

Marginal likelihood

DSGE Baseline

4493.85

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DSGE Baseline

DSGE without Signals

4493.85

4098.43

 Marginal likelihood

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 DSGE without Signals
 4098.43

 DSGE with Signals on Monetary Policy and No
 4427.59

Marginal likelihood **DSGE** Baseline 4493.85 DSGE without Signals 4098.43 DSGE with Signals on Exogenous Spending Shock (g) and No Signals on Risk Shock (σ) 4096 62
News on Risk Shocks Versus News on Other Shocks

Marginal likelihood DSGE Baseline 4493.85 DSGE without Signals 4098.43 DSGE with Signals on Technology Shocks and No Signals on Risk Shock (σ) 4334 47

Monetary Policy

- Nominal rate of interest function of:
 - Anticipated level of inflation.
 - Slowly moving inflation target.
 - Deviation of output growth from ss path.
 - Monetary policy shock.

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- Monetary policy shock.
- Equity shock.
- Risk shock.
- 6 other shocks.

Inference

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- Data: 1985Q1-2010Q2

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- Quantitative measures of importance.
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- Some Direct Evidence on Risk Shocks.



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Percent Variance in Business Cycle Frequencies Accounted for by Risk Shock	
variable	Risk, σ_t
GDP	62
Investment	73
Consumption	16
Credit	64
Premium (Z – R)	95
Equity	69
$R^{10 \text{ year}} - R^{1 \text{ quarter}}$	56

Note: 'business cycle frequencies means' Hodrick-Prescott filtered data.

Why Risk Shock is so Important

• In the model:

– jump in risk, σ_t , generates a response that resembles a recession





















Figure 3: Dynamic Responses to Unanticipated and Anticipated Components of Risk Shock



Looks like a business cycle

What Shock Does the Risk Shock Displace, and why?

• The risk shock mainly crowds out the marginal efficiency of investment.

Why does Risk Crowd out Marginal Efficiency of Investment?



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- When the stock market is included, then explanatory power shifts to financial market shocks.
- When we drop 'financial data' slope of term structure, interest rate spread, stock market, credit growth:
 - Hard to differentiate risk shock view from marginal efficiency of investment view.
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 - Firm-level stock return data in CRSP.





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