

Slow to Hire, Quick to Fire: Employment Dynamics with Asymmetric Responses to News

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
Stanford

“Causes and Macroeconomic Consequences of Uncertainty”
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Motivation

- Cyclical changes in employment growth distributions
 - ▶ aggregate: conditional aggregate volatility
 - ▶ firm level: cross-sectional dispersion

US employment growth



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 - ▶ generate *simultaneous* changes in volatility and dispersion from symmetric and homoskedastic shocks

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 - ▶ Correlated shocks? Cross-section ('micro') vs aggregate ('macro')
- This paper: asymmetric responses to news
 - ▶ generate *simultaneous* changes in volatility and dispersion from symmetric and homoskedastic shocks
- Plan for the talk
 - ▶ explain basic mechanism for countercyclical volatility and dispersion
 - ▶ use establishment-level & aggregate data to test other implications

Key mechanism

Model ingredients

- 1 Firms choose labor given dispersed noisy signals about future profits
 - ▶ noisy signals about future aggregate TFP
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 - ▶ more firms get negative signals & respond strongly
 - ▶ lower mean signal → strong decrease in aggregate employment
 - ▶ higher cross-sectional dispersion

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- Model predictions for employment growth
 - ① time series: countercyclical aggregate volatility and negative skewness
 - ② cross-section: countercyclical dispersion and negative skewness

A simple model

- Continuum of firms
 - ▶ beginning of period: get signal about future profits & choose net hiring
 - ▶ end of period: TFP realized
- Firm i 's log productivity and signal:

$$z_t^i = a_t + b_t^i - \frac{1}{2} (\sigma_a^2 + \sigma_b^2)$$


- Dispersed noisy signals

$$s_t^i = z_t^i + \sigma_\varepsilon \varepsilon_t^i$$

- Decision rule for net hiring $n_t^i \equiv \Delta \log L_t^i$

$$n_t^i = \gamma_t^* s_t^i; \quad \gamma_t^* = \begin{cases} \bar{\gamma} & \text{if } s_t^i < 0 \\ \underline{\gamma} & \text{if } s_t^i \geq 0 \end{cases}$$

Hiring decision rule



Average employment growth

- Average over strong negative and weak positive responses

$$\begin{aligned}\bar{n}_t &= \int n_t^i di = \int_{-\infty}^0 \bar{\gamma} s_t^i f(s_t^i) ds_t^i + \int_0^{\infty} \underline{\gamma} s_t^i f(s_t^i) ds_t^i \\ &= \bar{\gamma} \mathcal{M}^- E[s_t^i | s_t^i < 0] + \underline{\gamma} (1 - \mathcal{M}^-) E[s_t^i | s_t^i > 0]\end{aligned}$$

$$s_t^i \sim N\left(a_t + b_t^i - \frac{1}{2}(\sigma_a^2 + \sigma_b^2), \sigma_b^2 + \sigma_\varepsilon^2\right)$$

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- Effects of changes in aggregate component of TFP
 - ▶ if $a_t \downarrow$, more firms respond strongly to the bad s_t^i , so $\bar{n}_t \downarrow$ by more
 - ▶ if $a_t \uparrow$, more firms respond weakly to the good s_t^i , so $\bar{n}_t \uparrow$ by less

⇒ **negative skewness in time-series** of aggregate \bar{n}_t

⇒ **countercyclical aggregate volatility clustering**: aggregate \bar{n}_t more volatile in periods of negative a_t

Cross-sectional dispersion

- Cross-sectional quartiles of n_t^i monotonic in those of TFP signals

$$Q_3^n = c\gamma^*(Q_3^s)Q_3^s;$$

$$Q_1^n = c\gamma^*(Q_1^s)Q_1^s$$

$$Q_3^s = E(s^i) + 0.67\sqrt{\text{Var}(s^i)}; \quad Q_1^s = E(s^i) - 0.67\sqrt{\text{Var}(s^i)}$$

Cross-sectional dispersion


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
$$Q_1^n = c\gamma^*(Q_1^s)Q_1^s$$

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
- Interquartile range $IQR \equiv Q_3^n - Q_1^n$ **countercyclical**




Illustrative time-series



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Data

- Census data on U.S. manufacturing establishments
- Annual data 1972-2009
 - ▶ 55k obs. per year; 2.1m total
- Employment: sum of production and non-production workers
 - ▶ other information: output, hours, capital, investment, industry, ...
- Here: Focus on employment changes: $n_t^i \equiv \Delta \log(Emp_t^i)$

Employment growth – aggregate and cross section

- Time-series skewness of *aggregate* employment growth:

$$Skewness_{Aggr} = \frac{\frac{1}{T} \sum_t^T (\bar{n}_t - \bar{n})^3}{Vol^{3/2}} = -1 \text{ in data}$$

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- Cross-sectional skewness across establishments

$$Skewness_t = \frac{\frac{1}{N} \sum_{i=1}^N (n_t^i - \bar{n}_t)^3}{Vol_t^{3/2}}$$

- ▶ Data: $Skewness_t = -0.4$ on average; it's negative in almost all years

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- Cross-sectional dispersion across establishments.

