

United States Economic Outlook

Current conditions and near-term outlook

Anton Cheremukhin Senior Research Economist Vistas from Texas: an Economic Outlook, 6/27/18 The views expressed are my own and do not necessarily reflect official positions of the Federal Reserve System.


Roadmap

- Current conditions: where we are now
- Looking ahead
- A longer-run perspective on the U.S. economy

Current conditions: Where we are now

Quick sketch of current conditions


- Economy operating at or near potential
- Continued solid growth in economic activity
- Some headwinds have turned to tailwinds—e.g., overseas growth plus fiscal stimulus
- Labor market tight & tightening further
- Inflation getting close to the Fed's long-run goal of 2 percent, and has picked up noticeably in recent months




Q2 real GDP growth expected at 3+ percent

Q2 growth Real GDP grew at a 2.2 percent annualized clip in Q1. projection That's in line with average Simple new growth over the past 5 years: orders + ADS 3.4 2.3 percent. index model Projections for current quarter, **Blue Chip** 3.5 Q2, around 4 percent. **New York Fed** 3.1 nowcast **Atlanta Fed** 4.7 nowcast

Purchasing manager surveys point to robust growth in manufacturing, services




Small business survey shows a gradually tightening labor market and markedly improved optimism




Sources: National Federation of Independent Businesses, author's calculations

Robust payroll gains continue




Unemployment rate now 3.8 percent, well below policymakers' long-run projection




Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas

Headline PCE inflation slowed in early 2017, now rebounding



Early 2017 slowing also present in core inflation measures





Looking ahead

The view from the FOMC: 2018 and beyond

- At four of the eight FOMC meetings March, June, September, and December – members give projections for GDP, unemployment and inflation over the coming two or three years
- Last "Summary of Economic Projections" ("SEP") was in June
- As of June, FOMC members saw:
 - GDP growth tapering from 2.8 percent to 2.0 percent over 2018 2020
 - Unemployment dipping to 3.5 percent in 2019 & 2020
 - Inflation rising to over 2.1 percent
- Slightly stronger outlook compared with March SEP


GDP growth expected to slow toward long-run potential rate






Unemployment expected to be in the mid-3s

Inflation expected to rise to long-run target level



Fed funds rate expected to rise gradually above 3 percent



Summing up


- U.S. economy currently experiencing solid growth, a tightening labor market, and – at least over the past several months – inflation rising from subdued levels
- Labor market is strong; important secular trends
- The outlook over the next several quarters is for solid GDP growth that eventually slows to a long-run sustainable rate, unemployment dipping further below 4 percent, and inflation gradually rising to the Fed's long-run 2 percent goal

A longer-run perspective on the U.S. economy

Long run overview


- Real output growth has slowed considerably over the past few decades
 - Mostly a result of demographics, but also slower productivity growth
- Inflation is also much lower now than it was 25 years ago
- Interest rates are also a lot lower than they were 25 years ago
 - Partly reflects lower inflation
 - Also lower real (inflation-adjusted) interest rates
- Many of these patterns are not unique to the U.S., may indicate a new normal

Real GDP growth has slowed over the past few decades



25

This partly reflects slower labor force growth...




Sources: BLS, author's calculations


...but also slower productivity growth since the 1990s




Average growth rates by decade



Labor force growth shaped in part by long-run movements in population growth




Labor force participation rose in the 1970s and 1980s, has declined since the 1990s



Why has productivity growth slowed?


- Not U.S.-specific, happening quite broadly
- Open question, different views on why—some more pessimistic, some more optimistic
 - Pessimistic: All the big-impact innovations have already been made
 - Optimistic: Innovation comes in waves, takes time for full potential of general purpose technologies to be realized
- Difference between 1.7 percent/year (average of 1980s, 1990s) and 1.0 percent/year (2010s) is huge for long-run well-being
 - Do average living standards double every 40 years or every 70 years?

Inflation rose in the 1960s and 1970s, has fallen since the early 1980s




Sources: BEA, author's calculations

Long-term nominal interest rates have also declined



Real interest rates also declined since the 1980s



The new normal?

- Recent behavior may represent the "new normal"
- Demographics → labor force growth around 0.6 percent per year for the next 20 years
- Productivity growth is a wildcard: pace over the past 10 years is 1.1 percent per year.
- Those numbers together \rightarrow GDP growth of 1.7 percent per year
- That's close to the long-run forecast of FOMC members, 1.8 percent growth rate

The new normal?

- FOMC also assumes low interest rates (nominal and real) are here to stay for awhile; they project a long-run federal funds rate of 2.8 percent
 - By comparison, FFR averaged about 4 percent for 15 years prior to Great Recession
 - Implies a long-run real rate of 0.8 percent, assuming inflation averages 2 percent
 - This is also in the ballpark of what you can extract from
 Treasury yield curve data


Thanks for your attention!

A closer look at the labor market


Unemployment rate dips below 4 percent; this doesn't happen often!



Shift in age distribution away from young, toward old since 1960s



Demographic shifts make comparison to late 1960s unemployment more subtle than meets the eye



41


-Holding age distribution fixed at 1998 -Actual LFPR Percent 66.5 65.6 66.1 62.9 Sources: BLS, FRB Atlanta Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas

Aging effects on labor force participation




Long run LFPR projections: Steady decline

Over past 20 years, LFPRs have fallen for younger, risen for old





Sources: BLS, FRB Atlanta

In spite of rising LFPR for 55+, aging population means more nonparticipation due to retirement




Increasing nonparticipation by young reflects more school enrollment






Downward drift in prime age LFPRs

Another growing reason for nonparticipation: disability



48

A positive LFPR story: Nonparticipation due to discouragement almost back to pre-recession level



Why do falling LFPRs matter?

- Lower LFPR means higher "dependency ratio"—i.e., more non-workers per worker.
- Output per person = (output per worker) x (workers per person)
- For given productivity, lower LFPR reduces output per person \rightarrow lower standard of living.





Federal Reserve

Bank of Dallas

Declining U.S. Labor Force Participation Rates Stand Out

by Alexander W. Richter, Daniel Chapman and Emil Mihaylov


ABSTRACT: Male and female prime-age labor force participation rates have declined in the U.S. at

he U.S. labor force participation factors include less-generous mater the Great Recession. The rate is defined as less spending on on-the-lob retraining the number of neonle either employed or iob-search assistance progra

rate has declined over the past and child-care policies, higher incarc several decades, particularly since tion rates, poorer health outcomes

One last point on labor market: Declining dynamism

- Declining "dynamism" in US economy
- Lot of effort by economists to understand causes
- Usually thought of as less firm formation & entrepreneurship
- But also a labor market dimension: less turnover



Long run trend toward less "churning" in the labor market

