## Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas

## United States Economic Outlook

Current conditions and near-term outlook

Anton Cheremukhin Senior Research Economist
Vistas from Texas: an Economic Outlook, 6/27/18

The views expressed are my own and do not necessarily reflect official positions of the Federal Reserve System.

## Roadmap

- Current conditions: where we are now
- Looking ahead
- A longer-run perspective on the U.S. economy


## Current conditions: Where we are now

## Quick sketch of current conditions

- Economy operating at or near potential
- Continued solid growth in economic activity
- Some headwinds have turned to tailwinds-e.g., overseas growthplus fiscal stimulus
- Labor market tight \& tightening further
- Inflation getting close to the Fed's long-run goal of 2 percent, and has picked up noticeably in recent months


## US Economy operating at or near potential

Bil. chn. 2009 \$


Sources: BEA; BLS; CBO; NBER; author's own calculations.
Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas

## Q2 real GDP growth expected at 3+ percent

- Real GDP grew at a 2.2 percent annualized clip in Q1.
- That's in line with average growth over the past 5 years: 2.3 percent.
- Projections for current quarter, Q2, around 4 percent.

|  | Q2 growth <br> projection |
| :---: | :---: |
| Simple new <br> orders + ADS <br> index model | 3.4 |
| Blue Chip | 3.5 |
| New York Fed <br> nowcast | 3.1 |
| Atlanta Fed <br> nowcast | 4.7 |

## Purchasing manager surveys point to robust growth in manufacturing, services



Source: Institute for Supply Management

Small business survey shows a gradually tightening labor market and markedly improved optimism


Sources: National Federation of Independent Businesses, author's calculations
Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas

## Robust payroll gains continue



Source: BLS, author's calculations

## Unemployment rate now 3.8 percent, well below policymakers' long-run projection



Source: BLS, FRB-FOMC

## Headline PCE inflation slowed in early 2017, now rebounding



## Early 2017 slowing also present in core inflation measures



## Looking ahead

## The view from the FOMC: 2018 and beyond

- At four of the eight FOMC meetings - March, June, September, and December - members give projections for GDP, unemployment and inflation over the coming two or three years
" Last "Summary of Economic Projections" ("SEP") was in June
- As of June, FOMC members saw:
- GDP growth tapering from 2.8 percent to 2.0 percent over 2018 2020
- Unemployment dipping to 3.5 percent in 2019 \& 2020
- Inflation rising to over 2.1 percent
- Slightly stronger outlook compared with March SEP


## GDP growth expected to slow toward long-run potential rate



## Unemployment expected to be in the mid-3s



## Inflation expected to rise to long-run target level



## Fed funds rate expected to rise gradually above 3 percent



## Summing up

- U.S. economy currently experiencing solid growth, a tightening labor market, and - at least over the past several months - inflation rising from subdued levels
- Labor market is strong; important secular trends
- The outlook over the next several quarters is for solid GDP growth that eventually slows to a long-run sustainable rate, unemployment dipping further below 4 percent, and inflation gradually rising to the Fed's long-run 2 percent goal


## A longer-run perspective on the U.S. economy

## Long run overview

- Real output growth has slowed considerably over the past few decades
- Mostly a result of demographics, but also slower productivity growth
- Inflation is also much lower now than it was 25 years ago
- Interest rates are also a lot lower than they were 25 years ago
- Partly reflects lower inflation
- Also lower real (inflation-adjusted) interest rates
- Many of these patterns are not unique to the U.S., may indicate a new normal


## Real GDP growth has slowed over the past few decades



Sources: BEA, author's calculations

## This partly reflects slower labor force growth...



Sources: BLS, author's calculations

## ...but also slower productivity growth since the 1990s



Sources: BEA, BLS, author's calculations

## Average growth rates by decade



## Labor force growth shaped in part by long-run movements in population growth



Sources: BLS, author's calculations

## Labor force participation rose in the 1970s and 1980s, has declined since the 1990s



## Why has productivity growth slowed?

- Not U.S.-specific, happening quite broadly
- Open question, different views on why—some more pessimistic, some more optimistic
- Pessimistic: All the big-impact innovations have already been made
- Optimistic: Innovation comes in waves, takes time for full potential of general purpose technologies to be realized
- Difference between 1.7 percent/year (average of 1980s, 1990s) and 1.0 percent/year (2010s) is huge for long-run well-being
- Do average living standards double every 40 years or every 70 years?


## Inflation rose in the 1960s and 1970s, has fallen since the early 1980s



Sources: BEA, author's calculations

## Long-term nominal interest rates have also declined



## Real interest rates also declined since the 1980s



Sources: FRB Board of Governors, BEA, author's calculations

## The new normal?

- Recent behavior may represent the "new normal"
- Demographics $\rightarrow$ labor force growth around 0.6 percent per year for the next 20 years
- Productivity growth is a wildcard: pace over the past 10 years is 1.1 percent per year.
- Those numbers together $\rightarrow$ GDP growth of 1.7 percent per year
- That's close to the long-run forecast of FOMC members, 1.8 percent growth rate


## The new normal?

- FOMC also assumes low interest rates (nominal and real) are here to stay for awhile; they project a long-run federal funds rate of 2.8 percent
- By comparison, FFR averaged about 4 percent for 15 years prior to Great Recession
- Implies a long-run real rate of 0.8 percent, assuming inflation averages 2 percent
- This is also in the ballpark of what you can extract from Treasury yield curve data


## Thanks for your attention!

## A closer look at the labor market

## Unemployment rate dips below 4 percent; this doesn't happen often!



Sources: BLS, NBER

Shift in age distribution away from young, toward old since 1960s


Demographic shifts make comparison to late 1960s unemployment more subtle than meets the eye


Sources: BLS, author's calculations

## Aging effects on labor force participation



## Long run LFPR projections: Steady decline



## Over past 20 years, LFPRs have fallen for younger, risen for old



Sources: BLS, FRB Atlanta

## In spite of rising LFPR for 55+, aging population means more nonparticipation due to retirement



## Increasing nonparticipation by young reflects more school enrollment



## Downward drift in prime age LFPRs



## Another growing reason for nonparticipation: disability

Percent of 16+ population
—Nonparticipants citing "disability"


## A positive LFPR story: Nonparticipation due to discouragement almost back to pre-recession level

Percent of 16+
population

## Why do falling LFPRs matter?

- Lower LFPR means higher "dependency ratio"-i.e., more non-workers per worker.
- Output per person = (output per worker) x (workers per person)
- For given productivity, lower LFPR reduces output per person $\rightarrow$ lower standard of living.



## One last point on labor market: Declining dynamism

- Declining "dynamism" in US economy
- Lot of effort by economists to understand causes
- Usually thought of as less firm formation \& entrepreneurship
- But also a labor market dimension: less turnover


Source: BLS, Business Employment Dynamics survey

## Long run trend toward less "churning" in the labor market



Sources: BLS, author's calculations; series corrected for 1994 CPS redesign