$$IQR_t = Q_3(n_t^i) - Q_1(n_t^i)$$

- ▶ Data: countercyclical *IQR*
- ▶ average = 13%, one quarter of the year in NBER recession it \uparrow to 17%
- ▶ doubles in fully recessionary years

Micro-level evidence

- Time-series skewness of *individual* establishment

$$\text{Skewness}^i = \frac{\frac{1}{T^i} \sum_t (n_t^i - \bar{n}^i)^3}{(\text{Volatility}^i)^{\frac{3}{2}}}$$

Micro-level evidence

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- ▶ Data: on average establishment growth is negatively skewed over time

$$\frac{1}{N} \sum_{i=1}^N \text{Skewness}^i = -0.5$$

Micro-level evidence

- Time-series skewness of *individual* establishment

$$\text{Skewness}^i = \frac{\frac{1}{T^i} \sum_t (n_t^i - \bar{n}^i)^3}{(\text{Volatility}^i)^{\frac{3}{2}}}$$

- ▶ Data: on average establishment growth is negatively skewed over time

$$\frac{1}{N} \sum_{i=1}^N \text{Skewness}^i = -0.5$$

- ▶ no evidence of time-series skewness in individual TFP innovations ω_t^i

Table: Time-series volatility and skewness of a typical establishment

Skewness	Variable		
	$d \log(TFP_t^i)$	ω_t^i	n_t^i
Unweighted	-0.05	-0.02	-0.18
Employment-weighted	-0.12	-0.04	-0.50

Empirical test for asymmetric responses

- Model-based test: does establishment's employment growth respond asymmetrically to signals about future shocks?
- Estimate establishment-level TFP z_t^i and recover TFP innovations ω_t^i
- Current unobserved signals show up in average future innovations
$$n_t^i = \alpha + \beta_{pos}\omega_{t+1}^i + \beta_{neg}\omega_{t+1}^i \mathbb{1}\{\omega_{t+1}^i < 0\} + \theta X_t^i + c^i + y_t + \epsilon_t^i$$
 - ▶ Estimates: $\hat{\beta}_{pos} = +0.025^{***}$ $\hat{\beta}_{neg} = +0.099^{***}$
A typical *positive* TFP shock increases employment by 0.5%.
A typical *negative* TFP shock decreases employment by 2.5%.
- Could it be frictions? Hiring/firing cost?
⇒ evidence on hiring frictions suggests only small role ▶ Hiring cost

Model candidates for asymmetry

1 Physical adjustment cost

2 Information processing

- ▶ firm decision makers are ambiguous about quality of signals:

$$s_t^i = z_t^i + \sigma_{\varepsilon,t} \varepsilon_t^i; \quad \sigma_{\varepsilon,t} \in [\underline{\sigma}_\varepsilon, \bar{\sigma}_\varepsilon]$$

- ▶ hiring decision based on 'worst case' expected profits
- ▶ expected profits depend on signal's precision
- ▶ worst-case precision: high for bad news, low for good news

$$n_t^i = \gamma_t^* s_t^i; \quad \gamma_t^* \equiv \frac{\text{var}(z_t^i)}{\text{var}(z_t^i) + (\sigma_{\varepsilon,t}^*)^2} = \begin{cases} \bar{\gamma} & \text{if } s_t^i < 0 \\ \underline{\gamma} & \text{if } s_t^i \geq 0 \end{cases}$$

• How to distinguish?:

- ▶ proxies for physical adjustment cost
- ▶ asset prices: ambiguity implies predictable excess returns

Conclusion

- Objective: endogenous joint changes in distributions
 - ▶ volatility and skewness in aggregate and firm-level employment growth
 - ▶ from symmetric and homoskedastic shocks
 - ▶ model of asymmetric decision rules
- Key mechanism
 - ▶ firms receive dispersed noisy signals
 - ▶ firms optimally respond more to bad than to good signals
- The asymmetric response generates:
 - ▶ countercyclical aggregate and cross-section
 - ▶ negative skewness in the time-series and cross-section
 - ▶ model's key properties consistent with micro and macro data

Appendix: Asymmetric responses & hiring costs

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Sample	ASM
Firms w/ pos. shock	+0.5%*** (0.1%)
Firms w/ pos. shock & hiring constraint	
Firms w/ neg. shock	-2.5%*** (0.3%)
<i>N</i>	1,416k

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$$n_t^i = \alpha + \beta_{pos}\omega_{t+1}^i + \beta_{cstr}\omega_{t+1}^i \mathbb{1}\{\omega_{t+1}^i > 0\} + \beta_{neg}\omega_{t+1}^i \mathbb{1}\{\omega_{t+1}^i < 0\} + \dots$$

Sample	ASM	PCU
Firms w/ pos. shock	+0.5%*** (0.1%)	+0.7%*** (0.2%)
Firms w/ pos. shock & hiring constraint		-0.2% (0.4%)
Firms w/ neg. shock	-2.5%*** (0.3%)	-2.8%*** (0.8%)
<i>N</i>	1,416k	116k